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There has been a significant response to the war in Ukraine on the part of the European Union (EU). Particularly noteworthy is its support for Kyiv via measures in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and especially in the defence field. It has provided substantial assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility (EPF); the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the EDIRPA common procurement instrument; and its military assistance mission (EUMAM Ukraine). These initiatives show how, in the wake of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the CSDP has made unprecedented, yet still only partial steps to allow the EU to progress towards moving beyond its traditional status as a small power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Western states have provided billions of dollars of military aid to Ukraine to help it in its war against Russia. Yet, despite numerous discussions of the ethical issues raised by the war, there has been little discussion of the opportunity costs of this military assistance. Is it right that the West has prioritized military assistance to Ukraine, when the conflict in Ukraine is just one of numerous challenges facing the world, from forced displacement to global poverty, preventable disease to climate change? This article offers the first detailed engagement with this issue, taking seriously the nonideal feasibility constraints that states face. It firsts set out the prima facie case against assisting Ukraine militarily due to the opportunity costs. It then explores—and largely rejects—two responses: that military assistance is required to protect Ukrainian self-determination and that it is needed to stop the march of authoritarianism. It argues that the opportunity costs objection has serious force and counts against much of the provision of military assistance to Ukraine (although not all). This argument has broader implications for the extent to which states should prioritize military aid over other means of addressing global challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Norwegian parliament has agreed to fund the Nansen Support Program for Ukraine, promising to deliver a total of NOK 75 billion (EUR 6.7 billion) in military and civilian aid to Ukraine over the period 2023–2027. In 2023, half of the aid was delivered in the form of military support, the other half constituted civilian support, including humanitarian relief and direct support to the Government of Ukraine. Over the next four years, the distribution between military and civilian aid through the Nansen Support Program will be decided on an annual basis. To achieve the long-term goal of making Ukraine ‘well-functioning, democratic and safe’, and supporting the country’s ambitions for European integration, the Norwegian aid is intended to strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law and civil society in Ukraine. This paper examines the debate on Norway’s assistance to Ukraine and discusses the competing, or even conflicting, goals of helping Ukraine win the war and strengthening Ukrainian civil society, looking for answers to several difficult questions: How will the Norwegian government ensure that funding to Ukraine is in fact spent ‘in line with Ukraine’s needs’ and does not enrich criminals or facilitate unlawful activities? How will the funding help strengthen Ukraine’s democratic institutions and civil society? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Illicit arms trafficking in Ukraine has been a significant issue since the Cold War, with leftover Soviet stockpiles providing lucrative smuggling routes. With over US$100 billion in aid being provided by the West, a sizeable portion being in the form of small arms and guided infantry weapons such as MANPADS and ATGMs (Masters & Merrow 2023), and accompanying ammunition, Action Plans have been developed conducive to limiting eventual diversion of military aid into the illicit market. What this paper seeks to analyse, is the United States’ ‘Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons in Eastern Europe’. The plan highlights steps towards limiting illicit arms trafficking such as increased traceability, provision of end-use-monitoring (EUM) capacities and training, intelligence sharing, and capacity building for border management. This paper argues that the current iteration of the United States’ effort to limit arms trafficking, though still in its infancy, has provided some benefit in Ukraine’s efforts to combat the illicit diversion of arms, and could limit the presence of US-made weapons in the illicit arms market, as has been the case thus far. However, this paper does argue that, given the context of lacking institutional accountability, the role of corruption, an inconsistent and incoherent legal framework for gun ownership, as well as lacking coordination with US partners, the Action Plan will unlikely help reform the structural conditions that established Ukraine as a lucrative arms market before the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The western response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was unprecedented. The states of the European Union, the G7 and NATO have targeted Russia with sanctions and diplomatic isolation, and furnished Ukraine with military assistance sufficient to ensure the Zelensky regime's survival. These efforts have proven insufficient to dislodge Russia from its occupation of Ukrainian territory. Nonetheless, when launched in the aftermath of the invasion, they were seen (and often justified as) as bold, innovative, and steadfast—a necessary response to a grievous act. What explains this response? In this article we argue that the answer lies in the emotions of guilt and shame for past actions and mistakes in the West's dealings with Russia and Ukraine. Informed by a qualitative discourse analysis of key speeches, statements and interviews with leading western policy-makers (past and present), we regard these two emotions—expressed as apologies and the acknowledgment of mistakes—as important drivers of policy. This article contributes to the bourgeoning literature on emotions in world politics. In addition to offering a coherent explanation of the West's unprecedented response our argument has policy implications. While the admission of wrongdoing is laudable, it can lead to actors overcompensating, resulting in further mistakes and policy failures. Fast-tracking Ukraine into the European Union would be one such error. