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We challenge Kruck and Weiss' argument about the regulatory security state on two counts. First, we contest the notion that the regulatory state is a viable alternative to the positive security state. While regulation and epistemic authority are increasingly important means of security provision, they remain critically dependent power resources and political authority that only the positive state provides. The regulatory security state is premised on the positive state and unviable without it. Second, the rise of the regulatory security state over the past three decades reflects highly specific historical conditions rather than a general trend. These conditions include unusually low geopolitical tensions in Europe and the strong regulatory bias of EU integration. Concepts matter: The wider the notion of security, the more relevant the regulatory security state becomes. It is an important reality but the war in Ukraine reminds us of the enduring centrality of the positive state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the Russian war in Ukraine affect European integration? Bellicist theories predict a push towards federation, marked by a centralization of fiscal, coercive and administrative core state powers at the EU level. But is it happening? We examine two main conditions of bellicist integration. The 'functional' condition refers to the efficiency gains of centralization: no federation without functional benefit. The 'political' condition refers to a threat-induced alignment of interests and identities that makes centralization politically viable: no federation without public support. We gauge both conditions during the early months of the war and explain why they have not pushed the EU towards centralized federation but, to the contrary, towards decentral alliance. We discuss issue-specific differences in defence, energy and fiscal policy and conclude with some general theoretical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kelemen and McNamara claim that the imbalance between the EU's strong regulatory authority and weak capacity in core state powers reflects its peaceful origins: the EU lacks coercive force, fiscal autonomy and administrative grip because it never had to confront a serious military threat. Will the emergence of such a threat suffice to correct the imbalance? As I argue theoretically, military threats have ambiguous effects on integration. They can fuel center-formation and capacity-building, as Kelemen and McNamara suggest, but also block it. As I show empirically, the military threat posed by the Russian attack of Ukraine in February 2022 has triggered very little EU capacity-building so far. I observe almost no centralization of core state powers but rather a strengthening of national powers with the support of EU institutions: 'bellicist integration' rather than 'bellicist state-building'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]