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This article examines the politics of private renting in 1950s and early 1960s Britain, through the radical approach taken by Labour Party towards private landlords. Through setting the radical aims of Labour in a mid-twentieth-century context of decrepit housing, rising rents and sluggish public housing programmes, Labour’s rationale in arguing for the ‘abolition’ of the private landlord is more transparent. This article takes a chronological approach, investigating what actions Labour actors took, at local and national level, and what effect this had on the wider housing market. Part one takes a long view of Labour attitudes to the private rented sector. Part two explores the policy of ‘municipalization’— the attempt to place rented homes under local authority control. Part three discusses the post-1962 policy shift to state-sponsored ‘improvement’ of private rented housing, prior to Labour’s victory at the 1964 general election. Three key arguments are made: that Labour’s radicalism hastened the collapse of the postwar private rented sector; that rental market weaknesses indicated the confused place of renting in the ‘tenurial pattern’; and that the proposed ‘abolition’ of private landlords had a direct effect on slum clearance and the composition of British cities. The conclusion suggests that Labour’s pursuit of the private landlord can shed light on the vast urban transformations of the post-war period. It invites greater attention to be paid to the effects that political ideas had on the composition of the twentieth-century British housing market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The private rented sector of the British housing market has been in decline since the beginning of the present century; that decline has continued apace since the end of the Second World War. A proposed solution for the stemming of this demise is the removal of present rent controls and the substitution of free market conditions so that rents find their own market levels. This, so it is argued, would enable landlords to obtain a proper return on their housing investment and lead therefore to an increase in supply and an ending to the present disinvestment from this housing sector. This article disputes this thesis. In the first place it is argued that "market rent" is a problematic concept and raises complex issues of distributive justice and social policy -- which its advocates ignore. Secondly, it is argued that a free market solution is ahistorical in that it takes no account of the past failure in Britain of privately rented housing; and similarly it ignores the complex web ahistorical circumstances behind its decline -- attributing the decline to the single causal/actor of rent control. Thirdly, it is suggested that a market solution is sociologically misconceived because it ignores the characteristics and needs of throe social groups dependent upon this, sector. Finally, on grounds of practicability it is proposed that a free market in rented housing may be quite inappropriate for the rump of housing stock remaining in the private rented sector; and that, given the current social and economic constraints operating in the housing market as a whole, any revival of this sector is unlikely, even with enhanced rental inducements. It is thus concluded that a free market solution is misconceived and would merely serve to impose an ideological straightjacket upon the provision of a basic human need. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the theory and practice of rent control in the UK and elsewhere in order to contribute to the important debate on the future of the private rental sector UK. Our opposition to rent and eviction controls is unequivocal. We shall show that wherever control has been imposed the effects have been, at best, adverse and at worst, appalling. The effects on the quantity and quality of a housing stock can be so devastating that one Swedish socialist economist, Assar Lindbeck (1967) concluded: "In many cases rent control to be the most efficient technique presently known to destroy a city--except for bombing." Controls which lead to an excess demand for housing foster unfortunate practices discrimination on various grounds other than willingness and ability to pay rent, and the creation of a black market. Rent and eviction controls also have a major impact mobility of labour. The encouragement to immobility can lead to the perpetuation structural imbalances in an economy prompting rigidities which can have considerable economic and social costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses controls on the rents of privately let property in Great Britain, which was originally introduced as a temporary wartime measure and has been progressively extended over the sub-sectors of the privately rented market. As of 1981, the economic bases and rationality of housing policy in Great Britain are being subjected to severe scrutiny. The author aimed to illustrate how a local, privately-rented sector can be analyzed with respect to the economic effects of the British 1974 Rent Act. The author also provided a detailed, if localized, account of some consequences for tenants of the 1974 Rent Act.

There is a widely held view that the housing-market policies of successive British governments may have significantly influenced the incentives for labour to undertake long-distance migration.[1] The main features of policy which are mentioned in support of this view are: (i) Several decades of rent control have created extreme shortages of rental accommodation in certain areas, so that migrants find it difficult to obtain short-term housing in the area of destination. (ii) The council-house system, which now provides a dwelling for one British family in every three, is administered using policies which appear likely to discourage long-distance migration.[2] Despite the importance of these issues for regional and industrial policies, they have yet to receive a comprehensive empirical analysis, although the influence of council housing on migration has been discussed by a number of authors - see, for example, Cullingworth (1969), Gleave and Palmer (1978), Johnson et al. (1974) and Robertson (1979). In this study, we use individual household data from the 1973 General Household Survey (GHS) to examine whether council house tenancy reduces the probability that a household will migrate from one region to another during a given time period. The high costs of selling and purchasing a house suggest that if housing tenure is included as an explanatory variable in a model of the probability of moving house, that rental tenants would be found to be more likely to move. For council tenants this is only true for local movement; over longer distances they are found to have much lower migration rates than owner-occupiers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the regional differences in the property market in Great Britain. Costs of transacting in location-specific property rights; Rent regulation; Housing policy reforms; Migration rates; Mobility barriers.

Rent Control in Britain began in the First World War and has lasted, on and off, most of this century. There has been almost no new building for private rent since 1939. The private rented sector is small (8%), marginalized, delapidated, and unattractive. The British Government is enacting new legislation to reform all areas of rented housing. Rents of new lettings will be freely agreed (i.e., at market levels) between landlord and tenant. But the tenant has security of tenure, subject to renegotiating a new rent. The absence of any important tax incentives or other subsidy was an obstacle to revival even with market rents. But the Business Expansion Scheme proposal in the March 1988 budget has created considerable interest among investors.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the Housing Bill proposed by the British government. The government plans to end rent controls and tenancy regulations for future private lettings and to introduce a right to choose for council tenants. There are two assumptions here. First, private landlords, once freed from rental controls, will return to this sector of the market. And second, council tenants will choose a private landlord in preference to a local authority. According to the revised bill, new owners of public sector housing must keep the property available for letting and any sales will be subject to the consent of the Secretary of State for the Environment. Moreover, a tenants' guarantee will confer most of the tenants' rights which currently exist in the public sector upon new tenants of property which was previously owned by a local authority. These changes seem likely to prevent asset-stripping by commercial landlords and to end any thoughts which the government may have had of privatizing the sector. Even if the revised Housing Bill will not bring about a privatization of public sector housing, it is still the government's intention to see that sector's role reduced. At present, three-quarters of all rental housing is provided by local authorities, even more in some parts of the country. The hope is that by replacing these with housing associations, competition and greater choice for tenants will result.