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The article analyzes Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases involving China, and China's anti-bribery law. Topics discussed include the provisions of the FCPA, anti-bribery provisions and agencies enforcing bribery and corruption in China, and the country's business culture and the economic system. Also mentioned are the differences between China's anti-bribery laws and the FCPA, and the wide-array of potential FCPA violations.

The regulation and control of bribery and corrupt practices by globally active corporations has become a matter of increasing concern in recent years. For many years the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) has stood as a model for other countries. Other countries have been slow to introduce improved anti-bribery laws and have often only been prompted to review their laws and practices in this area as a result of major corporate scandals. The passage of the UK Bribery Act (2010) has now provided a more broad-ranging model that has built upon prior experiences, such as in the USA, as well as upon advances in regulatory theory. Multilateral efforts, such as by the G20, have also become more important in encouraging countries to enhance global anti-bribery mechanisms. This paper critically examines this national and multilateral regulatory experience and discusses difficulties that individual states, such as Australia, have had in responding to the need for more effective anti-bribery laws and enforcement mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the issues on the issues surrounding extraterritorial corruption, along with solutions for mitigating the same in the U.S. Topics dicussed include enactment of U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and Great Britain Bribery Act for addressing the same; laws governing transnational bribery in the country; and shortcoming of current criminal law models in eliminating the same.

Governing transnational corporate behaviour is a challenging area that has been canvassed in much academic literature. Transnational corporations make extensive use of regulatory arbitrage and corporate structures in order to avoid or mitigate the reach of legal and regulatory governance. Moreover, international soft law standards that encourage multinational corporations to be more responsible are not always effective or enforceable. Against this context, we explore an emerging regulatory trend in corporate regulation that has the potential to overcome some of the currently perceived limitations in the regulatory governance of transnational corporations. There is an intensifying trend in adopting procedural regulatory strategies for corporations. This involves prescribing various control systems and processes that corporations have to institute, such as compelling them to develop due diligence requirements within their commercial operations. We suggest this is a new milestone in ‘new governance’ design that we call ‘procedural legalisation’. Procedural legalisation is being adopted at an unprecedented level in financial sector and corporate regulation, and offers a new promise in changing corporate culture and behaviour, possibly addressing longstanding limitations in effectively regulating corporations. We present two case studies to explore how procedural legalisation is applied to regulate corporations in the financial sector and in anti-bribery. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In a unanimous opinion in McDonnell v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated the conviction of the former Governor of Virginia on charges of bribery and called attention to the critical role that bribery laws play in democratic government. Bribery laws fulfill this function by determining what actions of governmental officials are, and are not, for sale. Bribery laws also undergird the Court's campaign finance cases. Campaign finance doctrine rests on the assumption that a legitimate campaign contribution is distinguishable from a bribe, at least in theory. But is it? In order to answer this question, we need a theory of bribery. This is no easy task. This Article offers a new theory of bribery according to which agreements to exchange official acts for something else only constitute bribery when the value exchanged for the political act is something external to politics. According to this "external value" account, trading a legislative vote for money is bribery, while trading it for another vote is not. An "external value" theory of bribery explains why campaign contributions are controversial. Contributions can be seen as money or politics. However, recent Supreme Court cases treat giving money to the campaigns of political candidates and elected officials as a central form of political participation. But if the campaign contribution is a purely political act, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish a campaign contribution from a bribe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits bribery of foreign public officials in order to obtain or retain business. It is, for all intents and purposes, an anti-bribery statute. To detect bribery, the FCPA contains accounting provisions related to bookkeeping and internal controls. The books and records provision requires issuers to make and maintain accurate books, records, and accounts; likewise, the internal controls provision requires that issuers devise and maintain reasonable internal accounting controls aimed at preventing and detecting FCPA violations. If one considers the analogy that bribery is the "fire" in FCPA enforcement actions, and books and records violations are the "smoke," internal controls are the "smoke detectors. ". The government is increasingly punishing, or threatening to punish, companies for the potential ineffectiveness of these "smoke detectors." Internal controls violations arguably are not substantive violations, but instead are violations arising out of the potential for other violations. The recent increase in the number of enforcement actions alleging violations of the internal controls provision in the absence of any correlating anti-bribery provision violations suggests that enforcement of the Act has (d)evolved to a place well beyond its stated purpose. Additionally problematic is that the internal controls required by the FCPA are not a fixed standard but instead a fairly ambiguous set of recommendations and guidelines that depend on the characteristics of each company and industry. The result of this is overcriminalization and overenforcement of the statute by the government, and overcompliance by the private sector. This Article addresses the alarming shift in the interpretation of the breadth of the statute by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DO)), and discusses the vast theoretical ramifications of this overcriminalization and overenforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the shortcomings in the current methods of prosecuting international commercial bribery in the U.S, definition of commercial bribery and its impact. It mentions the inadequacies in current U.S. laws to tackle the menace of international commercial bribery. It mentions U.S.' laws including Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Robinson-Patman Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

