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The Seven Years' War worked as a catalyst of mutations already present before the hostilities. The case is particularly palpable when we consider the transformation of American, British, and French political culture between 1756 and 1763. In America, William Pitt's colonial policy based on partnership led after the peace to a huge disappointment in America and a growing tension with London. Eventually, it paved the way for the revolt of the Sons of Liberty. In Great Britain, the ideological and political consequences of the war were no less dramatic. Pitt's patriot policy, which was in many respects a mirror of the colonists' political culture based on the same republican principles, brought a decisive contribution to the birth of radicalism after the peace. Last but not least, French political culture was deeply affected by the conflict. A new conception of the political role of the French people emerged during the war, leading to the transformation of the subjects of Louis XV into self-proclaimed citizens willing to offer spontaneously their services for the common weal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the COVID‐19 virus first arrived in the United States in early 2020, many epidemiologists and public health officers counseled for shutdowns and advised policymakers to prepare for a major pandemic. In 2020, though, US society was rife with major political and cultural divides. Some elected leaders promoted policies at odds with the experts, and many people refused to heed the public health‐based communications about the coming pandemic. Additionally, the capacity to respond to a pandemic was distributed in the country in a highly unequal fashion. This paper analyzes the noteworthy geopolitical patterns of COVID‐19 illnesses, subsequent demands on hospitals, and resulting deaths. This description is based on a snapshot of archival data gathered in the midst of the pandemic during late January and early February of 2021. Demographic data, indicators of political party support, indicators of citizen attitudes, and public health compliance behaviors are combined in a multivariate analysis to explain COVID‐19 outcomes at the local government (county) level. The analysis suggests strongly that regional political culture and local demographics played a substantial role in determining the severity of the public health impact of the COVID‐19 pandemic. Key points: During the early stages of the COVID Pandemic, regional political culture and local demographics played a substantial role in determining the severity of the public health impact of the COVID‐19 pandemic.Race, as measured by the percent white of a county, was the single strongest predictor of COVID outcomes.Preparing for future pandemics requires us to address social and economic inequality in our society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Decades ago, research described American political culture in terms of consensus. Contemporary research, however, reaches opposite conclusions, arguing that the "culture war" that now defines American politics stems from value disagreements among partisan and ideological groups. What factors are at work in this transition from consensus to dissensus? This manuscript pulls from two literatures—one on American core political values and another on partisan-ideological sorting and affective polarization—and argues that the term dissensus best describes value preferences among individuals whose partisan and ideological identities are aligned. Among others, however, preferences on core political values are largely in consensus. First, using data from 2006 and 2019 and fitting geometric models of value preferences, I show that strong value disagreements exist primarily among sorted partisans. Next, I explore possible implications of such alignments and find that relationships among value preferences, political attitudes, and political behaviors are significantly stronger in sorted partisans. I close with a discussion of how theories undergirding affective polarization and partisan-ideological sorting can help the discipline better understand value conflict in the American mass public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes how five Norwegian news media outlets cover Black Lives Matter (BLM) in the United States. Examining media coverage of BLM in other countries allows media scholars to begin to draw comparative conclusions. The analysis shows that in contrast to much of the U.S. news media, Norwegian news media are clearly positively disposed toward BLM, which I suggest may be related to Norway's political culture, journalistic praxis, and geographical distance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on the political culture of rural areas in the U.S. He discusses the problems occurring in Columbus County, North Carolina and the lack of policy intervention in the county. He argues that the evidence of separation of these rural areas from the modern society, such as poverty and local oligarchy, are the effects of political and economic integration. He also tackles the assumption by liberal Democrats that they cannot build political power or win elections in these rural areas.

The author explores the concept of political trust. Topics discussed include the problem of political trust in the U.S., the conception of political trust into political and legal philosophy, an account of interpersonal trust, the concept of social trust, the understanding of social and political trust in the empirical literature, and the causes and consequences of political trust.

