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The article focuses on the Iraq War and how ignorance by U.S. forces and Iraqis aggravated the conflict. It states that by dismantling the Iraqi army the one working institution in Iraq was destroyed and resulted in tens of thousands of weapon-trained men joining the insurgency. It comments on how Iraqi insurgents initially believed the U.S. military had no staying power and believed that negative U.S. public opinion would force President George W. Bush to withdraw the army. It talks about how the Shi'ite-Sunni war forced U.S. diplomats and military commanders to learn more of Iraq's social and religious complexities and led to General David Petraeus' surge strategy, which included paying Sunni tribes to fight al-Qaeda. INSET: WHAT WE'VE LEARNED.

In this article the author discusses the fact that the U.S. defense department of the presidential administration of Barack Obama is preparing to fight insurgencies in several developing countries. The policy marks a shift in focus from high technology wars likely to be fought in Europe to low intensity combat in under-developed nations. Among other issues the article examines Obama's opinion on the Iraq War versus the conflict in Afghanistan. Offered is a brief history of insurgency warfare in the U.S. going back to the administration of president John F. Kennedy.

The article discusses the potential benefits and disadvantages of the U.S. and Afghan President Hamid Karzai working with moderate members of the Taliban to bring about a peaceful resolution to the Afghan War. The author notes that working with the enemy worked in 2007 when the U.S. and Iraqi government convinced large numbers of Iraqi insurgents to lay down their weapons in return for money and jobs. Some Taliban leaders have rejected the idea of working with Karzai and the U.S.

The article discusses the composition of the Taliban organization, pointing out that it is made up of different elements, including nationalists, gangs led by religious leader Mullah Omar, soldiers, and warlords. The article describes how conflict among different factions led to the emergence of the Taliban. The author describes how the insurgents' common theme became eradicating U.S. troops, offers a history of the progression of the Taliban, and explains the growth of other Taliban factions.

The author reflects on the political campaigns of the candidates competing in the 2008 United States presidential election. The question of which candidate best represents the political ideals endorsed by the "Nation" magazine is addressed. It is noted that Dennis Kucinich, the candidate who represents those ideals most faithfully, has no chance of winning. The hope that an insurgency will influence the election is expressed.

This article reports on the U.S. Army's updated counterinsurgency manual. The manual was prepared with the help of Sarah Sewall of Harvard University and is being emphasized in a publicity push to increase support for the Iraq War. The author argues the tactics recommended take an unjustified toll on civilian populations.

The article discusses the lack of criticism towards the U.S. military over the perceived failure in Iraq. It has been argued that the U.S. military invaded Iraq unprepared for an insurgency, and with no concise occupational strategies. Particular focus is on U.S. General David Petraeus, his potential influence, and his peace-evoking strategies as opposed to the hard-handed strategies of other military officials. Comments from military officials such as General Jack Keane are included.

The article discusses the U.S. military's encounters with insurgent fighters in Iraq. The author profiles a group of Marines in Ramadi, Iraq who encounter violence from insurgent militants practically every day. Blasts from improvised explosive devices have caused several casualties among the group. Relations between the Marines and the Ramadi community are also discussed.

Letters to the editor in response to articles published in the January 9, 2006 edition of "U.S. News & World Report" are presented. Included are responses to the articles "Cracking an Insurgent Cell," and "The Tipping Point?" are included. Also included are responses to the articles "A New South American Bad Boy," and "The Eyes Have It."

This article discusses how long the United States will keep ground troops in Iraq and why. On December 15, 2005 millions of Iraqi civilians voted in the first election of permanent government since the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Most insurgents decided to lay low that day in order to avoid alienating Sunni supporters who had joined the voting after boycotting previous Iraqi elections. INSETS: NO EXIT RAMP IN SIGHT;THANKS. NOW PLEASE GO HOME..

