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Introduction: This study was designed to assess current recommendations from child neurologists and epileptologists on masking for school-age children with epilepsy., Methods: A 7-item survey was created and sent out to members of the Child Neurology Society and Pediatric Epilepsy Research Consortium in August of 2021 to assess current practice and provider recommendations on masking., Results: One hundred four individuals participated with representation from all regions of the United States. Masking was recommended by 95.1%, with 63.4% (n = 66) noting exception of those with severe intellectual disability, autism, and behavioral problems. Of those who write exemption letters, 54% write these <5% of the time. Only 3% reported potential adverse events associated with masking., Conclusion: Nearly all respondents recommended masking for school-age children with epilepsy. Potential risks of masking and adverse events were low. Improved guidance on masking is needed to ensure academic success of our patients with epilepsy.

In accordance with the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) located within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has reviewed the list of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety and is republishing that list. As a result of our review, we have added Chapare virus, Lujo virus, and SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) to the list of HHS select agents and toxins. We have also removed from the list of HHS and overlap select agents and toxins, or excluded from compliance with part 73, the agents and toxins described in the Executive Summary. Further, in accordance with Executive Order 13546, "Optimizing the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States," HHS/CDC has designated those select agents and toxins that present the greatest risk of deliberate misuse with the most significant potential for mass casualties or devastating effects to the economy, critical infrastructure; or public confidence as "Tier 1" agents; established new security requirements for entities possessing Tier 1 agents, including the requirement to conduct pre-access assessments and on-going monitoring of personnel with access to Tier 1 agents and toxins; and made revisions to the regulations to clarify regulatory language concerning security, training, biosafety, and incident response. In a companion document published in this issue of the Federal Register, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has made parallel regulatory changes.