This study aims to answer the question of how political cultures of respective countries affect policy learning processes. Using historical and contextual information about the political cultures of the United States and Germany and with applications of the advocacy coalition framework and cultural theory, this study finds that the originally American business improvement district (BID) institutional form was adopted in Germany when its political culture was open to it. German policy makers adopted the provisions of the U.S. laws that were compatible with their secondary beliefs, which were related to where and how to deliver local services. They did not directly adopt the BID governing models in the U.S. laws, which were based on the American deep core and policy core beliefs. Instead, they adapted the American models to their own Hegelian deep core beliefs and the hierarchical political core beliefs, which resulted in the formulation of the " Aufgabenträger " (task performer) model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The endless struggle between two seemingly incompatible but occasionally convergent concepts, namely liberal values and national interests, has determined United States (US) foreign policy and its implementation throughout the nation's history. Based on the neoclassical realist assumptions shored up by the methodological insights offered by the five-dimensional pre-theory of foreign policy, this article reveals a persistent dichotomy in US foreign policy through the analysis of Washington's response to the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Throughout history, US foreign policy has had a pendular behavioral pattern, swinging across a policy spectrum ranging from moralpolitik to realpolitik. While the inherent values-interests dilemma lies at the root of the inveterate oscillation of US foreign policy, the interplay of international stimulus and societal factors stands out as the principal source of its ambivalence, if not inconsistency, in the face of the upheavals that swept across the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spread and defense of liberal values are one of the main elements of American foreign policy. The five features of value-based foreign policy that the United States developed and implemented are analyzed in this study. First, American decision-makers have claimed that the value-based foreign policy is beneficial for both the United States and humanity. Second, most of the time, they addressed short-term American interests by invoking values in foreign policy. Third, while carrying out policies inspired by values, they determined the methods and tools in a way that puts American interests first. Forth, they made revisions in them when they faced with serious costs. Lastly, pursuing value-based foreign policy is inspired by American political culture. This article claims that these features have made the value-based foreign policy unique to the United States. They have also contributed greatly to its constant application. Unless radical changes occur in American domestic policy and world politics, a great shift is unlikely in American conceptualization and practice of value-based foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021 was extraordinary. Analysts and commentators quickly attributed the attack as having been motivated by "populism" without much nuance or recognition of the diversity of voices and attitudes embedded in the insurrection. This commentary assesses the populist ideas and attitudes expressed by the insurrectionists in an effort to understand why they felt drawn to Washington, D.C. that day, as well as why they felt their attack on the U.S. Capitol was legitimate. In so doing, it addresses the particular ways the insurrectionists framed and legitimated their attack (at least to themselves). The January 6 insurrection was an extraordinary attack on American democracy, but it was related to deep themes and elements of US political culture. Understanding those dynamics is crucial to preventing such attacks in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the diplomatic history of the U.S. through a discussion of the career of Louisiana senator Pierre Soulé. The author reflects on the development of U.S. nationalism and political culture in the Democratic party during the antebellum era. Emphasis is given to topics such as Soulé's conflicted support for slavery, territorial expansion, and his appointment as minister to Spain under the administration of president Franklin Pierce.

