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The article discusses the mission of Raoul Wallenberg, as the secretary of the 1944 Swedish delegation to Hungary, to coordinate humanitarian relief for the Jews of Europe during the Jewish Holocaust. The genesis of Wallenberg's mission, which resulted from a request to Sweden's government by the U.S. government's War Refugee Board (WRB), is discussed. The Soviet Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Vladimir G. Dekanozov's assertion that the Soviets would protect Wallenberg in Hungary is discussed. An overview of Wallenberg's disappearance in 1945, which resulted from his arrest by the Soviets, is provided.

The article presents an examination into the history of foreign relations between Hungary and the United States during the 1930s up to 1941 under the administration of the U.S. ambassador Herbert C. Pell. Introductory information is provided detailing Pell's political career in Europe prior to being stationed in Hungary. Pell's attitudes towards Hungary and his position are reviewed. Accounts are then given describing the deterioration between the two nations despite Pell's efforts as World War II accelerated in 1941.

The article discusses relations between the U.S. and Hungary during and after the Second World War. The author reflects on Hungarian foreign policy directed by prime minister Miklós Kállay to redirect loyalty away from Germany and provide intelligence to the Allies and the U.S. in their war efforts. Emphasis is given to the postwar international status of the communist regime of leader János Kádár and the diplomatic process of normalizing relations with the West. U.S. policy aimed at not destabilizing Soviet satellite countries is noted. Other topics include repatriation of the Holy Crown under U.S. president Jimmy Carter, the influence of Hungarian émigrés on U.S. policy, and U.S. loans to Hungarian financial institutions.

This article examines US-Hungarian bilateral relations from the Hungarian declaration of war on the United States in 1941 to the collapse of the communist system in 1989. It deals with bilateral issue from both the American and the Hungarian angles on the basis of archival sources from both countries. Throughout the period bilateral relations were subject to changes in world politics. Hungary was never an independent actor -- being under the influence of Germany and then the Soviet Union -- and the United States was unable to assert its political will in the sphere of influence of another great power. Even though -- as sources reveal -- the Hungarian public's attitude was generally favorable and even friendly towards the United States, and Washington regarded the majority of Hungarian public to be generally favorably disposed towards the United States, with the exception of the 1945-1947 period relations ranged from hostile to uneasy accommodation but never cooperation. The United States viewed Eastern Europe in the paradigm of national self-determination and continental stability. Stability always had priority over self-determination; Washington supported self determination in case that condition seemed compatible with stability. This was the case between 1948 and the early 1960s; in that period Washington sought to roll back the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe to enhance Western security and stability. In 1942-1944 Hungary sought to jump out of the war in the hope that it could avoid both evils: German and Soviet invasion of the country. Hungarian strategy was built on erroneous assumptions: namely that the Anglo-Americans would invade the Danubian Basin and would count on Hungary as a bastion against Bolshevism. Even though Hungary, which was allied to Germany, performed some services to the Allied (including intelligence gathering) and was the last haven for European Jewry, Washington made it clear that it could offer no inducements to Hungary. In fact Washington and its allies sought to force Hungary (as well as Romania and Bulgaria to jump out of the war) in order to elicit their invasion by the Wehrmacht so as to relieve the Western theater or war. Winning the war dictated post-war planning as well: in order to secure Soviet cooperation in winning the peace, Washington accepted an open sphere of influence in Eastern Europe for Moscow. Hungary was not immediately written down; the US hoped to keep it economically open to the West. But Washington had no leverage on Moscow; Stalin opted for an exclusive sphere in Eastern Europe at the expense of cooperation with his former allies. The weakness of the Hungarian democratic opposition dampened American enthusiasm for championing Hungary's independence; US inaction convinced the Hungarian to give in to the Soviets. In 1956 the revolution presented an opportunity to roll back the Soviets from Eastern Europe, a prime objective of American foreign policy since 1948. Since military intervention was ruled out, the US hoped that it could work out a political solution for Eastern Europe o the basis on Finlandization. But simultaneously -- even though the State Department deemed armed struggle against the Soviet suicidal -- US propaganda urged the Hungarians to fight possibly in the hope that self-liberation would work. The failure of 1956 spelled the end of liberation; from the early 1960s the earlier policy of destabilizing Eastern Europe to maximalize Western security was changed to one of consolidating the communist regimes. Instead of isolating them bridges would be built for trade and cultural contacts. This policy met with Hungary's economy-driven desire to open up to the West and the US in particular. But for a long time the policy of bridge-building was little more than rhetoric just like Budapest's claim that it wanted normal relations with the West. From the mid sixties it became apparent that the US accepted the European status quo. Washington still pushed for domestic reform and external autonomy to make the continent more stable but gave up the idea of eventual continental reunification. From the early 1970s the policy of engaging the East Europeans economically and culturally overcame political and security obstacles. Hungary sought foreign loans to modernize its economy and thereby consolidate its political system. In order to do so Kadar opened the country to Western cultural penetration and thrust the country into a indebtedness. Hence he inadvertently undermined the system he wished to consolidate. In 1989 when events spiraled out of the control of the ruling party, which gradually relinquished its monopoly of power, the West, including the United States, anxious to keep Gorbachev in power and to safeguard European stability, sought to keep a lid on transformation in Eastern Europe. The Bush administration's position was to support political reform and economic transformation without, however, challenging the Soviet Union's security interests in Eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]