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essence of Russian security policy is composed of the combined use of conventional and unconventional threats in both war and peacetime. Russia aims to dominate the process of escalation especially by frequently threatening nuclear war in Ukraine. It attempts to maintain the strategic initiative superiority, forcing its enemies to act under its control. Put differently, through the means of manipulating the fear of nuclear war in Ukraine, it tries to avert other states from directly intervening in the battlefield and to prevent military aid delivered to its enemies from becoming strategic. Methodologically, this article examines Russia's effort to gain dominance in escalating tensions through nuclear risk as a case study. The nuclear risk hinges on the uncertainty of nuclear deterrence. The nuances of this often-ignored uncertainty are explained in this article. Since such a uncertainty poses credible risk of nuclear war, absolute victory is not possible. No party will get everything it wants; therefore, the only solution is diplomatic compromise through negotiation. The importance and implications of this article lie in the fact that the problems and warnings examined here are likely not only in Ukraine but also in a possible future crisis over Taiwan or future conflicts involving nuclear powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proxy wars are an increasingly common feature of great power competition in the 21st century. In this context, the role of the small states is less clear and has not been properly addressed in the academic literature. Although states of this type have often been chosen as battlegrounds for such wars and have even acted as proxies for the superpowers, this article argues that they are also capable of conducting proxy warfare themselves. Since the start of the 2014 conflict in Donbas, Eastern Ukraine, this country has experienced proxy interventions from many external actors, both large and small, that provided resources to both conflict parties. One of the smallest states which has been trying to affect the course of this conflict in support of the Ukrainian government is Lithuania. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with the security and defence policy-makers in Vilnius, the article aims to explain why Lithuania is punching above its weight and interfering with this conflict from backstage. The empirical evidence points to an almost perfect alignment of interests between the current governments in Kiev and Vilnius in that they both see Russia as their long-term 'enemy' which makes Ukraine a surprisingly suitable proxy for Lithuania to exploit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine is the most severe challenge that the European Union faces. The EU has generally responded in a united and robust manner, overcoming the clash of national interests that had previously characterized its policymaking vis-à-vis Russia. The most transformative and significant decision that the EU has made is to treat Ukraine as a candidate for EU membership. However, cracks have appeared in the EU's unity, and the enlargement process will be long and difficult—and it could be derailed if Ukraine's territorial integrity is not restored. That will depend on increased European efforts and continued US military assistance to Ukraine, neither of which appear certain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in massive refugee migration. In this article we consider how the European Union (EU) and the United States have so far managed this influx of people. For reasons explained in the article, the EU is more focused on humanitarian aid, while the United States is especially engaged through military aid. The EU and the United States have historically employed both overt and covert means of limiting refugee migration, and this has been especially the case with migrants of color. Ukrainian refugees have no problem entering EU countries and receiving help (work permits, housing, etc.), while the United States uses various ways that make entry into the United States fairly complicated and thus contain Ukrainian migration (e.g., difficulty filling out applications, finding a sponsor in the United States). