Search

I analyse the effect of collusion on profitability with the use of evidence from a natural experiment of policy reform: the introduction of anti-cartel legislation in the UK in the late 1950s. This caused an intensification of price competition in previously collusive industries but did not affect industries that had not been collusive. Three main results are established: First, a comparison of the two groups of industries shows that the breakdown of collusion had no significant overall effect on profitability in the long run—although it had a strong negative effect on firm numbers. Second, the larger was the decrease in firm numbers, the smaller was the decline of profitability in previously collusive industries; however, no such correlation exists in industries that were not affected by the cartel law. Third, most cartels did not restrict entry; but in industries where entry had been restricted, profitability rather than firm numbers decreased when collusion broke down. These results are consistent with theories that emphasise the role of entry conditions for profitability: Cartels are often unprofitable because of entry even when collusion is effective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Harrington (2022) provides a novel theory that explains how a private information exchange involving gross list prices can lead to higher transaction prices. On this basis, he considers that private list price exchanges between competitors should be presumed to harm competition. The theory, which has received much attention in the context of the EU trucks cartel case, was recently referred to by the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal as a "unilateral effects" theory, given that it involves no coordination once list prices have been exchanged. Unlike conventional collusion, the theory does not rely on a monitoring and retaliation mechanism. Given its novelty and relevance for recent competition cases, we consider it useful to explore its potential limitations. We show that both the scope for and magnitude of harm are sensitive to key modelling parameters such as the number of firms, the degree of product substitutability, and the level of marginal cost—sometimes in opposite directions. We also show that there may be no scope for the anticompetitive effect when firms are capacity constrained. Finally, we discuss several additional qualitative aspects that may undermine the theory of harm: the adaptability of internal pricing processes over time, the lack of verifiability of exchanged list price information (especially when the exchange is private), and possible procompetitive or competitively neutral reasons for the conduct. We conclude that, although Harrington provides an insightful addition to the wider literature on the competitive effects of information exchanges, the effects of list price exchanges are not sufficiently unambiguous to justify a general presumption of competitive harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National research evaluation systems that use metrics for the assessment of academic institutions are usually regarded as exemplifying the same neoliberal model of governance that, with minor variations, is implemented worldwide. This essay argues, however, that despite apparent similarities, metrics are used for different aims in different national cases. It compares the use of figures in the UK RAE/REF, a prototypical neoliberal framework, with various schemas of assessment that have been used to evaluate Russian universities in recent decades. It argues that in the RAE/REF, the principal role of statistics is to solve 'the lazy agent' problem by creating a prisoner's dilemma for academic institutions, while in the Russian case, statistics serve to solve 'the corrupt knower' problem, preventing collusion between the assessor and the assessed. The essay concludes by putting forward some hypotheses on the origins of different approaches to quantification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a conceptual analysis of collusion, the often overlooked relative of plagiarism in debates on academic integrity. Considered as an inherently social phenomenon, we present the results of a systematic effort to understand the anatomy of collusion. The term's meanings and associated governance practices are compared for contexts outside higher education. These are considered alongside a thematic analysis of publicly available UK university academic integrity documentation that specifies for students what counts as collusion. We indicate how current guideline practice can (1) appear incomplete by concentrating on classroom peers, (2) create blurred boundaries around useful collaboration, peer review and dishonest practice and (3) be so unrealistic as to have unwelcome, unintended consequences for students and staff. Taking an ecological perspective on the conditions of collusion emphasises how these guidelines—by seeking to constrain social interactions around assignment work—may create an uncomfortable incoherence between their prescriptions and well‐established patterns of study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor) are two key benchmark interest rates used in a plethora of financial contracts. The integrity of the rate-setting processes has been under intense scrutiny since 2007. We analyse Libor and Euribor submissions by the individual banks and shed light on the underlying manipulation potential for the actual and several alternative rate-setting procedures. We find that such alternative fixings could significantly reduce the effect of manipulation. We also explore related issues such as the sample size and the particular questions asked of the banks in the rate-setting process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Establishing a positive, proactive approach to issues such as plagiarism requires that students are equipped with the skills and experience to act with integrity, and that educators are fully aware of the attitudes and ability of students, particularly when they start university. This project used a questionnaire-based methodology to probe the attitudes, ability and confidence of undergraduates newly enrolled at a university in the UK, with a focus on concepts relating to written assignments. New undergraduates were confident in their understanding of plagiarism, yet performed poorly on simple tests of referencing. Students were generally of the opinion that academic misconduct should be modestly penalised compared to the standard penalties imposed by the UK higher education sector. Positive correlations were found between confidence, performance and recommended penalties, suggesting that confident students did better on tests of simple tests of referencing, and recommended more severe penalties for transgressions of academic integrity. These correlations were supported by findings that new postgraduates were more confident than new undergraduates, recommended more severe penalties and performed better in the simple tests of referencing. Findings are discussed in the context of educational needs identified for students, educators and institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the nature of collusion between the British state and loyalist paramilitary organisations during the conflict in Northern Ireland in the context of British counterinsurgency theory and practices in prior colonial campaigns. It briefly outlines the nature, pattern and logic of collusion in Northern Ireland before examining some of the key works of British counterinsurgency theorists -- Charles Callwell, Charles Gwynn and Frank Kitson -- reflecting on earlier imperial experiences. Collusion is understood as an expedient coercive state practice, premised on a 'doctrine of necessity', designed to remove 'enemies' and induce fear in a target population via a strategy of assassination in which the appearance of adherence to the rule of law is a political end shaping the specific forms of state violence involved. Such a practice, the author argues, is not an aberration in the tradition of British state counterinsurgency violence, it is exemplary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Twyne's Case, a leading case of Anglo-American fraudulent conveyances law, decided in 1602 by the Court of Star Chamber, states six marks et ensigns de fraud: if for instance a debtor conveys the entirety of his assets or conveys them to a closely connected person, this transfer of property is presumed to be fraudulent with regard to his creditors. This – at first glance – English