The article focuses on the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) which followed an extensive Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the investigation and voluntary disclosure. It mentions that FCPA regulates international corruption using two approaches such as accounting provisions and the anti-bribery provisions and the criminal and civil penalties. It also mentions that in-house counsel seeking consultation on the design and implementation of compliance programs.

The article examines the domestic anti-bribery initiatives and enforcement actions of the U.S. Topics discussed include the U.S. the global anti-corruption agenda to combat bribery by targeting the source: the demand; China and Brazil's China and Brazil to target domestic bribery; and promotion of domestic prosecutions.

The article focuses on the scope of Great Britain's territorial criminal jurisdiction over cross-border bribery offences under the Great Britain's Bribery Act 2010. Topics include the scope of the territorial jurisdiction over bribery offences stated to be ambiguous since there is no authoritative guidance on how to determine whether a cross-border bribery offence is committed within or outside the Great Britain and comparison of the Bribery Act with the U.S. bribery law.

United States law criminalizes providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations, assaulting foreign officials, accepting campaign contributions from foreign nationals, bribing foreign officials, and transmitting trade secrets to foreign governments, foreign instrumentalities, or foreign agents. These are but a few examples of how foreignness has permeated into a variety of criminal offenses in force today. There is extensive literature on the trend towards expanding the geographic reach of U.S. criminal laws to include extraterritorial conduct. What criminal law literature has failed to discuss in detail is the decision to single out foreignness as a focus of the criminal law somehow separate and distinct from concerns confined to the American homeland. This Article examines how foreignness is reflected in contemporary U.S. criminal law and encourages caution when including a foreign nexus as a substantive element of crimes. It questions when a foreign link increases the threat of harm or the actor's blameworthiness such that it makes sense to include foreignness within the definition of an offense. Even if building a foreign/domestic distinction into a criminal statute is justifiable as central to the very nature of the offense, this Article exposes the challenges of even discerning what is "foreign." In closing, this Article takes a step back and asks whether creating a polarity between what is domestically American and the rest of the world is a valuable distinction in the criminal law or, in contrast, undermines other values. What do we gain by blatantly specifying "foreign" as an element in defining criminal offenses? And, when we do single out the otherness of "foreign" in criminal statutes, what do we lose? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the transational (cross border) efforts to combat bribery and corruption in places such as the U.S. as of 2015, and it mentions domestic and foreign criminal laws, as well as demand-side (passive) and supply-side (active) bribery laws. The authors claim that there is an absence of effective tools to control corrupt solicitations of benefits by public officials. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) transnational bribery (TNB) statute is also examined.

In recent years, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement has become a top priority for the U.S. government, and government enforcement officials have stated that "we in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption" and that FCPA enforcement ensures not only that the United States "is on the right side of history, but also that it has a hand in advancing that history." However, the FCPA is not the only statute in the federal criminal code concerning bribery. Rather, the FCPA was modeled in large part after the U.S. domestic bribery statute, and when speaking of its FCPA enforcement program, the government has recognized that it "could not be effective abroad if we did not lead by example here at home." Indeed, the policy reasons motivating Congress to enact the FCPA--that corporate payments were subverting the democratic process, undermining the integrity and stability of government, and eroding public confidence in basic institutions--apply with equal force to domestic bribery. Against this backdrop, this Article explores through various case studies and examples whether the United States's crusade against bribery suffers from uncomfortable truths and double standards. Through these case studies and examples, readers can decide for themselves whether the U.S. government "practices what it preaches" when it comes to the enforcement of bribery laws and whether the United States is indeed "in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a speech by U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara which was delivered as the keynote address at the "Fighting Corruption in America and Abroad" symposium at Fordham University School of Law. The efforts to prevent public (political) corruption in places such as New York are addressed, along with bribery- and fraud-related laws in the U.S. and other nations. The views of New Yorkers are examined, along with government power and democracy in America.

