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The article discusses the political significance of law by analyzing the 2020 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the case Department of Homeland Security (DHS) v. Regents of the University of California. Also cited are how the court ruled in favor of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, the court's decision in DHS v. Thuraissigiam, and why the 2020 ruling was not a victory in immigration law.

The article discusses the impacts of American federalism and power on immigration enforcement as of 2015, and it mentions détente in relation to cooperation between U.S. federal and local law enforcement. The Arizona state government's attempt to augment U.S. federal immigration enforcement efforts is examined, along with the U.S. Supreme Court case Arizona v. United States which deals with federal power and an immigration federalism concept. U.S. President Barack Obama's views are assessed.

The contours of our federal system are under constant negotiation, as governments construct the scope of one another's interests and powers while pursuing their agendas. For our institutions to manage these dynamics productively, we must understand the value the system is capable of generating. But no single conception of this value exists, because the virtues and costs of any particular federal-state relationship, in any given federalism controversy, will appear different depending on perspective: the federal, state, and even local will each perceive their own advantages. And none of these conceptions will map perfectly onto the people's perceptions. In this essay, I attempt to answer the question of what federalism might be good for from each of these perspectives by considering how it has structured various regulatory and social controversies in recent years on matters such as immigration, marriage equality, drug policy, and health care reform. I focus on the administrative and enforcement judgments that each of these debates has required, in order to illuminate the discretionary spaces in which much of the work of federalism occurs. I argue that the value of the system common to all participants and that should govern the negotiation of inter-governmental relations is its creation of a framework for ongoing negotiation of differences large and small. In the spirit of this Feature, I emphasize that having many institutions with lawmaking power enables overlapping political communities to work toward national integration, while preserving governing spaces for meaningful disagreement when consensus fractures or proves elusive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In considering what it means to treat immigration as a "civil rights" matter, I identify two frameworks for analysis. The first, universalistic in nature, emanates from personhood and promises non-citizens the protection of generally applicable laws and an important set of constitutional rights. The second seeks full incorporation for non-citizens into "the people, " a composite that evolves over time through social contestation--a process that can entail enforcement of legal norms but that revolves primarily around political argument. This pursuit of full membership for non-citizens implicates a reciprocal relationship between them and the body politic, and the interests of the polity help determine the contours of non-citizens' membership. Each of these frameworks has been shaped by the legal and political legacies of the civil rights movement itself, but the second formulation reveals how the pursuit of immigrant incorporation cannot be fully explained as a modern-day version of the civil rights struggle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article proposes recalibrating the separation of powers between the political branches in the context of their regulation of immigration law's core questions: how many and what types of immigrants to admit to the United States. Whereas Congress holds a virtual monopoly over formal decisionmaking, the executive branch makes de facto admissions decisions using its discretionary enforcement power. As a result of this structure, stasis and excessive prosecutorial discretion characterize the regime, particularly with respect to labor migration. Both of these features exacerbate pathologies associated with illegal immigration and call for a structural response. This Article contends that Congress should create an executive branch agency, marked by indicia of independence, to set visa policy-an avenue increasingly contemplated by reformers. Though it may seem counterintuitive, delegation of greater authority can help constrain executive power by substituting a transparent process, subject to monitoring, for decisionmaking that occurs hidden from view. Delegation can also help overcome limitations in the legislative process that contribute to the current regime's dysfunction, making immigration policy more efficient and effective. The Refugee Act of 1980 provides a parallel that is helpful in thinking through what it would mean to delegate ex ante admissions power to the executive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on immigration reform and civil rights legislation in the U.S. It offers the three frameworks of understanding the phenomenon of illegal immigration including civil rights paradigm, mutual benefit framework and rule of law agenda. It emphasizes the ability of civil rights, mutual benefit and rule of law to continue to shape public deliberation over the nature of immigrant future.

The core substantive principle of democracy is that those subject to the law should have a voice in its formulation—a principle of consent realized primarily through the mechanism of the vote. Yet the populations of few (if any) nation-states consist solely of formal citizens; migration and transnational practices give rise to populations within states bound by laws over which they have no direct control. In this essay, I consider a practice that can help address this potential democracy deficit—alien suffrage. I focus on three jurisdictions that have adopted some form of noncitizen voting in their histories—the United States, New Zealand, and Ireland—and consider how their practices reflect on the processes by which constitutional democracies construct their polities. Alien suffrage is not inconsistent with a sense of national identity nor does it necessarily diminish the cultural value of the vote. At the same time, the adoption of the practice may not be part of a robust regime of immigrants’ rights nor is it necessary to promote participation by noncitizens. Whether a society adopts alien suffrage, however, does reflect that regime's particular constitutional values and structures, as well as assumptions about the manner and pace at which the body politic ought to incorporate noncitizens. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The plenary power doctrine sharply limits the judiciary's power to police immigration regulation - a fact that has preoccupied immigration law scholars for decades. But scholars' persistent focus on the distribution of power between the courts and the political branches has obscured a second important separation-of-powers question: how is immigration authority distributed between the political branches themselves? The Court's jurisprudence has shed little light on this question. In this Article, we explore how the allocation of regulatory power between the President and Congress has evolved as a matter of political and constitutional practice. A long-overlooked history hints that the Executive has at times asserted inherent authority to regulate immigration. At the same time, the expansion of the administrative state has assimilated most executive policymaking into a model of delegated authority. The intricate immigration code associated with this delegation framework may appear at first glance to limit the President's policymaking discretion. In practice, however, the modern structure of immigration law actually has enabled the President to exert considerable control over immigration law's core question: which types of noncitizens, and how many, should be permitted to enter and reside in the United States? Whether Congress intended for the President to have such freedom is less important than understanding that the Executive's power is asymmetric. The President has considerable authority to screen immigrants at the back end of the system through enforcement decisions, but minimal control over screening at the front end, before immigrants enter the United States. We argue that this asymmetry, in certain circumstances, has pathological consequences that Congress could address by formally delegating power to the President to adjust the quotas and admissions criteria at the heart of immigration law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the social status of the Latin American people in the U.S. It states that Latinos are said to be in good position in the society in which they use the tools designed for the African American who struggle for equality. The author asserts that scholars and lawmakers must understand the status of Latino population within the U.S. polity and adds that demographic power comes with political power and with political power comes responsibilities.

