1. Fuzzy Math, Disclosure Regulation, and Market Outcomes: Evidence from Truth-in-Lending Reform.
- Author
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Stango, Victor and Zinman, Jonathan
- Subjects
FUZZY mathematics ,CONSUMER credit ,INTEREST rates ,PRICE discrimination ,TRUTH in Lending Act ,LEGAL compliance ,DISCLOSURE laws - Abstract
We posit that consumer lenders shroud interest rates and market “low monthly payments” to price discriminate on “fuzzy math” or “payment/interest bias”: consumers' pervasive tendency to underestimate borrowing costs when an interest rate is not disclosed. We test whether mandated disclosure changes lenders' ability to price discriminate using within-household interactions between payment/interest bias and policy-induced variation in the strength of Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) enforcement across lenders and time. Weak TILA enforcement substantially widens the gap between rates paid by more-biased and less-biased borrowers. TILA compliance costs appear to increase interest rates overall, making the net effect on interest rates ambiguous. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]
- Published
- 2011
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