Although the law of bribery may look profoundly underinclusive, the push to expand it usually should be resisted. This Article traces the history of two competing concepts of bribery--the "intent to influence" concept (a concept initially applied only to gifts given to judges) and the "illegal contract" concept. It argues that, when applied to officials other than unelected judges, "intent to influence" is now an untenable standard. This standard cannot be taken literally. This Article defends the Supreme Court's refusal to treat campaign contributions as bribes in the absence of an "explicit" quid pro quo and its refusal to read a statute criminalizing deprivations of "the intangible right of honest services" as scuttling the quid pro quo requirement. While recognizing that the "stream of benefits" metaphor can be compatible with this requirement, it cautions against allowing the requirement to degenerate into a "one hand washes the other" or "favoritism" standard. This Article maintains that specific, ex ante regulations of the sort commonly found in ethical codes and campaign finance regulations provide a better way to limit corruption than bribery laws, but it warns that even these regulations should not prohibit all practices that may be the functional equivalent of bribery. This Article concludes by speculating about whether the efforts of federal prosecutors to reduce corruption over the past sixty years have given us better government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article discusses the feature of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Topics discussed include history of development of the act that was resulted due to amendments in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; anti-bribery prohibitions as defined by the act; criminal and civil penalties for bribery; need of effective FCPA corporate compliance programs; and international anti-bribery efforts.

As U.S. law enforcement agencies have intensified their efforts to combat bribery in international business under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), one form of corruption has been overlooked: bribery of indigenous leaders by multinational enterprises undertaking projects that will impact their communities. This Article demonstrates that the FCPA, the Travel Act, and other federal statutes could be readily applied to this form of bribery. However, it also shows that certain economic dealings between companies and indigenous leaders have legitimate purposes, and that these dealings likely would be treated as permissible under these statutes. The author proposes guidelines for distinguishing between legitimate and corrupt transactions, which should inform companies, indigenous leaders, and law enforcement agencies when navigating and applying the statutory requirements. This Article also argues that enforcement agencies should assign to this form of bribery an enforcement priority equal to that of more conventional foreign corrupt practices, if and when the statutory elements are satisfied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision of the U.S. Fifth Circuit court in the case United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. in which court expands the employer liability under the U.S. Anti-Kickback Act (AKA). It mentions the two prongs of AKA such as penalties against offenders of bribery for twice the amount of the kickback and strict liability on higher-tier contractors for the kickback activity of their employees, and subcontractors.

An essay on implicit quid pro quo agreements between members of Congress and election campaign contributors is presented. Topics discussed include need of disclosure for America's campaign finance system, need of noncriminal remedies that impose civil fines on members of Congress who fail to disclose information related to campaign funding, and challenges associated with the federal enforcement of bribery laws due to political nature of criminal investigations.

Sports bribery and match-fixing have become a part of the on-going sports news cycle. European and Asian match-fixing scandals in soccer, cricket and tennis have rocked the sports world recently. The 1919 Black Sox World Series scandal and the 1970's Boston College point shaving incidents have illustrated that the manipulation of sporting events is a global scourge. This paper examines the corruption cases that led to the 1964 passage of the Sports Bribery Act (18 U.S.C. § 224). We discuss the scope of the statute, its operation with complementary and ancillary federal and state laws, and the reported instances of the statute's application. The economic discussion focuses on Becker's model for optimal deterrence, its application to the Sports Bribery Act, and an examination of the implications regarding the utility for would-be match-fixers. The paper concludes with a discussion of the challenges facing a policy change, including the complexity of regulating both professional and amateur sport, methods of detection, and jurisdictional issues raised by the global nature of match-fixing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often said that distributive justice has no place in private law. However, distributive justice considerations feature strongly in cases involving the remedies imposed over bribes gained in breach of fiduciary duty. This paper argues that courts should exercise structured discretion, guided by principles of distributive justice, in ascertaining the appropriate remedy. The distributive factors of desert, needs and equality should inform the determination of what remedy is apposite to provide justice in the circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses decision taken by the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to track foreign officials for taking bribes in the country. Topics discussed include decision taken by the federal government to curb bribery which are excluded by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), passage of the FCPA as an amendment to Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and use of the Money Laundering Control Act and the Travel Act by prosecutors to save bribe takers.