Institutional change is typically studied at the organizational field level; we leverage political culture to examine how the context in which these fields are embedded influence processes of institutional change within such fields. Specifically, we look at the effect of conservative political culture on legitimation and adoption of crowdfunding in the United States. We find that crowdfunding is less popular and more slowly legitimated in conservative regions. However, we also find that crowdfunding's legitimacy is more important in these regions and that once a legitimacy threshold is reached, the adoption of crowdfunding in conservative regions surpasses that in liberal regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the resettlement of refugees is always politically contentious in host countries, the current global refugee crisis has only magnified those contentions. In the United States and in many European countries, there has been a strong backlash against the resettlement of refugees—particularly those from Muslim-majority countries. However, within countries such as the United States, there are areas of the country that are more anti-refugee than others. The purpose of this article is to explore the variation in refugee resettlement across the 50 US states from 2002 to 2010. Refugee resettlement in the United States is done in conjunction with the federal government, religious and secular non-profits, and state governments. Some states are far more hospitable to refugee resettlement than others and this article explores the political, economic and social factors that influence the number of refugees resettled in each state. We find that states with a moralistic political culture resettle the most refugees but more liberal states do not resettle more refugees than conservative states. Also, states with a better quality of life resettle more refugees but so do states with higher poverty rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: This study aims to determine if attitudes toward the bureaucracy affect trust in government. Trust is a topic of interest in several disciplines but theory and empirical work are not well integrated with one another. Methods: I extend previous work to create a macro‐level measure of attitudes toward the bureaucracy, bureaucratic approval, and then use time‐series analysis of aggregate public opinion to model trust in government from 1973 to 2018. Results: I find that bureaucratic approval does affect trust in government, controlling for other important factors, and that the magnitude of this is comparable to that of congressional approval and consumer sentiment. Conclusion: This study provides the first evidence that aggregate attitudes toward the bureaucracy affect trust. Moreover, bureaucratic approval is modestly favorable and has not substantially declined over time like congressional approval. I discuss the implications of the findings of this study for using the bureaucracy to improve trust in government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few have written so astutely about the difficulty of being both socialist and American as did Irving Howe. Seeking a "conciliation" between socialism's solidaristic values and America's culture of self-reliant individualism, Howe warned that the American democratic Left could not survive unless it made its peace with America's "Emersonian" mood. Yet he found Emersonianism too "airy" and appreciated the "thicker" teachings of Hawthorne and Melville and of European writers steeped in biblical stories. Although his efforts to reach a conciliation with individualism were problematic, Howe at times suggested a better way to reconcile socialism with American political culture: a solidaristic ethic beyond liberal individualism, drawing on the marginal but persistent fraternal themes in American political culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political attacks against scientists and scientific research are nothing new, though the Trump Administration appears to have increased both the breadth and the depth of such attacks. What is new, it seems, are attacks on science that are not in service of protecting any identifiable regulated industry. Under the Trump Administration, the attacks on science are more systemic, and aimed more at reducing scientific capacity in the federal government, rather than mere one-off policy interventions to help an individual industry. This Article suggests that the Trump Administration, more than previous administrations, has sought to use science as part of a political culture war, reviving a populist suspicion of intellectuals that has a long and cyclical history in American culture. This current episode of anti-intellectualism, while targeting social science as past episodes have, has also uniquely targeted the biological and physical sciences, the difference being that findings in these fields are more firmly grounded in empirical fact than in the social sciences. The Trump Administration's attacks on science, writ larger, are non-epistemic in nature, seeking to build an ideology of hostility to science. This strategy builds upon a decades-long and continuing misinformation campaign to discredit climate scientists but goes further and seeks to portray scientists as part of the "deep state" that is conspiring to victimize Americans. To be sure, federal funding for most research unrelated to industry regulation remains robust, even higher in some programs. But a manufactured suspicion of "regulatory science" (relating to industry regulation) has begun to bleed ominously over into policy arenas completely outside of regulation. The Trump Administration's policy meanderings to deal with the COVID-19 crisis are emblematic of a growing and systemic subjugation of science to political objectives, ones that can be bizarrely unscientific. A number of cultural, political, and economic factors contribute to this latest resurgence of anti-intellectualism, one with a unique animus towards the hard sciences. A restoration of endangered and broken societal norms governing the advancement of science will require vigorous enforcement of federal administrative laws but will also require the development of government policies that address the cultural, political, and economic roots of this latest crisis of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As traditional news outlets decline and corporations cultivate publisher ambitions, brand journalism (i.e., native advertising and content marketing) has grown robustly. This paper examines and critiques the various ways in which those corporations have adopted and mirror news production practices, given the "techno-logics" of convergence culture and the political economy pressures of our media era. The research draws upon 28 in-depth interviews with brand journalism professionals who operate in the United States along with years of trade press coverage of the phenomenon. Findings illustrate how brand journalism is informed by traditional reporting fundamentals and techniques, the affordances and demands of online environments, and industrial shifts in media labor allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

