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Detection and interdiction of nuclear materials in all forms of transport is one of the most critical security issues facing the United States and the rest of the civilized world. Naturally emitted gamma rays by these materials, while abundant and detectable when unshielded, are low in energy and readily shielded. X-ray radiography is useful in detecting the possible presence of shielding material. Positive detection of concealed nuclear materials requires methods which unequivocally detect specific attributes of the materials. These methods typically involve active interrogation by penetrating radiation of neutrons, photons or other particles. Fortunately, nuclear materials, probed by various types of radiation, yield very unique and often strong signatures. Paramount among them are the detectable fission signatures, namely prompt neutrons and gamma rays, and delayed neutrons gamma rays. Other useful signatures are the nuclear states excited by neutrons, via inelastic scattering, or photons, via nuclear resonance fluorescence and absorption. The signatures are very different in magnitude, level of specificity, ease of excitation and detection, signal to background ratios, etc. For example, delayed neutrons are very unique to the fission process, but are scarce, have low energy, and hence are easily absorbed. Delayed gamma rays are more abundant but "featureless," and have a higher background from natural sources and more importantly, from activation due to the interrogation sources. The prompt fission signatures need to be measured in the presence of the much higher levels of probing radiation. This requires taking special measures to look for the signatures, sometimes leading to a significant sensitivity loss or a complete inability to detect them. Characteristic gamma rays induced in nuclear materials reflecting their nuclear structure, while rather unique, require very high intensity of interrogation radiation and very high resolution in energy and/or time. The trade off of signatures, their means of stimulation, and methods of detection, will be reviewed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Pulsed accelerators are being used for radiographic inspections in homeland security applications. Adding spectroscopic detection capability enables additional information to be extracted but challenges signal processing hardware. This work compares two approaches to cost-effective digital spectroscopy systems designed to handle these high rate scenarios. In the first system, the signal from a PMT is directly digitized and then deconvolved on a PC using standard techniques. Bypassing the preamplifier, this system can handle high count rates (>106 cps) from an LaCl3 detector with no dead time and an energy resolution of 5% at 1.33MeV. Spectra acquired from fission product gamma rays between interrogation pulses are shown. At higher rates, this approach is limited by the DAQ transfer rate to the PC. Instead, we tested a fast ADC (125 MSPS) and an FPGA that performed onboard, real-time digital signal processing (DSP). The energy spectrum is generated on the FPGA board during the measurement and transferred later. This system was tested in nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) experiments. Resonance peaks from NRF reactions are shown. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper compares the results from a GEANT4 simulation of the gas Cherenkov detector 1 (GCD1) with previous simulations and experimental data from the Omega laser facility. The GCD1 collects gammas emitted during a deuterium-tritium capsule implosion and converts them, through several processes, to Cherenkov light. Photon signals are recorded using subnanosecond photomultiplier tubes, producing burn reaction histories. The GEANT4 GCD1 simulation is first benchmarked against ACCEPT, an integrated tiger series code, with good agreement. The simulation is subsequently compared with data from the Omega laser facility, where experiments have been performed to measure the effects of Hohlraum materials on reaction history signals, in preparation for experiments at the National Ignition Facility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]