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British diplomatic wives of the early nineteenth century were under increasing pressure to perform their public duties to higher standards of accountability. This article examines the embassies in Paris led by two women --Elizabeth Stuart and Harriet Granville -- to ascertain how they negotiated the expectations of their post with respect to class and gender norms. Their records illustrate how new standards of state service could be set for women and how women's hospitality work in the service of diplomacy could make it a more consultative political domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the fall of 1862, William Ewart Gladstone opened a cabinet debate whether Great Britain should intervene in the American Civil War. Influenced by the staggering death toll and lack of results, the British cabinet contemplated a humanitarian intervention. Coinciding with the debate was a cabinet crisis in France over French policies toward Italy and more importantly the overthrow of the Greek king. The revolution in Greece reopened the Eastern Question and forced the Palmerston Government to carefully consider its foreign policy. By closely looking at the chronological overlap of the intervention debate, the French cabinet crisis, and the Greek Revolution, this article shows the interplay of the entangled global crises during the fall of 1862 and their impact on trans-Atlantic diplomacy. The British Government had to determine whether the situation in North America or the containment of Russia and the Eastern Question required attention more urgently. The British Government determined that threats closer to home mattered more. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Clerks employed in the Foreign Office before 1906, and in the offices of the secretaries of state before 1782, were scribes rather than advisers; often little is known about either their opinions or influence. An interesting exception is Sir David Nairne, who worked for many years for the secretaries of state in exile employed by King James II and his son, King James III. Nairne's career falls into three unequal parts: 1689–1713, when little more than a clerk carrying out the instructions of his superiors; 1713–1719, when promoted as one of James III's principal advisers; and 1719–1728, when demoted once again to a clerk, albeit with enhanced status. Yet even when one of James III's two most influential advisers, he remained primarily an assistant rather than a councillor putting forward his advice with caution. For both James II and James III, Nairne was not a civil servant in the modern sense but, rather, a domestic or household servant employed and used as circumstances demanded. For a short time, Nairne had a significant diplomatic career, but he always remained primarily a servant. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the economic diplomacy between the United States and Great Britain in South America during the Second World War. The dominant theme presented in the existing relevant literature on this subject is one whereby the US promoted a multilateral economic system, based on equal access to markets and resources, against the opposition of a British government determined to protect a closed trading system. The situation that arose in South America was markedly different. It was Britain that promoted multilateralism in South America, based on the belief that such a system would provide the surest means of protecting its interests in this region. The US, on the other hand, prioritised security concerns and short-term economic gains over the promotion of a multilateral trading system in its policy towards South America. In exploring this alternative situation that arose in South America, this article represents a challenge to traditional conceptions of Anglo-American economic diplomacy during the Second World War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article seeks to establish the significance of intercepted Greek diplomatic messages as both historical source and catalyst in Britain's Near Eastern policy in the crucial years of 1920–2. Specifically, the intercepts reveal how members of the British government, foremost among them the prime minister, covertly supported Greek expansion in Asia Minor even after declaring neutrality in the conflict. Such evidence confirms rumours that were dismissed as fallacious by those implicated and by their defenders in later historiography. Aside from their value as historical sources, the intercepts had an immediate and significant impact which has also been neglected. Intelligence regarding a distant conflict became central to a war at the heart of Westminster and helped mobilize a cross-party, transnational coalition against Lloyd George's foreign policy in the region. Although Lloyd George's opponents, incited by intelligence revelations, eventually succeeded in transforming British policy, this reverse did little to reduce the scale of the resultant catastrophe. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Very little has been published on British political activity in the province of Baghdad in the nineteenth century. Indeed, those formally responsible for it – officials in India – considered the region insignificant. This article argues, however, that it was not insignificant either to men on the spot or to influential British public figures in London and Constantinople. These men argued for its strategic and commercial potential, based on an inter-continental rather than a narrowly Indian view of policy, and optimism about the transformative material and moral power of steamships. Their pressure was responsible for the introduction of British armed steamers to the Mesopotamian rivers in 1835 and their retention throughout the century. This helped to ensure that the British had greater power in the region than any rival. The British also cultivated good relations with Arabs, expecting Ottoman rule to collapse in favour of something more progressive. The case of Baghdad shows the value for diplomatic historians of seeing Britain's European and Indian strategy as connected. It also raises doubts about the importance to British officials of promoting specific commercial interests abroad: the British in the region were much more concerned with the projection of power, reliability, and even-handedness. For the early Victorian mind, the key to progress was surely not the making of particular tariff arrangements, but the dynamic potential of steam itself. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

