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The analysis in this paper was performed before the disastrous and unsolicited invasion of Russia to Ukraine. The paper aims to identify if the biggest Russian gas exporter Gazprom used market power to decouple its gas prices from European gas hub benchmarks. The empirical analysis is based on pairwise price convergence between the Russian pipeline and European gas hubs. The main finding shows that Gazprom takes advantage of its market position. The proposed model does not support the company's claims of pipeline price tightness to liquid European gas hubs, and rather proves fluctuating and unstable price convergence between pipelines and hubs from 2016 to March 2020, right before the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably, a robust and trendy-stable price convergence is observed between the Russian pipeline gas and Brent benchmark. Methodologically, the paper contributes with a modified convergence model compliant with gas market fundamentals and suggests a time-expanding concept missed in previous studies. Ongoing political and European gas market developments of 2022 (during the paper review) support the conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Russian gas export scenarios to Europe, considering infrastructure, long-term contracts (LTC), and the new geopolitical landscape in Europe. Short-term expectations preclude export growth, while Ukraine transit risks stem from military actions, sanctions, or termination of the transit contract. Export volume may recover in a benign post-conflict resolution, though not to pre-war levels. Available export infrastructure options include the Ukraine transit and the TurkStream pipeline, with a combined capacity of 75 billion cubic meters per annum (bcma), about 50% of Russia's exports in 2021. Gazprom's LTC position will also dictate possible export volume to Europe. Pre-Ukraine war, Gazprom held 135bcma of LTCs with EU buyers. Currently, only 25bcma is active, with the rest terminated or under legal review. Of the remaining LTC, 12bcma faces risk if the Ukraine transit ends in 2025. Considering these issues, we model baseline and counterfactual scenarios with flows from Russia from 0 to 75bcma. Results suggest gas price differences are prominent until 2026 due to a tight global gas market. Beyond 2026, LNG expansion and Europe's decarbonisation commitments lessen the price impact, making Russian gas economically irrelevant. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the divisive issue of Russian gas becomes economically insignificant by mid-decade. • Russian gas supply scenarios to Europe considering geopolitics, contracts, economics, and infrastructure. • Short-term expectations suggest no supply growth, while disruption of flows through Ukraine remains high. • Until 2026, European buyers would benefit from any increased availability of Russian gas. • Buying more Russian gas before 2026 is politically infeasible or morally unacceptable. • The potential economic impact of Russian pipeline gas is set to decline sharply from the mid-decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article describes a dispute over contracts for supplies and transmission of natural gas through Ukraine from March 2018. The concept of energy Prometheism in relation to bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine and the historical context of the crisis are also presented. The author analyses the consequences of the crisis for Ukraine and predicts further development of the situation. He also assesses the impact of the European Union's involvement in the dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to develop an analysis of the South Stream project in view of the Ukrainian crisis. We cannot put aside the internal factor as Ukraine is facing serious internal issues such as corruption and instability, therefore Russia's invasion of Ukraine can not be simply ignored in this pipeline project. The article uses mostly facts that happened throughout last years, as well as for and against declarations in the case of the South Stream project and its mother Russia. When we hear about South Stream, we think of Russia and since 2007, this pipeline has encouraged Putin's faith in energy superpower. A good point to start with was to gather all declarations since then and cover all actions that regard the South Stream game. In Russian foreign policy for the South Stream race, Soft Power was used more than enough and it has recently made room for Hard Power, which is the Ukraine never ending episode. Insights of the South Stream story have been lately related both softly and hardly, this is the reason why I have chosen to analyse both sides in order to complete the energy landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]