This article focuses on the lack of strategy demonstrated by the U.S. military in Iraq. The U.S. has won every battle in Iraq, but if operations do nothing to further a strategic goal, an army can win every battle and still lose the war. This was the lesson from the Vietnam war worth learning, the author claims. The problem with the Army's approach to Iraq has been confusion regarding the utility of force as an instrument of counterinsurgency. Defeating an insurgency runs through the population.

Focuses on the Iraqi's frustration with the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Failure of the Shiite and Kurdish factions to find agreement with the Sunni negotiators on the constitution, leading to increased support for the insurgency among Sunnis; Polls indicating that 85% of Iraqis want a U.S. withdrawal as soon as possible; Reasons why the Iraqis want the U.S. out, including the widespread destruction and casualties inflicted upon local populations by U.S. forces while they fail to remove resistance fighters.

Focuses on the escalating violence and the deaths of American soldiers in Iraq. Observation that the rebels keep building deadlier bombs; Deaths of Marines in Iraq; Impact of the casualties on U.S. public support for the war; Policy of the President George W. Bush administration in Iraq; Overview of the fighting; How U.S. troops rely on tracked and wheeled vehicles to secure them from enemy attack; The Pentagon's explanation for the rise in casualties; Strategies of insurgents, including use of improvised explosive devices to kill U.S. soldiers; Efforts of a Pentagon task force to outwit the bombers; Expectation that there will be more lethal attacks.

Discusses the U.S. Pentagon's secret new strategy for taking on terrorists. Changes in the approach adopted after the September 11, 2001 attacks; Key features of the new strategy, which examines the nature of the anti-terror war in depth; Definition of the terrorist threat against the U.S. as Islamist extremism, not just al Qaeda; Emphasis on encouraging foreign partners; How the Pentagon will measure its progress in the war against terrorism; Views of the deputy director for the war on terrorism for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Brigadier General Robert Caslen.

Focuses on United States armed forces' efforts to hunt bomb factories used by Iraqi insurgents to manufacture car bombs. Announcement from the Iraqi government that several Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi lieutenants, including the alleged "bomber-in-chief," have been captured; Narrative of a 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry (2-12) raid on a suspected bomb factory southwest of Baghdad; Insurgent cells that the 2-12 has cracked, including an al-Zarqawi bombmaking cell, an Ansar al-Sunnah stronghold, and several nests of former Republican Guard officers.

This article asks if Iraq will be able to rule itself following the elections in January. There is a divide in Iraq on the eve of its ready-or-not plunge into democracy: heady optimism on one street, jittery paranoia down another. In a country roiled by insurgency and sectarian tensions, occupied by a foreign army and populated by citizens largely unfamiliar with the democratic process, this is a time of profound uncertainty. The U.S. and the interim Iraqi government are hopeful that at least half the country's 15 million eligible voters will take part in the election, but no one can predict with any certainty what the turnout will be, especially among the disaffected Sunni population. It's highly likely that the vote will be compromised by violence and plagued by Sunni underparticipation, meaning the legitimacy of the new government will be suspect from the start. Given the vows by the insurgents to step up their onslaught, will next week's elections matter? For Iraqis and Americans alike, much depends on whether the new government can prove that it has real authority, bring disenfranchised Sunnis into the political process and quickly establish itself as a credible body willing to work for national reconciliation. Considering the performance of the current government, headed by interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, chances that the new leadership can impose order aren't great. If it fails, the country could slide into civil war.

Reports on the situation of United States-lead forces in Iraq, where insurgency is running rampant. Plans for a major offensive on Fallujah; Intensity of insurgency, leading to the claim that the insurgents are winning; Details of various attacks by insurgents, making it difficult for United States forces to control the country; Infiltration of Iraqi forces and intelligence gained by insurgents; Belief that victory in Fallujah will reverse the downward trend; Resistance of the Sunni, who, as a minority, feel they will have no power in a new democracy; Repeated claim by Washington, D.C. officials that the insurgency will soon be ended, while insurgency continues to grow. INSET: Iraq: A Reality Check.