During the Suez crisis the head of the Royal Navy, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, twice appeared to offer his resignation, fearing Sir Anthony Eden favoured a military resolution of Britain's dispute with President Nasser over Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal. Mountbatten believed that an Anglo-French seizure of the Canal Zone would destabilize the Middle East, undermine the authority of the UN, divide the Commonwealth and diminish Britain's global standing. Within the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and in advice to cabinet, the First Sea Lord voiced his fears, querying what the exit strategy was. The parallels with the Iraq war are striking, except that in 1956 the White House opposed military intervention, compounding Mountbatten's unease by deploying the US Navy to delay its erstwhile allies' taskforce en route to Port Said. Mountbatten believed his unique status as royal confidant and imperial consul, and presumed close friend of the prime minister, allowed him to buck constitutional convention and complement military advice with keenly felt political opinion. Yet at the same time he prepared the Royal Navy for war with characteristic professionalism and thoroughness, finding himself party to the collusion with Israel which he later condemned. How did Mountbatten reconcile genuine dissent with a state servant's obvious sense of duty, and was this achieved through constructing an alternative version of events that ran counter to actuality? From a contemporary perspective what insight does this episode offer into the historic relationship between executive and chiefs of staff within the British model of civil-military relations? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the friendship between Huguenot poet Guillaume de Saluste Du Bartas and King James VI of Scotland in the 16th century, and how their relationship affected Du Bartas popularity. The poet's diplomatic work for King Henri de Navarre of France is discussed, as well as his efforts to negotiate marriage between James and Henri's sister Catherine de Bourbon. Du Bartas route from France to Scotland is described, as well as his reputation in the court of Queen Elizabeth, and the author discusses the connection between diplomacy and English translations of French poetry.

This article addresses the debate on petitioning between England and the papal curia in Avignon during the reign of Edward II (1307-27). The first part of the article attempts a comprehensive historiographical survey of petitioning on the continent and in England during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, while the second part suggests a new methodogical approach to the topic, which is illustrated by means of case studies. The main sources of the article are the Roman rolls, which are preserved at The National Archives and enroll petitions sent from the English chancery to the papal curia. Where possible, these English records have been matched with the papal responses to the petitions, recorded in the Registra Vaticana and Registra Avenionensia. Arguably, the cross-examination of secular and ecclesiastical sources allows a comparison between different administrative practices and will help to redefine the nature of diplomacy in the early fourteenth century, challenging some of the existing historiography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Secret intelligence became a major ingredient in international relations in the twentieth century, vital as much to peace as to war. Cooperation was an ingredient in intelligence success, with the British-American special relationship the century's prime and dominant example. The US-UK arrangement reached a Churchillian apogee in the 1940s and 1950s, then in the 1960s there were signs of change. Upheavals within American society, new challenges to US foreign policy, a decline in British capabilities and the end of the Cold War did not destroy the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, but they did undermine its exclusive character. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Following the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the British government established an office dedicated to gathering the views of political groups there, below the level of the state. By looking at the numerous contacts, conduits and intermediaries that existed (however temporarily) between the British government and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) before the 1975 ceasefire, this article illustrates that an almost continuous conversation was taking place. It also demonstrates that these contacts were centred on Dáithí Ó Conaill, the then Sinn Féin Vice President, and that these ‘talks’, when taken as a whole, can better explain the events that culminated in the 1975 ceasefire. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the role of the French embassy in London during the pivotal period between the Munich Agreement of September 1938 and Germany's occupation of the rump Czechoslovakian state in March 1939. In particular, it focuses on the reports sent to the French foreign ministry by the ambassador, Charles Corbin, and his colleagues on the subject of British public, press and political opinion vis-a-vis appeasement. The aim of this article is threefold. First, it illustrates how French embassy staff perceived British public opinion, the sources from which such perceptions were derived, and the extent to which their reading of opinion was accurate. Second, it reveals how the apparent evolution of British public opinion, from support for appeasement at Munich to support for resistance after the Prague coup, was interpreted by French embassy officials and subsequently conveyed to Paris. Finally, it assesses the impact of French embassy reports on the wider foreign policy-making process, suggesting tentatively that indications of a British public tiring of appeasement encouraged Paris to pursue a politique de fermete independently of Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article concentrates almost entirely on the events of 1971 and the author's involvement in the 'sometimes complicated and frustrating