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can political geographers bring their critical tools to questioning the EU's 'geopolitical turn'? This commentary challenges the narrative of an EU‐wide 'Zeitenwende', pointing out some of the limitations of a 'geopolitical Europe' as it is being envisioned currently, while also noting the divided geographies of Europeans' support for continued military assistance to Ukraine. In closing, the piece points to some of the perils of the rhetoric of 'no alternative' in EU geopolitics, noting how it risks leaving the discursive space open to illiberal political forces. How can political geographers bring their critical tools to questioning the EU's 'geopolitical turn'? This commentary challenges the narrative of an EU‐wide 'Zeitenwende', pointing out some of the limitations of a 'geopolitical Europe' as it is being envisioned currently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the provision of military aid to Ukraine during the first year after the 2022 Russian invasion and explains why it was more effective compared to other examples. It discusses the impact of material and intangible military assistance. The article examines tensions arising from principal-agent relationships between Ukraine and the states that provided support that may have affected what was provided and when it was delivered. It is notable that providers of assistance emphasised equipment rather than training, a choice that could be made because Ukraine had already built up a high level of combat skills and military organisation. The article argues that the distinctive aspects of military assistance to Ukraine that led to its impact were the quality and quantity of equipment provided, good communication and co-ordination between Ukraine and those states providing assistance, and that Ukrainian defence and government institutions could manage the aid provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents on trends in military spending, building on the most recent military expenditure data by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). World military spending grew for the eighth consecutive year in 2022, up 3.7 per cent to an all-time high of $2240 billion. The increase in world spending in 2022 was largely due to three factors: Russia's invasion of Ukraine; the increase in military spending by Central and Western Europe countries as a reaction to the invasion and expenditure rises in major powers in Asia, namely China, India and Japan. There were two major military expenditure related developments in 2022 linked to the war in Ukraine. Firstly, Central and Western European responded to the deteriorating security situation by announcing plans to substantially increases their military spending. Some of the acutest increases in military spending took place in countries with close geographical proximity to Russia and Ukraine. Secondly were the immediate and record levels of military aid sent to Ukraine. Based on official figures for the largest donors and other assistance funds, at least $30 billion worth of military aid was given to Ukraine in 2022, with the US as the largest provider accounting for around two-thirds of all military aid [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States of America (U.S.), and the European Union (EU) have supplied weapons to Ukraine in the ongoing Russian-Ukraine armed conflict. The Pentagon has pledged thousands of weapons to Ukraine as part of the security/military aid to worn-torn Ukraine. The supply of such weapons by a neutral/non- belligerent state stands in clear violation of the laws of Neutrality which casts a duty on the neutral states to refrain from participating in the hostilities and be impartial in their conduct towards the belligerents. However, the argument of the U.S. government in previous such instances has been that laws of neutrality have been overshadowed by the United Nations (UN) Charter and modern forms of warfare and the U.S. maintains that they fall under qualified neutrality after the 20th century. However, Qualified Neutrality is not recognised either under treaty conventions or customary international law. Similarly, international laws in terms of co-belligerency are also governed by International Humanitarian Laws (IHL) under the Four Geneva Convention of 1949 which lays down rules where military assistance by a neutral state can result in co-belligerency. However, no existing treaty or international law lays down a clear threshold for crossing from a neutral state to a co-belligerent state which has also led to an ambiguity in terms of checks and balances of the lethal weapons supplied to Ukraine by the U.S. currently. This article attempts to define the threshold in terms of severity, effectiveness, and inertia of the intervention. It further argues that the U.S. has crossed its threshold and therefore the existing laws governing violation of neutrality and affixing of state responsibility are now applicable to the U.S. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relevance of the investigated problem lies in the need to provide primary psychological assistance to military personnel and other victims of the Russo-Ukrainian war at its current stage, because psychological problems are occurring in an increasing number of people, in particular in the territory of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. The purpose of the article is to determine the specifics and stages of providing psychological assistance, as well as consultations to victims of the war, primarily to the populations of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, which are located within the war zone. In the course of the research, a set of methods was used, namely analytical, graphic and synthesis methods. The main results of the conducted research should be considered the established features of providing assistance to the affected part of the population, which was at the epicentre of combat events in the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, as well as specific actions that prevent the deterioration of a person’s psychological state during the war. Identified were the factors needed to provide psychological assistance for thevarious population specifics, taking into account aspecvts such as gender, age, as