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This study examines the unintended effects of a pre-Reg FD practice that gave a broad group of sophisticated market participants 15-minute earlier access to all corporate press releases than the general public. We find that roughly one-eighth of the price discovery to earnings announcements issued during regular trading hours was due to privileged access to information in earnings press releases, with the 15-minute priority dissemination contributing to just over 50 percent of price discovery from all privileged access. In addition, we find that transient institutions benefited from priority dissemination, especially when the earnings contained good news. Finally, consistent with economic theory, we find that intraday bid-ask spreads decreased post-Reg FD for firms that had sufficient market liquidity to allow trading opportunities during the 15-minute window. Our study has implications for current discussions on whether preferential information distribution by firms and information intermediaries creates an uneven playing field among investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from the EDGAR era, we find a significant market reaction surrounding quarterly periodic reports only when their filing coincides with the first public disclosure of earnings, although that for 10-K reports is not subsumed by earnings releases. However, after eliminating incidence of concurrent earnings releases, the 10-K market reaction is restricted to a quarter of the reports that are filed around calendar quarter-ends. The calendar quarter-end price and volume effects are unrelated to the filing of periodic reports and are not explained by self-selection. However, while the quarter-end volume reaction is indistinguishable between filers and non-filers, we find an incremental price reaction to 10-K filings at calendar quarter-ends in recent times. We provide evidence that the calendar-time effect is partially due to an intra-industry information transfer that is a function of the incidence of 10-K reports at quarter-ends. Finally, equity analyst reactions are muted around periodic filings, with no evidence that they contribute to quarter-end information transfer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]