1. Does prospective payment influence quality of care? A systematic review of the literature.
- Author
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Pott C, Stargardt T, and Frey S
- Subjects
- Humans, United States, Quality of Health Care, Hospitalization, Outcome Assessment, Health Care, Motivation, Prospective Payment System
- Abstract
In the light of rising health expenditures, the cost-efficient provision of high-quality inpatient care is on the agenda of policy-makers worldwide. In the last decades, prospective payment systems (PPS) for inpatient care were used as an instrument to contain costs and increase transparency of provided services. It is well documented in the literature that prospective payment has an impact on structure and processes of inpatient care. However, less is known about its effect on key outcome indicators of quality of care. In this systematic review, we synthesize evidence from studies investigating how financial incentives induced by PPS affect indicators of outcome quality domains of care, i.e. health status and user evaluation outcomes. We conduct a review of evidence published in English, German, French, Portuguese and Spanish language produced since 1983 and synthesize results of the studies narratively by comparing direction of effects and statistical significance of different PPS interventions. We included 64 studies, where 10 are of high, 18 of moderate and 36 of low quality. The most commonly observed PPS intervention is the introduction of per-case payment with prospectively set reimbursement rates. Abstracting evidence on mortality, readmission, complications, discharge disposition and discharge destination, we find the evidence to be inconclusive. Thus, claims that PPS either cause great harm or significantly improve the quality of care are not supported by our findings. Further, the results suggest that reductions of length of stay and shifting treatment to post-acute care facilities may occur in the course of PPS implementations. Accordingly, decision-makers should avoid low capacity in this area., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest None, (Copyright © 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)
- Published
- 2023
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