The author criticizes the individualized consideration in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the case Grutter versus Bollinger stating that the University of Michigan Law School in Ann Arbor have the right to deny the admission of Cuban student Barbara Grutter on the basis of race. She stresses that individualized consideration promotes racial discrimination in decision making. She contends that individualized consideration hinders the long-term objectives of reducing race-based stereotyping. She advocates the use of rules instead of standards.

The article provides an analysis on the agendas and interest of Latino immigrants in the U.S. According to the article, Hispanic's position as a group in the political community of the state needs solution in fighting against the integration of new immigrants. In addition, it relates two significant preferences on the interest and preferences of Latino Americans in the nation.

In this piece, I tackle a current subject of popular controversy—whether growing multilingualism in the United States imperils the future of American democracy. I offer a positive theory, centered on the value of democratic participation, of how a society like the United States should approach the multilingualism of its population. I conclude that embracing bilingualism in individuals and multilingualism in society is more likely to make linguistic pluralism socially functional and to sustain the vitality of public and social institutions than demanding public monolingualism. I begin by demonstrating that current approaches to language diversity in constitutional democracies, including our own, are largely remedial in nature. They focus either on ensuring the survival of particular minority groups historically present and marginalized in a given nation-state, or on helping immigrants overcome language barriers as they assimilate into the dominant language of the society in question. On its own, this remedial conception cannot ensure that linguistic diversity complements, rather than undermines, democratic institutions, because it does not account for the variety of linguistic interests present in a multiethnic society. I then ad- dress this limitation by offering an alternative, participatory theory of language difference. I base my conception of participation on principles of decentralized decisionmaking. This focus requires considering how to expand the individual's associative options and improve access to the mid- level social institutions where we live out most of our lives, such as the workplace and the public schools. In accommodating speakers of multiple languages in a given institution, we should focus on promoting social investment by individuals and groups, as well as preserving individual control over matters of deeply personal concern, rather than on the survival of particular languages or cultures. In developing this framework, I draw from the experiences of other multilingual societies and legal systems, but I present the United States as a case study to explain what a participatory approach would look like in practice. I focus on the major sites of language conflict in the United States—the political arena, the debate over official English, the workplace, and the public schools—and argue that a multilingual understanding of these sites and the legal rules that structure them best promotes participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Medical meetings are a tool to help physicians advance and update their medical knowledge. Their quality is the responsibility of colleges and institutions., Objective: To assess and compare the academic level of four different annual rheumatology meetings., Material and Methods: As a source of information, we used the abstracts published in the supplements of the journal Reumatología Clínica, SE1 Vol. 12, issued in February 2016, SE 1 Vol. 13 issued in February 2017, the electronic application of the 2016 ACR/ARHP of the 2016 American Congress of Rheumatology, devoted to the works presented at the 44th Mexican Congress of Rheumatology (CMR 44), the 45th Mexican Congress of Rheumatology (CMR 45), and the 2016 ACR/ARHP Annual Meeting (ACR 2016), as well as the Web page on the files and abstracts of EULAR 2017, respectively; from each work we compiled information on the major disease being referred to, the type of information provided and the type of report. We should point out that some were combined conditions or designs, from which we selected that which we considered to be the most important., Results: In all, 275, 340, 3275 and 4129 studies were submitted to the XLIV Mexican Congress of Rheumatology, XLV Mexican Congress of Rheumatology, the 2016 ACR/ARHP Annual Meeting and EULAR 2017, respectively. Rheumatoid arthritis was the most common disorder, dealt with in 23%, 26%, 21% and 27% in CMR 44, CMR 45, 2016 ACR and EULAR 2017, respectively, followed by systemic lupus erythematosus; in third place, Mexican congresses reported trials related to systemic vasculitis, whereas spondylitis was the main subject of international congresses. In the case of rheumatoid arthritis, clinical topics accounted for 30% in the Mexican congresses and ACR, and nearly 20% in EULAR. Observational studies accounted for 40% in the Mexican congresses vs. 33% in 2016 ACR and 55% in EULAR 2017. Studies on basic science were minimal in the Mexican congress, whereas in 2016 ACR, they represented 21% and 12% in EULAR 2017., Conclusion: Rheumatology meetings constitute a tool to obtain adequate evidence-based medical knowledge in this important branch of medicine. For our Mexican Congress, we should encourage collaborative efforts between institutions, which will result in a greater number of controlled studies, clinical trials and basic studies that support the quality of the congress. We wish to emphasize that a greater diffusion of other musculoskeletal diseases is needed, not only autoimmune diseases, since the former represent an important percentage of the daily practice., (Copyright © 2018 Sociedad Española de Reumatología y Colegio Mexicano de Reumatología. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. All rights reserved.)