Discusses five goals that should be met before the U.S. leaves Iraq. Overview of recent political violence in Iraq, including kidnappings and decapitations of foreigners; Doubts about the future of the American effort in Iraq; Views of President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry; Importance of launching offensives against the insurgency, training Iraqi forces and improving intelligence; Reconstruction efforts; Goal of holding real elections; Outlook for Iraq, if all the suggested goals are achieved.

Reports on civilian casualties in Iraq and how the United States military is addressing the issue. Statistics on the number of people killed in terrorist and insurgents' attacks and U.S. airstrikes; Idea of Iraqis that the U.S. can stop collateral damage, street crime, and terrorist attacks; Indication that the State Department has asked the Pentagon to curtail airstrikes; View of the military that strikes are effective and have reduced American casualties; Mention of reparations; Comments of Iraq's deputy health minister Ammar al-Saffar and others.

Considers the price paid by the United States for the Iraq War. Reference to the U.S. death toll, which has topped 1,000; Strengthening of the insurgency in Iraq; Efforts to train Iraqis to maintain public order; Plans for the Iraqis to hold elections before the end of January; Avoidance of a growing number of towns by United States troops. INSET: The Price We Have Paid.

Provides a close look at the United States effort to defeat Iraq's angry insurgents. Need for offensive operations to be conducted with extraordinary precision and with consideration of the political and psychological ramifications; Concern about the use of multiple car bombs; Expectation that the insurgency will continue; Focus on the commander charged with responding to the day-to-day tumult, General Thomas Metz; Importance of training Iraqi security forces; Importance of improving government services, infrastructure, and the economy.

Reports on the challenges facing occupation forces in Iraq following the release of pictures depicting U.S. soldiers abusing Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib prison. Claim that Iraqis are becoming more opposed to the occupation with each passing week; Description of the photographs; Argument that the abuses are the product of inadequate training and oversight, and a fundamental breakdown of leadership among occupation forces in Iraq; Reactions of President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to the scandal; Report on efforts by U.S. troops to contain Iraq insurgents; Discussion of efforts led by UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi to create a plan for the transition of sovereignty to an Iraqi government on June 30; Claim that manpower shortages could further jeopardize the occupation; Comment by Douglas Feith, under secretary for defense policy, on the Bush administration's commitment to staying in Iraq.

Reports that American officials in Iraq are enlisting the aid of Muslim clerics and other influential tribal and civic leaders in their efforts to bring a peaceful resolution to the uprising in Fallujah. Comment by an American negotiator on six sets of talks that have been held; Background on the political role of religious leaders in Iraq since the toppling of Saddam Hussein; Observation that the U.S. appears to be learning from mistakes made earlier in the occupation, when decisions made without the involvement of the clerics met with opposition; Description of how Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr have used their power to undermine the occupation; Report that the Sunni Association of Muslim Clerics has become increasingly influential, both in provoking, and in reining in, violence.

Looks at life on the front lines for the Marines in Iraq. Ambush against American soldiers in Iraq; Why the Marines are holding back on an all-out assault on Fallujah; Conditions the 200 Marines of Easy Company live in; Fighting the Marines are expecting from the insurgents who have developed a good command structure.

Reports on the reactions of the American public to the ongoing in violence in Iraq and the rising death toll among U.S.troops. Report that polls show that 51% of Americans believe the war is still worth fighting; Discussion about whether the administration of President George W. Bush planned adequately for the occupation; Details of the debate over how many troops are needed in Iraq; Observation that maintaining peace in Iraq is becoming harder for the U.S. military as allies--including Spain--prepare to withdraw, and Iraqi police and security forces are proving ineffective; Speculation about whether the planned handover of sovereignty to Iraqi leaders on June 30 will take place; Details of the security and logistics challenges facing the U.S. occupying forces, and the cost of operations; Discussion of the response of U.S. forces to the insurgency in Fallujah; Speculation about how the demands on soldiers and their family will affect attitudes in their home communities. INSET: CRACKS IN THE COALITION.