concept of facilitating the evidence of fraud by the means of six presumptions stems from the ius commune and is rooted in the writings of the glossators of the thirteenth century, who developed this doctrine based on Roman legal sources from the Corpus Iuris Civilis. If not the members of the Star Chamber themselves in their judgment, at least Sir Edward Coke, when reporting their decision, incorporated this continental doctrine of praesumptiones fraudis into the law of fraudulent conveyances, where it still plays a prominent role in Anglo-American law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several articles have considered procedures for identifying markets susceptible to coordination. When a checklist of factors is considered, firms are usually assumed to be coordinating based on price. In this article, this approach is adapted to accommodate markets that may be coordinating on other focal points based on geographic or customer allocations. Some of the check-list features are still valid, but others need to be seen in a new light. New approaches for identifying tacit collusion in these markets are outlined.The example of the recent UK market investigation into cement is discussed as well as some other literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As exogenous shocks impact on industry we believe it timely to revisit the experience of two ‘staple’ industries during the interwar period: cotton and wool textiles. Using a variety of under- explored primary source materials we argue that the ability to withstand the shocks of the interwar years was largely dependent on prior investment decisions. In cotton textiles the re floatation boom precluded strategic flexibility and encouraged collusion. The absence of such behaviour in wool textiles fostered competition and the pursuit of a successful marketing policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses how different focal points in a market can lead to different collusive agreements and how merger analysis can identify markets that may be vulnerable to these potential agreements. Focal points based on customer allocation and geographic markets are considered with recent U.K. examples of this type of analysis. The focal point that firms are using for coordination can affect both the transparency required to maintain coordination and how targeted or effective any punishment for deviation can be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the onset of recession may lead some oligopolistic firms to engage in price-cutting behavior, we argue this is likely to be only a temporary phenomenon. As the recession deepens, firms will find themselves with (unplanned) excess capacity, which will increase the mutual benefits of collusion and hence the degree of monopoly is likely to rise. To support this proposition, and adopting a largely heterodox framework, we consider some historical evidence and present some recent data for both U.S. and UK manufacturing and UK retail during the current prolonged slump that has been labeled the "Great Recession." Such behavior has significant implications for economic recovery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiation of collusive and efficiency-based synergies in horizontal mergers has proven difficult. The authors propose a theory-backed methodological approach to classify mergers that yields greater information on merger types and merger effects. Moreover, the methodological approach distinguishes between mergers characterized largely by collusion-based synergies and those characterized largely by efficiency-based synergies. Crucial to the proposed method is that it considers the impact of merger events not only on merging firms, as is common in the literature, but also on non-merging rivals. The authors demonstrate how the proposed approach clarifies the nature of merger activity through an event-study procedure based on stock market data on samples of large horizontal mergers drawn from the US and UK (an Anglo-American sub-sample) and from the European continent the authors demonstrate how the proposed schematic clarifies the nature of merger activity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Using a comprehensive dataset on the incidence of price-fixing across British manufacturing industries in the 1950s, I compare collusive and competitive industries and find evidence of a negative relationship between collusion and the labour productivity of larger firms relative to smaller firms. In particular, collusion is associated with a reduction or even a reversal of the productivity gap between larger and smaller firms. This result is robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of collusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions of policy networks are common in Britain and Europe. Possibly reflecting the elitist view of politics, these discussions stress stability. In a similar vein, policy studies in Hong Kong have been carried out within the confines of elitism, with a particular emphasis on government/business collusion. This article, however, argues that networks and policies do change, and the change does not necessarily favour business. In explaining change, exogenous factors are important, so is the type of the network involved. The impact of exogenous factors depends on the structure of the network, which affects the network's ability to resist external pressures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major feature of current security is the development of intelligence networks between agencies within and between nations and across public and private sectors. The performance of the UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is examined within this context, especially regarding allegations of collusion by UK agencies in rendition and torture. Proposed changes to the ISC are discussed and it is argued that the ISC must seek to leverage its limited powers by helping to construct an oversight network. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper revisits the issue of the productivity performance of Britain’s railways with an improved dataset and modern cliometrics. We find a slowdown in TFP growth between 1850 and 1870, after which it stabilized at about 1.1%. An analysis of company-level productivity performance reveals large discrepancies in TFP growth and substantial cost inefficiency. The evidence suggests that there was managerial failure in companies with agency problems in a context of collusion and high entry barriers. A wider implication is that the neoclassical exoneration of late-Victorian British management may be less convincing for the services sector than for manufacturing. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We review the decision by the European Commission in the case of the UK Agricultural Registration Exchange. We propose a theoretical model, offering a basis for some of the intuitive arguments used by the Commission on the anti-competitive role of information exchange in the case of price and non price collusion. Market transparency on non price data is shown to be a collusion facilitating device which may achieve stability in otherwise unstable cartels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the interaction between employers' product market activities and labor market strategies in flour milling. Flour milling was an industry which in the interwar years considered itself and was held by others to have developed a particularly comprehensive and exemplary system of industrial relations. The article also provides a perspective on the rise and decline of national collective bargaining in Great Britain. The standard interpretation, as best articulated by the Donovan Royal Commission and the Oxford School of Industrial Relations, places paramount emphasis on factors endogenous to the industrial relations system and in particular on the role of the trade union. In the product market, collusive arrangements such as market sharing and price fixing had a long history in many British industries. In the final quarter of the nineteenth century, confronted by new competitive pressures and threat to profit margins, there was a growth in trade associations and collusive practices. It was learned that during the First World War, encouraged by government controls and rationing, both formal associations and informal restrictive practices increased further. The merger wave and increase in concentration which occurred in the 1920s made it possible in some industries for a smaller number of larger firms to organise collusion.

