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This study uses four qualitative ‘tests’ designed by another researcher, Ryan Hendrickson, to test if the U.S. intervention in Panama in 1989 was a case of diversionary war. These tests were used by Hendrickson to find that several cases of the use of force by President Clinton were not diversionary uses of force. Here it is found that the invasion of Panama was most likely to be a kind of diversionary intervention--an intervention motivated by a need to solve domestic political problems in the U.S. rather than to achieve strategic goals or preserve U.S. national interests in Panama. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How and why did the executive branch successfully inflate the threat from Iraq in 2002-2003? Some scholars have proposed that the shocking event of 9/11 predisposed the public to psychologically inflate the threat and made it willing to rashly lash out at any threat. Other scholars have argued that the executive branch institutionally has preponderant power in the marketplace of ideas, so can successfully inflate threats. This paper argues that through "issue ownership" and the use of militarized "patriotism" the executive branch cornered and silenced its political opponents in 2002, and militarized patriotism stifled and muffled prominent critique by the mainstream media. Despite the strong "taboo" against fully vetting "strong" military policy, there is strong evidence the "threat inflation" was not actually very successful--and it was imperative for the administration to "rush to war" and garner the patriotic "rally effect" to create the illusion of overwhelming support for the invasion. Understanding these critical pieces of the puzzle leads to policy prescriptions very different from other scholar's findings on the Marketplace of Ideas. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]