The author discusses the threat to stability in Iraq posed by radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, and calls upon the Coalition Provisional Authority to stop Sadr and his followers before they became even more dangerous. The Shia uprising is the disastrous result of a year of miscalculations by L. Paul Bremer and his associates. Isolated in the Green Zone in Baghdad, and ill-informed about Sadr's military muscle, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was essentially presented with two options in dealing with the upstart cleric. One course was to try to bring the cleric into the fold of the occupation. The other was to crack down hard on the cleric and his supporters early on, trying to silence Sadr before his support swelled. Unfortunately, the CPA did neither. Little known to Iraqis when the war began, he burst into prominence immediately after the 101st Airborne Division stormed into Najaf in April 2003; Sadr unleashed a series of fiery speeches against the U.S. occupation from his late father's mosque in Kufa. Then came the killing of Khoie. After Khoie's murder, senior CPA officials, who rarely left central Baghdad, had little sense of how strong Sadr's following was. Even as Sadr's brigades were becoming a serious threat to stability, the CPA did little to equip or train the Iraqi security forces that might have helped stop his army, especially in the Shia south.

Reports on efforts by the U.S. military and coalition forces to control the violence in Iraq. Details of attempts by Iranian mediators to persuade radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to end his uprising; Discussion of the continued violence in Fallujah; Claim that Iraq's reconstituted security forces appear to be disintegrating; Report that many Iraqis are angry about civilian deaths in the attack by U.S. Marines on Fallujah; Comment by Lt. Col. Gary Volesky on the challenges of controlling the uprising in Sadr City; Account of how many ordinary Iraqis appear to be turning on American troops.

Focuses on the attempts of the United States to restore order to Iraq and engineer a credible transition to Iraqi sovereignty. Danger posed to the cause of the United States in spreading democracy to the Middle East; Negotiations of the U.S. military with Iraq insurgents; Resistance from both Sunni and Shiite Muslim groups; Tactics of the insurgency; Response to a series of questions about the situation in Iraq; Number of troops to be sent to Iraq; Possible help from the United Nations; Lessons for the U.S. government.

Offers a look at post-war Iraq in 2004. Suggestions for actions to be taken by the U.S. President George W. Bush administration; Report that anti-Americanism is on the rise in Iraq; Statement that Iraqis are not happy with the U.S. occupation of Iraq; Use of anti-Americanism by political figures such as Moqtada al-Sadr; Mistakes the Bush administration has made in the politics of nation-building in Iraq; Claim that the United States faces the dilemma of how to pull out of Iraq while saving face, maintaining stability and preserving its interests; Discussion of the criticism that the U.S. went into Iraq with too few troops; Failure of U.S. troops to provide order and security for Iraqi citizens; Sense of insecurity in the country; Strength of Iraqi militias; Lack of civilian authorities such as political advisers, engineers, and economists to help the Iraqis rebuild their country; Rejection of United Nations' help by the United States for the rebuilding of Iraq; Statement that the U.S. should have made Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani an ally in order to create legitimacy for the U.S. within Iraq; Problems with the U.S.-picked Governing Council; Steps the U.S. could take to stop the Sunni insurgency.

Reports on fighting between U.S. occupying forces and Sunni and Shiite militants in Iraq, and the debate over how to deal with radical Muslim cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Comparison between the attacks on Americans and the Palestinian intifada; Observation that the reluctance among Coalition Provisional Authority officials to crack down on al-Sadr, who is inciting violent uprisings against coalition troops, arises from the conflict between the dual goals of maintaining order and winning hearts and minds; Background on al-Sadr and his role in inciting violence; Details of the investigation into al-Sadr's role in the killing of moderate Shiite cleric Abel Majid al-Khoei; Claim that the Iraqi grand ayatollahs oppose al-Sadr, and are angry about his recent trip to Iran; Speculation about why the CPA has so far failed to stop al-Sadr.

Reports on the battle engaged by United States forces against insurgents who are challenging President George W. Bush's plan to remake Iraq. Recent surge in violence in Iraq; Threat to the support of the majority Shiites that America has been counting on; Convergence of previously unconnected forces, the Sunni former regime loyalists and the hard-line Shiite Islamists; Depth of anti-Americanism in Iraq.