well as the person’s degree of psy chological deterioration. The practical significance of the results of this academic paper lies in the development of an algorithm of actions for providing psychological assistance to Ukrainians during the state of war in the country, as well as conducting the necessary actions and consultations to improve the psychological state of the population affected by the war from specific cities. The results of the study can be used as an example to provide consultations and conduct to the population of other regions of Ukraine and beyond in real time. In addition, the results can be a helpful tool for establishing recommendations for improving mental health in conditions of war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Th e purpose of the article is to trace the nature, main directions, and components of Ukrainian British cooperation in the context of Russia’s large-scale aggression. Th e research methodology is based on the scientific principles of historicism, objectivity, alternative and social approach, and scientific methods - historical-comparative and historical-systemic. The novelty of the work lies in the reproduction of current events, processes, and phenomena in relations between the states against the background of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Th e main results of the study: the article analyzes the evolutionary processes in Ukrainian-British relations, the main areas of cooperation between the countries and ways of its implementation in the context of large-scale Russian aggression; traces the immutability of the course of comprehensive support for Ukraine by representatives of the British authorities, which is confirmed by new initiatives every week; identifies the personal role of state and political leaders of the United Kingdom in the process of forming and implementing international support for Ukraine. Conclusions. A qualitatively new stage in the dialogue between Ukraine and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was marked by the events of 2013-2014, which demonstrated the readiness of official London to provide comprehensive consolidated assistance to the Ukrainian people in the diplomatic, financial, economic, military, and humanitarian sectors. Th e political philosophy followed by the UK in the current situation is based on the perception of Russia as a state that is trying to unbalance the world and thus strengthen their power in it. Under these circumstances, official London, having proclaimed the strategy of “global Britain”, which aims to remain an influential player in the international arena now outside the EU, sees Ukraine as a reliable partner in the implementation of a common security policy in the context of Brexit. Prospects for further research include a thorough analysis of strategic Ukrainian-British relations, specifically the formation of a trilateral alliance between Britain, Ukraine, and Poland, designed to unite the eff orts of the three countries to counter the Russian threat and work together for the future of European security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What sort of military assistance has Ukraine received to date from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members since 2014? What has driven NATO allies' decisions to provide military assistance to Ukraine? This essay addresses both questions. It offers a preliminary examination of how strategic, economic, and risk considerations might have shaped NATO members' decisions regarding arms transfers to Ukraine, a country that remains outside of the Alliance but nevertheless is an Enhanced Opportunities Partner. Using both a qualitative analysis of post-2014 assistance and a purpose-built dataset combining military aid to Ukraine since late January 2022, we find that prior strategic preparation in the form of investments in military readiness and infrastructure is strongly associated with military aid to Ukraine. Economic considerations and prominent risk factors such as fossil fuel dependency thus far have not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interest of social sciences in the military dates back ages, and currently, special attention is being paid to Russia's war in Ukraine. The present paper also follows this research trend, and it intends to analyze both the tactical and operational levels of war by investigating how the military assistance provided by Western states and international organizations to Ukraine is influencing the course of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Subsequently, the paper studies the military assistance in all three phases of the war, beginning from the invasion of Crimea, through the Donbas offensive, to the phase of Ukrainian counter-offensives. The research method used by this paper was to review and synthesize the existing but scarce and sometimes disinformative literature. The findings suggest that Western military aid began cautiously by providing only non-lethal, defensive weapons, but it was of crucial importance in the second phase of the war by guaranteeing heavy weaponry. The paper concludes that Western military assistance, especially from the United States, United Kingdom, Poland, and Germany, has had a significant role in the Russo-Ukrainian war, without which Ukrainian forces may not have persisted to now. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Poland's ongoing solidarity with Ukraine, Poland's military assistance, financial assistance, and sheltering a large number of Ukrainian refugees. It highlights the historical lessons that define Polish perspectives and actions, as well as the political consensus and public support for Ukraine's support.

