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Disagreements about the value of the utility discount rate-the rate at which our concern for the welfare of future people declines with their distance from us in time-are at the heart of the debate about the appropriate intensity of climate policy. Seemingly small differences in the discount rate yield very different policy prescriptions, and no consensus "correct" value has been identified. We argue that the choice of discount rate is an ethical primitive: there are many different legitimate opinions as to its value, and none should receive a privileged place in economic analysis of climate policy. Rather,we advocate a social choice-based approach in which a diverse set of individual discount rates is aggregated into a "representative" rate. We show that performing this aggregation efficiently leads to a time-dependent discount rate that declines monotonically to the lowest rate in the population. We apply this discounting scheme to calculations of the social cost of carbon recently performed by the US government and show that it provides an attractive compromise between competing ethical positions, and thus provides a possible resolution to the ethical impasse in climate change economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Greater use of renewable energy is seen as a key component of any move to combat climate change, and is being aggressively promoted as such by the new U.S. administration. Yet there has been little economic analysis of renewable energy. This article surveys the literature on the economics of renewable energy and adds to it. The conclusion is that the main renewables face a major problem because of their intermittency (the wind doesn't always blow nor does the sun always shine) and that this has not been adequately factored into discussions of their potential. Without new storage technologies that can overcome this intermittency problem, much of the decarbonization of the economy will have to come from nuclear, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and energy efficiency, with geothermal and biofuels making small contributions. Nuclear and CCS are not without their problems. New energy storage technologies could greatly increase the role of renewables, but none are currently in sight. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We develop a game-theoretic model of strategic interdependence and tipping in public policy choices and show that the model can be estimated by probit and logit estimators. We test its validity and applicability by using daily data on state-level COVID-19 responses in the United States. Social distancing via shelter-in-place (SIP) strategies and wearing masks emerged as the most effective nonpharmaceutical ways of combatting COVID-19. In the United States, choices about these policies are made by individual states. We develop a game-theoretic model of such choices and test it econometrically, confirming strong interdependence in the implementation of these policies. If enough states engage in social distancing or mask wearing, others will be tipped to follow suit. Policy choices are influenced mainly by the choices of other states, especially those of similar political orientation and to a lesser degree by the number of new COVID-19 cases. The choice of mask-wearing policies is more sensitive to peer choices than the choice of SIP policies, and Republican states are much less likely than Democratic to introduce mask-wearing policies. The choices of policies are influenced more by political than public health considerations. These findings emphasize strategic interdependence in policy choice and offer an analytical framework for these complex dynamics., Competing Interests: Competing interests statement:The authors declare no competing interest.