Examines the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq. Attitudes of the U.S. military and the President George W. Bush administration; Incident in Fallujah where U.S. security personnel were murdered and mutilated; View that Iraq has become a strategic battleground in the war on terror; Iraqi reactions to the U.S. military presence; Outlook for the plan to hand over security to Iraqis; Challenges of bringing the killers in Fallujah to justice; The increased attacks on U.S. troops and civilians; Overview of the violence; How the growing threat to civilians has stalled reconstruction; Impact of the insurgency on the U.S. military; Question of who the insurgents are.

How does a civil servant who has launched a major attack on the Bush presidency protect himself from what he has unleashed? Richard Clarke, the former counterterrorism adviser to Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush--who saw al-Qaeda expand under his watch, attack U.S. interests abroad and produce the deadliest terrorist attack in U.S. history--knew he couldn't pin the blame on his bosses if he didn't start by apologizing himself. Clarke, who quit his job at the National Security Council a year ago, would not have survived Washington's brutal ways in the service of three Presidents if he had not been a good politician. And last week he needed all the political skills he could muster for what he was about to do--direct a missile at the very fortress that so far has protected Bush's presidential advantage in this campaign season: the perception that, for all his faults, Bush has done everything he could to keep the country safe and managed the war on terrorism well. With all the dust flying around Clarke last week, the question ofwhether Washington appropriately handled the terrorist threat tended to get lost. That question is of course the one of greatest interest to the public in the wake of 9/11. In his strongest public statement, to 60 Minutes, Clarke said Bush "ignored" the terrorist threat before 9/11. To the commission he testified, more soberly, that, for the Administration, it was an "important issue but not an urgent issue." the end, the drama produced by Clarke in Washington was not about the last terrorist attack against the U.S. but about the next one. Since it began its work in early 2003, the commission has uncovered huge failings in the national-security system, including how even a presidential order can be misunderstood down the chain of command. But these dangers got lost in a high-stakes political showdown. Unless Washington can focus on them, someone may risk having to ask forgiveness again.

Reports on the return of the United States to Haiti to try to stop the violence, and considers America's exit strategy for this latest conflict. Relation of the present crisis to the U.S.'s meager involvement there in 1994; Expansion of the initial goal of protecting key facilities like the airport; Challenges to the creation of a stable government in Haiti.

Discusses the efforts of Bechtel to oversee U.S. and Iraqi engineers in the projects to restore Iraq. Consideration of the program to rebuild the 12 exchanges which were destroyed during the war; Role of program manager Steve Beuby in the campaign to rebuild Iraq; How Bechtel employees are protected from bullets and bombs; Controversy regarding how much Halliburton charged the U.S. government for various products and services; Impact of the looting and insurgency that followed the demise of the regime of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein; Allocation of work for Halliburton in Iraq's oil fields.

The author reports on his encounters with insurgents in US-occupied Iraq. Welcome to the new Baghdad, and to the vexing little war that now grips central Iraq. After a month of traveling to many of the so-called Sunni Triangle's hot spots, seeing the fighting firsthand and spending time with both the resistance and the US military, I am left with the impression that this is a war that will neither end soon nor dramatically escalate. Instead, the conflict seems to have settled into a lopsided and contradiction-fraught stalemate. On the one hand, aggressive new counterinsurgency tactics--including high-tech surveillance, precision artillery, constant raids, mass detention and the fencing off of whole villages---are doing serious damage to the armed underground. But these same tactics also humiliate and enrage many otherwise pro-US Iraqis, possibly expanding the pool of potential recruits for the guerrillas. Meanwhile, the highly decentralized and secretive resistance has enough popular support and equipment to continue reproducing itself for some time to come. But the insurgency lacks the ideological coherence or organization it would need to grow into a more formidable force. And its tactics, like the Americans', though at times effective, alienate many war-weary Iraqis.