Search

Microbes are increasingly central to visions of sustainable and healthy futures, including in farming movements such as regenerative agriculture. In social science and environmental humanities scholarship, (re)connecting with microbes is seen as a way to challenge, conceptually and practically, the very ontology of human-nature separation which underpins the destruction and violence in human relations with other living beings and with environments. The crux of this onto-ethical potential is a shift towards relational modes of knowing microbes, rooted in localised, proximate, and sensuous practice, and expressed in embodied expertise. This paper engages critically with this promise by calling attention to persistence of calculability to people's self-governance within current microbiopolitics. Through a case study of regenerative agriculture in the United Kingdom, I argue that while embodied expertise of soil microbes is seen as crucial to soil health-oriented farming, it is also dismissed as an insufficient in guiding farmers and shaping future practice, including by farmers themselves. Regenerative agriculture continues to function within "farming by numbers", an agri-biopolitical regime in which farmers' and advisors' subjectivity is that of calculating managers situated in calculable environments. As a result, calculability acts as a 'break' on the development of alternative microbial onto-ethics, and regenerative agriculture practitioners look for ways to bring soil microbes into the realm of calculability (e.g., through metagenomics). Consequently, the way microbes are being incorporated into future agri-environmental relations reinforces rather than threatens existing structures of biopolitical power. Overall, I argue that human-microbe research, potentially due to its empirical focus on alternative practices, has underplayed the importance of calculability to people's self-governance in relations with microbes. The struggle for a new microbiopolitics, especially in agriculture and environmental management, will require addressing the continued importance of calculability, and a creative and socially relevant experimentation with alternative forms of expertise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of apparently ubiquitous relations of debt, it has been argued that the debtor possesses a unique, revolutionary potential. Why is this potential seemingly as yet unrealised? Where might nascent debtor publics be found? And what conditions, what infrastructures, might facilitate their emergence? In answering these questions, this paper argues that there are spaces where emergent “counter-agencing” debtor publics can be detected – however, these are organising less around the issue of (consumer credit) borrowing than default. By analysing a prominent online debtor's forum in the UK – the Consumer Action Group debt collection industry sub-forum – the paper argues that such spaces contain important insights into the politics of credit markets and debt default, collective practices of calculation, and the formation of publics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Payment by Results (PbR) is one of the most fundamental changes in NHS policy since the introduction of the 'internal market' in 1991. It is also one of the most visible and influential attempts across the same period to modernize the NHS through accounting and, more specifically, costing. As a funding system, PbR promises to pay providers fairly and transparently by using a 'standard national tariff.' However, like all accounting based reforms, PbR encounters the range of professions and expertises active in the domain. Like all costing systems that give visibility where previously it was lacking, PbR creates new calculable spaces and new risks. The aim of the paper is threefold. First, we seek to chart the nature of the arena within which PbR operates. We identify the multiple actors that are influential in the regulatory field of health service provision, and focus on three types of actor in particular, namely the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), Monitor and professional medical associations. We argue that these three actors need to be viewed as representative of different types of expertise (schematically speaking, health economics, accounting and medicine) and that, to understand fully the nature of the regulatory game in the healthcare arena, PbR needs to be analysed not as a stand alone intervention but as enmeshed within the inter-professional complex that emerges out of the interaction of these three types of expertise. Second, we argue that we need to focus on the ways in which PbR, along with other regulatory interventions in the healthcare field, such as those of NICE and Monitor, seek to create new and sometimes competing calculable spaces based on different entity assumptions. Third, we argue that to understand empirically the dynamics of healthcare reform in the UK we need to examine the extent to which PbR creates new calculating selves, or a hybridizing of the calculating and medical self. The regulatory complex within which PbR operates may, we argue, produce contradictory incentives and thereby contribute to systemic provision risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates on risk have largely assumed risk to be the outcome of calculative practices. There is a related assumption that risk objects come only in one form, and that the reason not everything can be transformed into a risk is because of the difficulties in calculating and creating universal quantitative comparisons. In this article, building on recent studies of preparedness that have broadened understandings of risk, we provide an analysis of how preparedness measures might themselves produce risk, in particular through risk's durable instantiation, or what we call 'concretization'. Our empirical focus is on how government agencies in two countries shifted their attention from the risk of nuclear attack during the Cold War to an all hazards approach to preparedness. Comparing the mid- to late-twentieth century histories of the UK and Switzerland, we show that both countries shifted from focusing from a single risk to plural risks. This shift cannot be explained by a change in prevailing calculative practices, or by the fact that the risks changed historically. Instead, it is driven by historically specific changes in how risks are produced and reproduced in relation to how materializations of risk operate over time., (© London School of Economics and Political Science 2017.)