The article discusses the consequences of the enforcement of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on businesses and individuals, and the proposals of the Chamber and neef of judicial intervention and boundaries set for the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).

The article discusses various legal aspects of public corruption in America, focusing on crimes involving bribery and illegal gratuities, as well as information about several legal defenses involving entrapment and the U.S. Constitution's Speech of Debate Clause. Due process, criminal penalties in America, and an honest-services doctrine are mentioned. Financial kickbacks and criminal offenses involving U.S. public officials and witnesses are also examined.

The article discusses various aspects of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), focusing on criminal liability in America, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) rules, and information about the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. Affirmative defenses, civil litigation in the U.S., and deferred prosecution agreements are mentioned. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the alleged benefits of corporate compliance programs are also examined.

We should no longer expect the Alien Tort Statute to be the principal federal statute that deters overseas corporate rights violations. That distinction rightly belongs to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, an anti-bribery statute that rests on undisputed principles of corporate liability, contains a clear congressional statement of extraterritorial application, and routinely collects penalties from multinational corporate defendants. Scholars have not associated the FCPA with human rights, owing principally to a thin understanding of rights theory. But freedom from corruption can and should be understood as a human right, one that is as old as social contract theory but new to federal and international law. With specific reforms--one modeled after environmental law and the other after intellectual property--the FCPA can become a more powerful statutory tool for deterring overseas corporate rights violations than the ATS ever was or will be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") is an essential anti-corruption tool used to prosecute corporations that engage in the bribery of foreign officials overseas. Once a mere rubber stamp, over the past five years the statute has been used aggressively to prosecute wrongdoing abroad leaving many companies nervous that they may be next. Seeking to return predictability to corporations exposed to FCPA-related liability, the United States Chamber of Commerce has sought to introduce a statutory "Compliance Defense" which would serve to inoculate corporations from liability if they have implemented, at the time of wrongdoing, adequate compliance programs. This Note will argue that codifying this defense would be detrimental to the FCPA's efficacy and to global efforts towards preventing corruption. It will utilize and expand upon an existing framework for appraising corporate liability schemes in order to demonstrate the various ways in which a Compliance Defense would damage the FCPA's statutory machinery. Finally, it will consider alternative reforms that may address the valid concerns of FCPA critics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses whether America's strict liability legal standard is applicable in a reported battle against foreign corporate bribery as of June 2014, focusing on the impacts of corporate corruption on business competition, accurate pricing, and corporate culture in the U.S. America's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), embezzlement, and financial fraud are addressed. It states that the FCPA creates civil and criminal liability for those who engage in the bribery of foreign officials.

The article focuses on the exemption of the U.S. businessman conducting business in China from the anti-bribery provisions of U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act of 1977 (FCPA). It mentions that extensive investigations by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding the corporate corruption. It also mentions that FCPA are wholly inconsistent with Confucianism based on the cultural value of reciprocal giving.