The article examines the role of neutrality in the Russo-Ukrainian war by analyzing the legal justifications offered by States with reference to the provision of weapons and economic assistance to the belligerents. The findings reveal that the law of neutrality has played a limited role as neutrality-based legal arguments were rarely utilized, even when they were available, either by countries supporting Ukraine or by those maintaining some impartiality towards the belligerents. The decision of a significant group of states to provide military and economic assistance to Ukraine was based on jus ad bellum arguments and rarely took into consideration the law of neutrality. Perhaps surprisingly, even the parties to the conflict seldom employed legal arguments related to neutrality. Permanent neutrals or countries traditionally adopting a policy of neutrality, on their turn, tend to limit the obligations of neutrality to their military dimension while remaining open to providing economic and humanitarian support. This diminishing relevance of neutrality law, amidst the ongoing crisis of the United Nations' collective security system, may lead to a legal order where third-party involvement in conflicts becomes more common. The authors maintain that the obsolescence of the law of neutrality is not yet complete, as occasional references to its rules still emerge, and many States have chosen not to take sides in the present conflict. Neutrality, however, as reflected in State declarations, appears to be interpreted more as a political choice rather than a legal obligation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The escalation in February 2022 of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia that first began in 2014 has not been the subject of particularly divergent opinions from an international legal perspective. The overwhelming majority of States and authors condemn the Russian military operations as a blatant act of aggression pursued in violation of the United Nations Charter. Yet, it might be useful to examine the reactions prompted by the main argument deployed by Russia as to the right of the Peoples' Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk to benefit from military assistance by virtue of collective self-defence recognized in customary international law and codified in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This argument raises the question of the applicability of the jus contra bellum regime to relations between States and secessionist entities which has already been debated. This contribution argues that the war in Ukraine sets a precedent which confirms that self-defence is a justification exclusively available to States and that secession or territorial annexation secured through forceful means cannot be recognized, while addressing how one can understand, from an international legal perspective, that this has sometimes been the case in the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'New Tuva' is a Tuvan anti-war movement that was created in the spring, 2022, after the Russian government started the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The movement consists of a decentralised group of activists and volunteers of Tuvan origin with an anti-war position and shared aim to prevent support of the war against Ukraine from Tuva in all forms of its manifestation. Their main activities include providing assistance to military personnel and those who might be mobilised in refusing to participate in the war and public awareness-building regarding the real situation in Ukraine, Tuva and statistics over Tuvans killed in the war etc. This study focuses on the context of the Tuvan republic, the activities of 'New Tuva', its influence on the Tuvan society within the region and what main obstacles and difficulties the movement faces in its work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article clarifies the EU population's perception of the war in Ukraine and identifies its cross-cultural features. The findings are based on the data of the survey “EU's response to the war in Ukraine”, conducted in April 2022 by Ipsos European Public Affairs at the request of the European Commission. The target population of the study is the citizens of the European Union member countries, aged 15 years and over (N = 26053). In the perception of the Russian-Ukrainian war, informational and activity-related aspects were distinguished. The first one included indicators of informational involvement (frequency of following and discussing news about the war in Ukraine) and trust in various sources of information (national authorities, European authorities, NGOs, journalists, and social media). The second one consisted of indicators of approval of measures announced by the EU (economic sanctions against Russia and Russian oligarchs, financial support to Ukraine, military and humanitarian aid, the ban on broadcasting in the EU of state-owned Russian media, welcoming in EU people feeling the war) and satisfaction with reactions of main actors (national authorities, the EU, NATO, UN, USA, citizens of own country). For cross-cultural comparison of various aspects of Russian-Ukrainian war perception, several macro indicators have been constructed. Common characteristics of the war perception in EU countries were a high frequency of following news and discussing it with friends and relatives, approval of main EU measures aimed at supporting Ukraine; great satisfaction with the reaction of the main actors to the events in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the research is to outline the priority directions for increasing the financial and investment potential of the development of the Ukrainian regions in the conditions of modern challenges of globalization, including taking into account the security threats that arose in