History is a word for a certain kind of reasoning: reasoning about time, about human agency, and about material records that can provide information about humans as marked by time. For many scholars—not to mention many of those outside the academy—such reasoning is antithetical to the word religion. No matter how many books prove incontrovertibly that the authors of the Talmud engaged rigorously with Greek philosophy, or that Islamic philosophers contributed to the formation of modern scientific practice, or that evangelical readers engaged significantly with Biblical criticism, scholars of religion have not (and perhaps finally cannot) upend the common perception that religion is not a site of reasoned thought, but rather a space where reason is suspended. "Religion is too important to be left in the hands of people who believe in it. Finally, historians are coming to grips with this simple truth," David A. Hollinger opined in response to reports about the flurry of scholarly interest in religion as an effect in the modern United States. It is a good quip, but one that portrays the historian as an axiomatically rationalist hero, swooping into medieval confusion in order to give clarifying accounts of the truth behind puzzling theologies, curious myths, and archaic rituals. Hollinger suggests that religious people or religious historians cannot do this work. Believers by his lights are not to be trusted with the reasoning history demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mayor's office potentially offers a launchpad for statewide and national political ambitions. We know relatively little, however, about how frequently mayors actually run for higher office, and which mayors choose to do so. This article combines longitudinal data on the career paths of the mayors of 200 big cities with new survey and interview data to investigate these questions. While we find that individual and city traits—especially gender—have some predictive power, the overwhelming story is that relatively few mayors—just under one-fifth—ever seek higher office. We suggest that ideological, institutional, and electoral factors all help to explain why so few mayors exhibit progressive ambition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine to what extent and in what ways teachers and families from an elementary school perceived the 2016 U.S. presidential election and subsequent presidency as influencing classrooms and children. Participants included 4 teachers and 10 families from the 2nd-6th grade classes. Teachers participated in interviews and families completed online questionnaires. Analysis of the data resulted in identification of five themes focused on teaching government to children, intergenerational transmission of political attitudes, classroom context and child characteristics, emotion, and time and the chronosystem. This article includes a presentation of these themes as well as discussion of assertions and reflections based on the findings of the study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does variation in political culture affect citizens' perceptions of political incivility? We theorize that Britons, being socialized into a political culture that is more permissive of uncivil political conversation than are Americans, will therefore be less sensitive to political incivility. We test for this variation by randomly exposing Britons and Americans to video clips of either civil or uncivil televised political debates. Results provide mixed evidence that Americans tend to perceive larger differences between civil and uncivil exchanges than Britons, indicating that they are calibrated to a different range of what constitutes civil political behavior. However, although Americans' perceptions of incivility span a wider range than Britons', Americans do not perceive politics overall as being more uncivil. These findings suggest that citizens' attitudinal and behavioral responses to uncivil behavior in political campaigns may be conditioned by varying norms of political civility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an introduction to a roundtable comprising three papers and a discussion considering the interweave of psychoanalysis and social and political life. Prepared for a 2017 conference in Prague, the three papers (and one discussion) address political and social changes in Central Europe and globally as they effect internal conscious and unconscious experience. The roundtable centers on how changes in political order, and in the environment, past and present, produce ongoing new and renewed trauma in citizens, both locally and globally. The introduction sets this work in the context of the 2017 conference and the subsequent election of Donald Trump to president of the United States, speaking to the unsettled "radioactive" effects of social and political change on the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this brief polemic we argue that Trump's words, actions and inactions are potentially deeply damaging to the legitimacy of the office he holds and to the continuity of the institutions defining that position. This, writ large, is an issue for organization theory. We use Searle's concept of status functions to argue that Trump invokes problems of status dysfunction. He has failed to place himself in a position to be competent and does not conform to expectations of the role of president, his presidency is characterized by disorganization and he has not become presidential. This is important in the context of US political culture and institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The weakness of the antigun lobby in the United States is attributed to the "collective action problem" of trying to mobilize "free riders" behind a public purpose. But the Coalition for Gun Control emerged in Canada to successfully lobby for the Firearms Act of 1995. If the "collective action problem" is not limited to the United States, then are its effects "mediated" by political culture? To address this research question, we content analyze (1) media coverage, (2) party platforms, (3) presidential, and (4) ministerial rhetoric. Three frames represent "restrictive" gun policies that ban or regulate firearms, "punitive" gun policies that penalize the person for the unlawful use of firearms, or "lenient" gun policies that encourage gun ownership and gun rights. Marked differences in framing the gun debate help explain why an antigun coalition emerged in Canada but not the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