An obvious reason to comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") is that non-compliance can expose a company to a criminal or civil FCPA enforcement action by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and/or the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). However, this Article highlights that settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement action are often only a relatively minor component of the overall financial consequences that can result from FCPA scrutiny or enforcement in this new era. By coining a new term of art - the "three buckets" of FCPA financial exposure - and through various case studies and examples, this Article demonstrates how FCPA scrutiny and enforcement can impact a company's business operations and strategy in a variety of ways from: pre and post-enforcement action professional fees and expenses; to market capitalization; to cost of capital; to merger and acquisition activity; to impeding or distracting a company from achieving other business objectives; to private shareholder litigation; to offensive use of the FCPA by a competitor or adversary to achieve a business objective or to further advance a litigating position. This Article thus shifts the FCPA conversation away from a purely legal issue to its more proper designation as a general business issue that needs to be on the radar screen of business managers operating in the global marketplace. By highlighting the many ripples of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement, it is hoped that more business managers can view the importance of FCPA compliance more holistically and not merely through the narrow lens of actual enforcement actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bribery in overseas markets is a major concern for U.S. foreign policy. In the 1970s, after allegations of corruption abroad, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA outlines civil and criminal sanctions for corporations that seek to bribe "foreign officials." It also inspired responses from other states, including the United Kingdom's Bribery Act, enacted in 2010. For decades, the federal government enforced the FCPA only sporadically. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, however, increased prosecutions under the FCPA by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission led to a corresponding increase in criticism of the statute. Responding to these critiques in November 2012, the two agencies co-authored a FCPA guideline. Viewing this new manual in comparison to prior implementation of the FCPA and to the Bribery Act may help determine the most effective tools to combat foreign bribery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various allegations of ethical violations involving land use in America, focusing on the apparent efforts to criminalize behavior involving bribery and theft in relation to the permitting and zoning processes in the U.S. American state and local ethics laws are addressed, along with misdemeanor penalties and U.S. zoning board decisionmakers. Public corruption in America is examined, along with law enforcement efforts, criminal statutes, and federal prosecutions in the U.S.

The article discusses the need to amend the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which regulates the redressal of tort for victims of human-rights violations aided and abetted by corporations, to impose civil liability and corporate accountability on companies for aiding and abetting human rights violation. It highlights the successful enforcement of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), in this context, that addresses the problem of bribery.

The article discusses the legislative intent of the U.S Congress during the time of enactment of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Topics discussed include the intention of the U.S Congress related to the role of FCPA in dealing with foreign corruption to protect the integrity of businesses and international relations, the history of the FCPA, and an accounting and the anti-bribery provision of the Act. It mentions the 1988 and 1998 Amendments to the FCPA.

The article discusses corporate responsibility for enforcing the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as of January 2014, focusing on the size and complexity of global multinational corporations and the allegedly limited resources that American enforcement agencies such as the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission possess. Compliance-related guidance for business entities is mentioned, along with self-investigation and self-reporting processes in relation to bribery.

In United States v. Skilling, the Supreme Court used the avoidance canon in response to a void-for-vagueness challenge to the federal criminal fraud statute. As explained below, the Court severely restricted the statute's meaning, limiting its proscription against "deprivation of honest services" to bribery and kickbacks. This Article argues that, contrary to the Court's decision in Skilling, the canon of constitutional avoidance is inappropriate in void-for-vagueness cases. This is because such cases do not present statutory ambiguity that requires choosing between competing meanings or interpretations. Instead, void-for-vagueness challenges concern statutes that either have a constitutionally clear meaning (and are not void-for-vagueness) or do not have a constitutionally clear meaning (and are void for vagueness). In other words, this Article claims that the absence of statutory ambiguity--one interpretation that complies with the Constitution and one interpretation that indicates constitutional infirmities--in void-for-vagueness cases makes the use of the avoidance canon improper in such cases. Simply put, vague criminal statutes are not inherently ambiguous. Instead of offering a choice between two meanings, they are indefinite, uncertain, and unclear. And, it is not the potential meanings of the vague statute that create constitutional problems; there is only a constitutional problem if there is no ascertainable meaning. Part I of this Article explores the justifications for the canon of constitutional avoidance. In Part II, this Article describes the Court's void-for-vagueness doctrine and its use of the avoidance canon to circumvent the vagueness question in Skilling. Part III argues that the use of the avoidance canon in Skilling was improper and explains why it is not an appropriate vehicle to respond to void-for-vagueness constitutional challenges to federal criminal statutes. Part IV explores the negative theoretical and practical consequences of applying the avoidance canon to potentially vague statutes. Finally, Part V concludes the Article by outlining a model for applying the avoidance canon to other constitutional questions involving criminal statutes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the legislative intent behind the U.S. Congress' passage of the nation's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977 which amended the 1934 U.S. Securities Exchange Act, focusing on investigations by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the moral ambiguity that is reportedly associated with the FCPA's passage. U.S. anti-bribery laws and the potential impacts of Chinese culture and guangxi (relationships) on business dealings are examined.

