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Objectives The objective of this study is to explore President Obama's nominations to the lower federal courts and compare his patterns to those from George W. Bush and William Jefferson Clinton using a typology established by Goldman in 1997. Methods Using data from 1993 to 2012 provided by the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy, we examine a series of cross-tabulations to make our comparisons. Results The data indicate that President Obama has nominated more women and minorities to the federal bench than either of his two immediate predecessors. Additionally, his nominees possess more moderate ideological preferences than the nominees from either Bush or Clinton. Conclusions These results demonstrate that Obama seems more concerned with racial and gender diversity rather than ideological preferences. Therefore, President Obama's claims of pragmatism and his desire to nominate individuals who reflect American society, often doubted by both political supporters and detractors, appear supported by the available data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do state supreme court judges render decisions according to their ideological preferences, or are they constrained by the language of state statutes? Using data from the Judge-Level State Supreme Court Database, the authors analyze the votes of individual judges from 1995 to 1998 to determine whether their behavior is constrained by legislation. The results indicate that more detailed language (resulting in statutes with higher word counts) significantly limits the discretion afforded to liberal judges while simultaneously facilitating the ideological voting of their conservative colleagues. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Congress passes statutes defining particular areas of the law, but the Supreme Court can interpret those statutes. This tension over the meaning of the rule of law has profound implications for democratic theory and the separation of powers. Though scholars have examined whether the Supreme Court issues decisions against the preferences of Congress, there has been little focus on whether legislators can constrain the Court. Our study examines how much discretion Congress provides in statutes it enacts into law. Our basic argument is that ideological decision making by Supreme Court justices depends upon the level of discretion Congress incorporates into the law. The greater the discretion, the less constraint federal judges and justices will encounter, making them more likely to vote according to their individual ideologies. Conversely, more detailed statutes will reduce the judges' discretion. Using data on 1953-96 Supreme Court decisions, our analysis supports this model of contingent discretion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the hierarchical relationship between the district courts and the courts of appeals influence decision making at the trial level? Do these judges anticipate responses by appellate panels and condition their decisions based on these expectations? Using a sample of district court cases from 1925 to 1996 that were subsequently reviewed by the courts of appeals, and incorporating a strategic choice statistical framework, I discover that the district courts are constrained by the anticipated responses of the appeals courts. However, this conclusion is not apparent if one analyzes the data using traditional maximum likelihood methods. Only when empirical analyses specifically model underlying strategic relationships does one discover this constraint. If the federal trial judges anticipate a negative response on appeal, then they curtail their ideological influences (the magnitude of influence decreases by approximately one-half). This pattern remains consistent when one examines civil liberties and economic cases, but not for criminal cases. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary appears to exert a significant constraint on the district courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the struggle between the legislative and judicial branches by focusing specifically on congressional influences on the behavior of federal judges. We argue that Congress may constrain individual judicial behavior by passing statutes containing detailed language. To test this thesis we borrow from the bureaucratic politics literature to introduce and test a new measure of statutory constraint. Using data from the U.S. Courts of Appeals we find that appellate court behavior is constrained significantly by statutory language, although this constraint is asymmetric across ideology. We discover substantial differences between Democratic and Republican appointees both in terms of statutory constraint and ideological voting. The data indicate judges appointed by Democratic presidents are constrained by statutory language in criminal cases. Similarly, Republican appointees are constrained by statutes in civil rights cases. Yet, neither Democrats nor Republicans are constrained in economic cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the September 11th attacks, questions regarding the relationship of civil liberties to foreign affairs have received renewed salience within our society. This paper reviews historical patterns of decision-making in the U.S. Supreme Court and the courts of appeals when confronted with questions of individual rights versus the government's ability to engage in foreign relations. Using an original dataset of federal cases from 1946 to 2000, this Article examines the influence of competing preferences and constraints (i.e., individual rights versus security) on judicial behavior. The empirical results indicate that traditional notions of ideology and preferences over security concerns significantly affect the federal judicial system. However; examinations of individual court levels reveal that the lower courts respond more to security concerns, whereas the Supreme Court is influenced solely by ideological proclivities. Scholars of the judiciary who do not account for these additional dimensions may not adequately capture the complete decision-making processes across the judicial system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes foreign affairs litigation in the United States Courts of Appeals. Understanding of how the judiciary operates in the foreign relations scheme; Influence of competing preferences on decision making; Paradoxical dilemma facing judges in foreign policy cases; Theoretical expectations for judicial behavior.