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Human Reliability Program (HRP) is a set of procedures, protocols, and the corresponding performance of activities to support and sustain the secure and safe operation of a facility. Our review indicated that HRP is referred to by various names, such as, Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), Trustworthiness Program, and Fitness for Duty Program, with PRP being the most common amongst them. A brief description of the evolution of HRP and its components for Finland, Japan, Jordan, Nigeria, Russia, US, and UK is provided. Details of the Trustworthiness Program by the International Atomic Energy Agency are also provided. Most of the HRPs have similar components and implementation steps with few variations, and they all have identical objectives. Even though a structured HRP may not exist in Indian civil nuclear energy facilities, an account of various HRP components practiced in India is discussed. The HRP review provided should help security practitioners and academics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the United States, along with many other countries, has significantly increased its detection and defense mechanisms against terrorist attacks. A potential attack with a nuclear weapon, using nuclear materials smuggled into the country, has been identified as a particularly grave threat. The system for detecting illicit nuclear materials that is currently in place at U.S. ports of entry relies heavily on passive radiation detectors and a risk-scoring approach using the Automated Targeting System (ATS). In this article we analyze this existing inspection system and demonstrate its performance for several smuggling scenarios. We provide evidence that the current inspection system is inherently incapable of reliably detecting sophisticated smuggling attempts that use small quantities of well-shielded nuclear material. To counter the weaknesses of the current ATS-based inspection system, we propose two new inspection systems: the Hardness Control System (HCS) and the Hybrid Inspection system (HYB). The HCS uses radiography information to classify incoming containers based on their cargo content into 'hard' or 'soft' containers, which then go through different inspection treatment. The HYB combines the radiography information with the intelligence information from the ATS. We compare and contrast the relative performance of these two new inspection systems with the existing ATS-based system. Our studies indicate that the HCS and HYB policies outperform the ATS-based policy for a wide range of realistic smuggling scenarios. We also examine the impact of changes in adversary behavior on the new inspection systems and find that they effectively preclude strategic gaming behavior of the adversary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]