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In recent decades an infusion of economics has lent the study of strategy much needed theory and empirical evidence. Strategy consultants, armed with frameworks and techniques, have stepped forward to help managers analyze their industries and position their companies for strategic advantage. Strategy has come to be seen as an analytical problem to be solved. But, says Montgomery, the Timken Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School, the benefits of this rigorous approach have attendant costs: Strategy has become a competitive game plan, separate from the company's larger sense of purpose. The CEO's unique role as arbiter and steward of strategy has been eclipsed. And an overemphasis on sustainable competitive advantage has obscured the importance of making strategy a dynamic tool for guiding the company's development over time. For any company, intelligent guidance requires a clear sense of purpose, of what makes the organization truly distinctive. Purpose, Montgomery says, serves as both a constraint on activity and a guide to behavior. Creativity and insight are key to forging a compelling organizational purpose; analysis alone will never suffice. As the CEO--properly a company's chief strategist--translates purpose into practice, he or she must remain open to the possibility that the purpose itself may need to change. Lou Gerstner did this in the 1990s, when he decided that IBM would evolve to focus on applying technology rather than on inventing it. So did Steve Jobs, when he rescued Apple from a poorly performing strategy and expanded the company into attractive new businesses. Watching over strategy day in and day out is the CEO's greatest opportunity to shape the firm as well as outwit the competition.

If a dam springs several leaks, there are various ways to respond. One could assiduously plug the holes, for instance. Or one could correct the underlying weaknesses, a more sensible approach. When it comes to corporate governance, for too long we have relied on the first approach. But the causes of many governance problems lie well below the surface--specifically, in critical relationships that are not structured to support the players involved. In other words, the very foundation of the system is flawed. And unless we correct the structural problems, surface changes are unlikely to have a lasting impact. When shareholders, management, and the board of directors work together as a system, they provide a powerful set of checks and balances. But the relationship between shareholders and directors is fraught with weaknesses, undermining the entire system's equilibrium. As the authors explain, the exchange of information between these two players is poor. Directors, though elected by shareholders to serve as their agents, aren't individually accountable to the investors. And shareholders--for a variety of reasons--have failed to exert much influence over boards. In the end, directors are left with the Herculean task of faithfully representing shareholders whose preferences are unclear, and shareholders have little say about who represents them and few mechanisms through which to create change. The authors suggest several ways to improve the relationship between shareholders and directors: Increase board accountability by recording individual directors' votes on key corporate resolutions; separate the positions of chairman and CEO; reinvigorate shareholders; and give boards funding to pay for outside experts who can provide perspective on crucial issues.

What differentiates truly great corporate strategies from the merely adequate? How can executives at the corporate level create tangible advantage for their businesses that makes the whole more than the sum of the parts? This article presents a comprehensive framework for value creation in the multibusiness company. It addresses the most fundamental questions of corporate strategy: What businesses should a company be in? How should it coordinate activities across businesses? What role should the corporate office play? How should the corporation measure and control performance? Through detailed case studies of Tyco International, Sharp, the Newell Company, and Saatchi and Saatchi, the authors demonstrate that the answers to all those questions are driven largely by the nature of a company's special resources--its assets, skills, and capabilities. These range along a continuum from the highly specialized at one end to the very general at the other. A corporation's location on the continuum constrains the set of businesses it should compete in and limits its choices about the design of its organization. Applying the framework, the authors point out the common mistakes that result from misaligned corporate strategies. Companies mistakenly enter businesses based on similarities in products rather than the resources that contribute to competitive advantage in each business. Instead of tailoring organizational structures and systems to the needs of a particular strategy, they create plain-vanilla corporate offices and infrastructures. The company examples demonstrate that one size does not fit all. One can find great corporate strategies all along the continuum.

Diagnostic criteria for hepatoproliferative lesions of Fischer 344 rats are presented to permit more complete categorization of the spectrum of lesions observed in two-year chemical carcinogenicity studies. A nomenclature recently adopted by the National Toxicology Program differs from previous classification schemes in that hepatocellular hyperplasia and hepatocellular adenoma are to be used for lesions which were previously combined under the diagnosis of neoplastic nodule. The term hyperplasia is reserved for proliferative lesions that are perceived to be secondary, nonneoplastic responses to degenerative changes in the liver. Foci of cellular alteration, hepatocellular adenoma, and hepatocellular carcinoma are believed to represent a spectrum of changes that comprise the natural history of neoplasia. This change in nomenclature was made subsequent to a peer review of representative hepatoproliferative lesions from two-year carcinogenicity studies. The revised nomenclature is consistent with traditional pathologic diagnoses for proliferative lesions in other epithelial tissues and should facilitate the interpretation of conventional toxicity and carcinogenicity studies in rats. Morphologic features of other selected rat liver lesions are also presented.