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How do global trade rules evolve? This article argues that agreements create precedent that shapes subsequent negotiations, and policymakers exploit this precedent. Specifically, states sequence agreements, using negotiations with likeminded or relatively less important partners to establish model rules for subsequent use where negotiations will be more challenging. By institutionalizing negotiating positions where stakes are low, negotiators seek to improve the odds of replicating preferred terms in later, more challenging deals. A two-stage regression analysis on trade agreement design from 1965 to 2016 and qualitative probes from the UK and New Zealand support the argument: agreements with less important partners are presented as strategic opportunities to innovate and set precedent. Legal language has a way of sticking around, and states know it. States sign agreements with an eye to the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in the case R. v Barre (Mohammed Said) concerning laws of alternative verdicts. It reports that Defendant charged with murder after fight with deceased. It mentions the court dismissing the appeal, that on the facts of the case, concluded that the judge had not been obliged to leave manslaughter to the jury.

The article discusses two British Court of Appeal cases related to criminal justice, namely R v Jogee and Ruddock v The Queen, citing decisions of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It states that in both the cases appellants had been convicted of murder after trial, and mentions that the Supreme Court has considered the doctrine of secondary participation. It notes pertinence of the case Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen.

This article examines the notion of ‘persuasive value’ of external precedent in the context of international criminal law. It finds that, in a number of cases, individual judges have appeared to assess the relevance and persuasive value of the same judicial decision differently and suggests that an assessment of this notion may be contingent on the specific circumstances of the case, including the individual approaches of judges. The article proceeds to flesh out some extrinsic and intrinsic elements of this notion. With respect to the former, these include: (1) the specific attitudes of individual judges; (2) the authority of the forum, including the generalist or specialist character of the court and the potential role of judicial networks; (3) the effect of successive citations; and (4) the potentially uneven playing field of citations. With respect to the latter, these may include: (1) the nature of the law being applied and the consonance of the findings with the applicable law; and (2) the quality of the reasoning. While there potentially may be a link between the quality of reasoning of a given decision and an assessment of its persuasive value, this may depend on the circumstances of the case and, in particular, on the approaches of the individual judges, who may accord differing weight to the elements involved in the equation. Thus, the article concludes that, ultimately, any assessment of the notion of persuasive value may have to remain contingent and incomplete. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analogical reasoning is a pervasive feature of the common law, yet its structure and rational force is much disputed by legal theorists, some of whom are sceptical that it has any rational force at all. This article argues that part of the explanation for these disagreements lies in there being not one form of analogical reasoning in the common law, but three: classificatory analogies, close analogies and distant analogies. These three differ in their functions and rationale. Classificatory analogies involve the use of decided cases to help characterize novel fact situations, and are justified by the rule of law ideal of minimizing the dependence of judicial decisions on the individual views of decision-makers. Close analogies are used to help resolve unsettled issues by reliance on decisions from other branches of the same legal doctrine. They complement the doctrine of precedent, and rest on similar considerations. Distant analogies are also used to help resolve unsettled issues, but by reference to decisions from other legal doctrines. They are the most susceptible to sceptical critique: although they can serve to maintain coherence in the law, they deserve a more modest role in legal reasoning than they are often given. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the recognition of foreign bankruptcy discharge and stare decisis by looking at the decision of Great Britain High Court in Global Distress Alpha Fund 1 Ltd. Partnership v. PT Bakrie Investindo. It provides an overview of the case and highlights the court's decision with regards to the doctrine of precedent. It discusses the principle of universalism as well as considers the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on Cross-Border Insolvency.

The article describes a case wherein the British Court of Appeal had ruled that the Crown Court had no power to impose a confiscation order when an offender was sentenced to a conditional discharge. Four unconnected applications for leave to appeal against sentence were made to the Court of Appeal following the case R. v. Clarke, with each applicant having been sentenced to a conditional discharge but had been the subject of a confiscation order. The implications of the case for the issue of precedent within the Court of Appeal are also examined.

This study presents the mid-twentieth-century English lord of appeal, Lord Wright, as an innovative traditionalist judge. Judges have a duty to be creative, Wright believed, but only within the framework of existing legal authority. Wright explained his innovative traditionalist perspective in relation to precedent, public policy, and legislation, and he illustrated his perspective particularly by way of contributions to decisions on worker compensation, commercial contracts, restitution, and international criminal law. He was not always a bold judge, as is especially evident from his contribution to Liversidge v. Anderson. But his efforts to develop the law without undermining established precedents and statutory authority could be subtly effective. In contract and tort decisions, he consistently argued that personal liability should attach only to outcomes that could reasonably have been expected to come about. He was realistic, and believed courts must be realistic, about the tendency of the business world to be guided primarily by its own norms. He incisively criticized implied contract theory and advanced a conception of unjust enrichment that, in England, was considerably ahead of its time. In employment law, he added a twist to freedom-of-contract reasoning, arguing that if it is permissible for individuals to use their economic advantage to impose contractual terms on weaker parties, then it should also be permissible for those parties to combine and gain the upper hand. After World War II, he argued that the positive laws necessary for punishing war criminals already existed. This study draws these arguments together in an effort to capture Wright's judicial style and to show that some of his contributions to legal thought and doctrine run deep and are historically significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a court case in which the defendant was convicted of two counts of possessing an article of terrorism in Great Britain. The first article is a notebook containing instructions on how to assemble and operate a mortar while the second is a substitution code of a list of articles and places. It states that the articles include components of explosives and targeted venues and countries. He filed an appeal arguing that he is not a terrorist and that the articles are for lawful defence of Muslims in Bosnia and Chechnya, Russia.

The article examines a court ruling issued by the British Court of Appeal Criminal Division in two unrelated appeals by appellants who were convicted of murder. It is said that the court has adopted the decision of the Privy Council in the case Attorney General Jersey against Holley. The appeals by the appellants were dismissed.

The article discusses a court case in which the appellants were charged of possessing an article to be used for terrorism under the Terrorism Act 1996 in Great Britain. The trial court decided that the electronically stored information was capable of being an article for the purpose of terrorism. The Court of Appeal overturned the trial court's ruling arguing that the compact disks were not for the purposes of terrorism under the section 58. The court accepted a submission be the prosecution that the decision in the first appeal reached per incuriam.