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Unlike the corporate funds in the US, mutual funds in many countries such as China and Germany operate under a different governance arrangement and are thus called 'contractual funds.' The governance structure of contractual funds allows shareholders of fund management companies, rather than the fund investors, to be responsible for asset management decisions. Therefore, a fund's governance attributes may be especially important in driving its performance. Using a comprehensive governance data covering Chinese mutual funds, this paper finds that the governance and organizational structures of Chinese fund management companies significantly influence the performance of their affiliated funds. In particular, while a larger stake from the top1 shareholder significantly improves the performance of affiliated funds, the presence of multiple largest shareholders reduces their performance. Moreover, fund management companies that offer fewer fund products and charge higher management fees tend to perform better. Finally, more institutional holding in a fund appears to function as an external supervisory surrogate for internal board governance to help improve fund performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the decline in attendance to museums in Galveston, Texas. Information on Galveston; Role played by the Galveston Historical Foundation (GHF) in revitalizing the city's interest in restoring its heritage of historic properties; Number of museum attractions in the city; Factors contributing to the decline in museum attendance; Negative implications of the decline in the museum attractions.