The article focuses on the law and the economics of market collusion. Sellers apprehended for rigging markets have been brought before courts from the earliest recorded civilizations to the present, but the policy of the law towards collusive practices has varied widely from one epoch to another and, at any given time, from one society to another. The differences in the various laws are essentially differences, first, in the amount of tolerance shown towards industry collusion and, second, in the discretionary powers which courts have and in the criteria which courts use to discriminate between legal and illegal collusive activities. Fundamentally, it is an issue of economic policy, and because the issue is economic, the article compares from the standpoint of an economist the limits of tolerance for collusive activities, the criteria of legality, and the areas of discretionary power, which may be found in the laws of several major countries at the present time. A comparison of alternative economic policies toward collusive activities of firms provides a sort of experimental test of these policies.

The article offers information about the British appellate court case R. v N (H) which related to sexual offences. It provides details of the case, which involved multiple allegations of sexual assault, and discusses the legal issues of contamination of evidence, collusion between accusers, and admissible evidence.

The author focuses on the underlying culture of collusion in the two scandals that occurred at foundation trust hospitals in Great Britain. She notes that one of the two scandals involved nurse Anne Grigg-Booth who was accused of killing three people by illegally administering opiates and was feared by others due to her intimidating behavior. She notes that an important lesson is that midwives and nurses must be confident and assertive to prevent themselves becoming psychologically controlled or tamed by trusting their own values and beliefs.

This paper uses the divergent patterns of large-scale retailing in the USA and Britain to explore the limitations of the conventional view of the rise of large-scale organisations in terms of the role of market forces, the visible hand of management and the work of Chandler and Williamson. Their analysis pays insufficient attention to the role of legal frameworks, state regulation, the relationship of market power and collusion and the role of class structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]