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Administrative monopolies are a rampant problem in China. The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (AML) attempts to deal with this problem by prohibiting government entities from abusing administrative power in anti-competitive ways. This article explores the effectiveness and enforcement of the administrative monopoly provisions by first looking at the treatment of administrative monopoly cases under the AML. The cases highlight not only the weaknesses of China's legal and judicial enforcement mechanisms, but also the important role of extra-legal mechanisms, such as the public pressure for rectification of violations. Second, China's situation is compared to that of Ukraine. The Ukrainian experience shows that the key elements to effective enforcement are providing for clear legislative penalties and having a strong and independent enforcement authority. Therefore, this article finds that, while the AML appears to have had some effect on reining in administrative monopolies, enforcement can be vastly improved by establishing an anti-monopoly enforcement agency that is independent, well resourced and empowered to take direct action against contraventions. Accordingly, the article concludes with some recommendations for short term and long term reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]