debates over the citizen's political role in a republic. A liberty pole was a wooden mast with a flag or sign that expressed opposition to the government as tyrannical. During the American Revolution, Patriots raised liberty poles to symbolize their resistance to British rule. In most cases, redcoats tore them down, eliciting fights with Patriot pole-raisers. In the 1790s, grassroots Republicans revived the practice of raising liberty poles to protest the Washington and Adams administrations as monarchists and tyrants. Echoing the British response, the Federalist supporters of government destroyed the poles, leading to vicious confrontations in both person and print. Using a case study drawn from Reading, Pennsylvania in 1799, this essay argues that liberty poles operated as the flashpoint for conflict over the place of protest in the new nation among grassroots partisans. Republicans advocated for an activist citizenry that aimed to impede any unjust exercise of federal power. Federalists, however, argued that representative government implied an obligation for citizens to defer to their elected officials. By raising and destroying liberty poles, both sides put into practice the type of popular participation they envisioned for the republic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper aims to analyze the political acceptance of the concept of security as it helps understanding the issue of national and global security. Power is the most influential factor that determines the behavior of states in the international system and therefore it is the main enemy concerning global peace and order. It is worth to highlight how strategic culture can improve the perception of security. Each state focuses upon its own interests and this aspect does not guarantee that the other states will cooperate for maintaining peace and world order and this situation is continuously feeding the global insecurity. This study focuses on the concept of political culture of the United States analyzing the relationship between culture and politics within the framework of the political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores selected aspects of the linkage between political culture and the change-agent organization. Daniel Elazar's characterization of the American states as having predominately a traditionalistic, moralistic, or individualistic political culture was taken here as a measure of state political culture. State planning and development agencies were identified as change-agent organizations. The analysis examined the effect of the cultural context on state governmental innovation, fiscal support for change-agent organizations, the character of organizational activity, and the presence or absence of organizational boards. The findings indicate that variations in the character of the cultural context affect all of these factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A significant undiscussed problem with the leading conceptualization of ideologically based judicial behavior, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth’s attitudinal model, is its lack of theory. This problem leads to circular reasoning, ad hoc coding adjustments, and inaccurate characterizations and explanations of case outcomes, judicial votes and ideologies, and trends in judicial behavior. A values-based theory of ideology, such as the cultural theory pioneered by Mary Douglas, Michael Thompson, Aaron Wildavsky, and others, can help remedy this problem. Applying this cultural theory to First Amendment cases, we find that political cultures valuing equality, order, and liberty provide a more accurate account of judicial decisions than labeling them liberal or conservative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Students of American politics are indebted to Richard Fenno's pathbreaking work, Home Style, published four decades ago. But, given the book's widespread acclaim, few have taken Fenno's prescription to go back home with members of Congress to heart. In this essay, I echo Fenno's call for scholars to become participant-observers of the political process while offering the modern "soaker and poker" a guide to the pitfalls and opportunities of pursuing such a research project. I respond to Fenno's methodological treatise, written as the appendix to Home Style, focusing in particular on gaining access and how to remain publicly engaged while observing a competitive Senate campaign. I discuss how changes in American political culture create additional wrinkles for participant observation that must be considered, especially if scholars chose to remain engaged in public outreach. I conclude by addressing the need to consider carefully the ethics of engaging the political world we study, particularly in the light of the Stanford-Dartmouth experiment scandal rocking Montana in the weeks preceding the state's 2014 judicial elections. We may not all do participant observation, but we should follow Fenno when considering the implications of interfering in the political world as we study it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the foreign relations of the U.S. and Germany. Topics mentioned include the perception of German on the foreign policies of U.S. President Donald Trump, the transatlantic partnership of Germany and the U.S., and the effects of political culture of two countries in their relationship. Also mentioned are immigration policy of two countries and the importance of their international cooperation.