negotiations and consultations' which led up to the signing at the end of 1971 of the various Treaties of Friendship as Britain withdrew from the Gulf, leaving behind a number of independent states, including the United Arab Emirates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author sets the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989) in the historical context of the 'Great Game', in which the British and the Russians had paranoid suspicions of each other. An analogous process continued through the Cold war and, as a result, after the coup against Daoud the Soviets were forced slowly down the road to the 1979 intervention which they tried hard to avoid. His detailed analysis of the campaign sheds new light on many aspects of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, overturning many Cold War myths in the process. He then assesses their overall performance, making some interesting comparisons with both Vietnam and the current Coalition campaign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that both Neville Chamberlain's National Government and many anti-appeasers used and abused the language of the League of Nations in the years before the Second World War, long after they had abandoned Geneva itself as an effective instrument to maintain peace. It concludes that while many formerly pro-League figures could not bring themselves to admit the truth about the demise of collective security-and were, in effect, deluding themselves-this was, in many cases, 'a most dishonest argument'; born out of party politics and the need to keep world opinion on side in the pursuit of alliances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High-ranking ministers in the British cabinet supported calls at the World Disarmament Conference demanding the abolition of aerial bombing. Their efforts, however, were checked by the Air Ministry, with the result that British delegates at the conference promoted a compromise position advocating abolition, with a reservation for colonial policing. Pressure from the conference made it difficult to maintain this posture, and abolitionists in cabinet came close to persuading colleagues of their case, but events in Iraq, Aden, and India served to underscore the importance of the overseas RAF. Several salient features of government in this period help account for the cabinet’s attitude to aerial bombing: the heightened importance of consensus in the National Government, the enhanced relevance of the Air Ministry, the necessity of affordably securing the empire, and a prevailing cynicism about the feasibility of an agreement on aerial bombing. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article is a study of the Australian government's exchanges with the Chamberlain government over the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to negotiate a Grand Alliance between the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union during 1939. Robert Menzies and Stanley Bruce carefully weighed the arguments for and against before deciding to support the proposal for an Alliance. Yet there was considerable ambivalence about their support as evidenced by Bruce's panicky response to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In its own very small and distant way the Menzies government contributed to the inertia that marked the British Empire's failure to secure a Grand Alliance in 1939. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the history of British diplomacy and the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The author relates that the Conservative Government in London, England, headed by Prime Minister Edward Heath was not so fascinated of the European Security Conference (ESC) proposal of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union in 1969. He argues that the esprit de corps built up at CSCE was an unparalleled international phenomenon.

In 1188, an eye-catching display of royal anger resulted in the destruction of the ancient elm tree at Gisors by Philip II of France. Building on recent reappraisals of anger and other emotions in the medieval context, this essay seeks to understand how contemporary observers may have interpreted their monarch's momentous outburst. The elm's longstanding significance as a site of diplomacy and peace negotiations in the border zone between France and Normandy makes its downfall especially symbolic, and suggests that the deliberate display of emotional excess may be an under-appreciated factor in the history of medieval diplomatic encounters. Examining chronicle sources and later literary renditions of the incident, retold from both French and an Anglo-Norman perspectives, the article reveals how medieval commentators made use of a rich emotional vocabulary in order either to celebrate or to deplore Philip's act of arboricide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventionally, it was Palmerston's political nemesis, Lord Aberdeen (foreign secretary 1841–46), who brokered an entente cordiale with François Guizot and France in the early 1840s, which the belligerent and unequivocally “English” Palmerston then systematically destroyed when he returned to office in 1846. However, not only is this a distortion of the relationship between Britain and France prior to 1846, it also fails to appreciate the nuances of Palmerston's approach to Anglo–French politics. Naval scares and rhetorical constructions of English and British identities certainly drew Palmerston to adopt aggressive positions towards France on occasion, but against this must be set his close personal ties with leading French statesmen, not least Napoleon III himself, and his desire to maintain peaceful harmonious relations with France in order to free Britain's diplomatic hand elsewhere in the world. Although superficially swinging between extremes of amity and enmity, therefore, Anglo–French relations under Palmerston's guidance were in fact far more cordial and close than has sometimes been allowed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses English courtier of the Restoration period Edward Tyldesley. Topics include Restoration diarist Samuel Pepys, the 1662 Portuguese delegation at Hampton Court Palace, the birth of a foundling girl baptized as Lisbona Silvia in 1662, and evidence forwarded in 1716 to the Forfeited Estates Commission by King George I of England to investigate Catholics.