The United States has been combating the bribery of foreign officials for 35 years through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Both domestic and international prosecutions for bribery remained almost nonexistent for decades. In recent years, the United States experienced an explosion of enforcement actions under the FCPA. Broad enforcement theories and increased prosecutorial effort have greatly expanded the scope of the FCPA. Moreover, the passage of the UK Bribery Act in 2010 has forced many U.S. organizations to face additional and conflicting antibribery regimes. Although the United States remains the world leader in prosecuting the bribery of foreign officials, the FCPA has failed to keep pace with the evolving international standard of antibribery legislation. As a result, ever-increasing uncertainty surrounds antibribery compliance and liability. In response to these concerns, Congress must amend the FCPA accordingly, as inaction will only exacerbate the current concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various aspects of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) as of September 2013, focusing on issues such as criminal liability, the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, and the design and implementation of corporate compliance programs in America. Other topics include FCPA enforcement, domestic law in the European Union, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Civil penalties and non-prosecution agreements are also examined.

The article discusses the definition of foreign official under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), focusing on the corruption, graft, and the development of a test for determining which foreign government employees qualify as foreign officials for the purposes of the FCPA. The British Bribery Act of 2010 is addressed, along with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United States v. Kay legal case from 2004, and deferred prosecution agreements.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") prohibits bribing 'foreign officials," but it does not define the word 'foreign" or give any guidance to what citizenship the official must have to fall under the FCPA. Adding to the difficulty when defining 'foreign, " the recent rise in prosecutions and increased FCPA case law has failed to produce an obvious answer as to how a court should address these issues. This makes it harder for businesses to comply with the FCPA or, in the alternative, obtain favorable deferred prosecution agreements. This Comment argues that, while the FCPA excludes those with U.S. citizenship from being 'foreign officials" to protect defendants from an ambiguous criminal statute, businesses should structure compliance programs to treat 'foreign officials" as including those with U.S. citizenship. Section I of this Comment traces the evolution of the United States' anti-bribery obligations. Section H1 analyzes courts' divergent readings of the FCPA and the problem this creates for interpreting whether 'foreign" implies that the actor must be a non-U.S. citizen to constitute a 'foreign official." Section III identifies how a court would use past approaches to interpret the term 'foreign" to include actors with U.S. citizenship, but ultimately would adopt a defendant's narrow definition under the rule of lenity. It then argues that businesses should consider this loophole nonexistent for compliance program purposes. The Conclusion places this issue within the current debate over narrowing the FCPA's terms, determining that it shows the need for statutory clarification and reform to better allow businesses to comply with the law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses anticorruption law and the theory of regulatory competition (RC) as of February 2013, focusing on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention and the application of the theory of RC to competition policy. The British 2010 Bribery Act is addressed, along with U.S. corporate governance regulations and the rules regarding access to American capital markets. U.S. antitrust laws, cartels, and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are examined.

The article focuses on the antibribery provisions and its administrative procedure for enforcement around the world. It provides summary of criticisms of those provisions by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (COC) which are interpretated by Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It explores procedural law governing the DOJ's enforcement policy formulation and suggests amendments to Bribery Act 2010 of Great Britain.

Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and his counsel are currently detained at The Hague, awaiting trial for alleged attempts to bribe witnesses and submit falsified evidence. This article utilizes those proceedings as a starting point for a broader discussion of criminal contempt proceedings brought by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) pursuant to Article 70 of the Rome Statute. Article 70 vests the OTP with exclusive discretion to instigate such proceedings, despite having an apparent conflict in every case brought against an attorney, whether a member of the OTP or opposing counsel. By vesting the OTP with such discretion, Article 70 also limits sanctioning options afforded to Chambers. Given these concerns, this article suggests that other alternatives, such as state referrals and disciplinary proceedings, should be employed in favor of Article 70 prosecutions. In the instant case and others where Article 70 is utilized, an independent counsel should be engaged at every step of the proceedings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]