connection with the invasion of the territory of our state by the occupying forces. Primary attention is focused on such components of the financial and investment potential as the financial and budgetary capacity of the region, the potential investment capacity of its market, the ability to attract resources with the help of cofinancing and lending. Proved that the most important factors in the formation and development of the financial and investment potential at the regional level are: institutional processes that determine the quality of the institutional environment of the region; openness of local authorities to cooperation with business and investors; the quality of human and social capital, as well as the level of development of various types of infrastructure; features of the geographical and spatial location of the region. The classification of the regions of Ukraine was carried out according to the criterion of the impact on them of modern challenges of wartime, in particular in the context of the possible increase of financial and investment potential in the conditions of current globalization changes. Separated: front-line regions, on the territory of which hostilities are taking place; regions freed from occupation; regions bordering Belarus and potentially threatened by a possible ground offensive operation on its part; regions close to the combat zone, which can be called conditional rear regions; rear regions; regions bordering the EU and are both rear and transit areas for receiving military aid from our Western partners. The main mechanisms capable of increasing the financial and investment potential for the development of various types of Ukrainian regions in the conditions of modern challenges of globalization and martial law include: institutional and organizational (based on the optimization of institutional processes in the regions), information and communication (consists in the application of modern tools and means exchange of information with the aim of increasing the financial, budgetary and investment capacity of the region), as well as cluster (based on the formation of clusters capable of attracting financial and investment resources from Ukraine and abroad). Proposals for state authorities and local self-government bodies were formulated, in particular regarding the priority of supporting entrepreneurship in the regions, the development of the domestic energy industry on new institutional foundations, as well as the directions of modernization of the military-industrial complex at the state and regional levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Die führenden westlichen Mächte USA, Großbritannien, Frankreich und Deutschland liefern zwar Waffen an die Ukraine, konditionieren aber stark das Ausmaß der Lieferungen sowie das sonstige Niveau ihrer Unterstützung. Hauptsächlich gelte es einen Weltkrieg mit nuklearer Eskalation zu vermeiden. Experten und frühere hochrangige Generäle kritisieren zunehmend diese Restriktionen, die sich an Konzepten der Rüstungskontrolle aus den 60er Jahren orientieren. Sie argumentieren, dass Russland weder die Absicht habe noch die Mittel besitze, den Krieg zu eskalieren – es sei denn, es wolle einen selbstmörderischen Nuklearkrieg beginnen. Außerdem lasse Russland keine Anzeichen von Restriktionen erkennen. Die derzeitige Fokussierung auf das Vermeiden eines Dritten Weltkriegs dürfte die Ukraine in absehbarer Zeit in eine unhaltbare Lage bringen. Dann bliebe den westlichen Staaten nur die sehr kostspielige Option, die Ukraine dauerhaft wirtschaftlich und militärisch über Wasser zu halten oder ihr einen Waffenstillstand aufzuzwingen, der bestenfalls eine militärische Pause bis zum nächsten russischen Angriff darstellen wird. Die Gefahr eines Weltkriegs könnte durch die westliche Politik der Vorsicht eher zu- denn abnehmen. The leading Western powers (USA, United Kingdom, France, and Germany) send substantial amounts of weapons to Ukraine, however these deliveries as well as concomitant military assistance activities are subject to conditions and restrictions. Their purpose is to avoid a direct confrontation with Russian troops and to prevent the danger of an escalation ushering into nuclear confrontation. These restrictions and conditions are based on arms control thinking from the 1960s and are subject to criticism from former Generals and strategic experts. They argue that Russia had neither the intention nor the means to escalate the war – except from a nuclear escalation, which, however, would go along with incalculable risks for Russia itself. The current mix of conditions and restrictions might put Ukraine in an untenable position. As a consequence, the Western states would be left with two unattractive options: either to support Ukraine indefinitely both militarily and economically, or to force the Ukrainian leadership into a cease-fire agreement with Russia, which would only be an interim step towards a new Russian invasion. The Western policy of caution might rather increase than decrease the risk of the outbreak of World War III. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern digital media have enabled the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, to talk to foreign parliaments while his country is at war. Zelensky's virtual communications are not aimed at enhancing Ukraine's international image, as in traditional forms of public diplomacy; rather, they seek to obtain military assistance and reach a mutually beneficial outcome for his country. These, however, are activities of media diplomacy, a concept that scholars have abandoned over the last two decades in favour of public diplomacy. Through a critical review, this study examines the division between these concepts and other related concepts and analyses the role of the media in international communications, including those in times of war. The widespread use of technology and social media, as well as the specific diplomatic communications that have allowed Zelensky to talk to the world, have led to the conclusion that the current concepts of media diplomacy, public diplomacy, and digital diplomacy are not appropriate in the current circumstances. Therefore, a new concept is proposed: digital media diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The wish from 24 February 2022 onwards to help Ukraine defend against Russian aggression has led to the provision of unprecedented lethal European Union (EU) military assistance. As the 'taboo' of supplying lethal assistance into non-EU conflicts is swept aside, what is the role of international arms control law? The legal requirements of the EU Common Position on arms exports and the Arms Trade Treaty compel EU Member States to assess various short- and long-term risks associated with arms exports. But it is unclear how arms control norms are being taken into account by the EU Council in its rapidly evolving role as a peacemaker. The standards that are being used to shape EU decision-making on Ukraine matter both for their precedent-setting as reflecting the trajectory of EU normative power, as well as on the long-term blowbacks of proliferation on illicit arms trafficking. While from the EU Council, there has been limited public articulation of these risks, greater consideration thereof would serve as a reminder of the reality of post-conflict arms proliferation, ie. illicit arms trafficking of weapons leached from the conflict, and their subsequent misuse by undesirable actors. Geostrategic precedent is being set, with implications that extend far beyond Ukraine, including to other conflicts where the EU is already intervening. The EU's delivering of massive lethal military assistance alters also the reflexive perception of its institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines key aspects of security relations in the framework of the Canada-Ukraine dialogue in 2014-2017. With the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian armed conflict in 2014, Ukraine has significantly deepened its security policy and military-technical cooperation with a number of leading countries in the world, including Canada. Therefore, since 2014, the Government of Canada has repeatedly provided material assistance to the Ukrainian army: ammunition, bulletproof vests, helmets, individual diets and first aid kits, night vision devices, walkie-talkies, drones, armored vehicles, ambulances, mobile hospitals and others. Moreover, Ottawa is actively assisting Ukraine in reforming its Armed Forces and achieving their compatibility with NATO forces. To this end, the Government of Canada has extended for another two years the UNIFIER military training mission, which provided for the ongoing training of Ukrainian soldiers and officers by Canadian instructors until 2019. As part of the previous UNIFIER operation (2015-2017), Canadian instructors conducted 140 training courses for more than 5,580 Ukrainian servicemen. Despite the Kremlin’s considerable efforts to quarrel with Ukraine and its South Atlantic allies, Canada remains Ukraine’s strategic partner in both the security and economic and socio-political dimensions. The aim of the study is to analyze the features and vectors of cooperation between Canada and Ukraine in the security field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The French European policy in 2022 was shaped by the French presidency of the Council and the presidential and parliamentary elections. France played an important role in coordinating the European response to the war in Ukraine and imposed sanctions against Russia. The EU provided military assistance to Ukraine for the first time. President Macron sought dialogue with Russia and other world leaders, but also faced criticism. France advocated for an improvement in European defense capabilities and pursued the goal of European sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The French presidency of the Council organized various meetings to increase the visibility of the European Union and strengthen support for President Macron's integration agenda. Political agreements were reached on minimum wages, digital markets and services, as well as carbon border adjustment tax and minimum taxation of multinational corporations. The French dual elections once again demonstrated strong support for eurosceptic candidates and parties. The minority government plans to comply with the deficit ceiling only at the end of the legislative period and advocates for a reform of fiscal rules. [Extracted from the article]

The article describes the European Union's reaction to the war in Ukraine, which was initiated by Russia. The EU condemns Russia's military aggression and imposes extensive sanctions against Russia. Measures are taken to reduce energy dependence on Russia and strengthen the defense capabilities of EU member states. The sanctions have massive effects on the Russian economy. The EU supports Ukraine with military aid and financial assistance. NATO is increasing its troops in Europe, and the EU is planning joint procurement of weapons to support Ukraine. The EU shows both strengths and weaknesses in its response to the crisis. The EU should continue to support Ukraine with extensive economic aid and arms deliveries, as well as impose stricter sanctions on Russia. The EU can replace most of its vital raw material and energy imports from Russia with other sources. The EU should also seek alternative energy sources to become more independent. The expansion of the EU to include Ukraine should be secured through NATO expansion, and a concept for the reorganization of Europe should be developed. [Extracted from the article]

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