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This paper examines four of Europe's more marginal military institutions that receive less attention: the Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF); the French led European Intervention Initiative (EI2); the British led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF); and the Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian joint brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG). These are described here as "interstitial" because they exist in the niches between both the main multilateral security forums (NATO, EU, UN, OSCE) and the national level. They are intermediaries, working like bridges to cover political obstacles, while often borrowing resources from established actors (notably NATO). It is argued here that such institutions are a form of national hedging against institutional blockages within NATO/EU while providing a platform for national defence policy entrepreneurship. In the context of Cold War 2.0 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, such institutional practices should not be dismissed as marginal. They offer a means to deploy European military forces outside formal NATO or EU decision-making structures, a feature which confers a useful flexibility. (161) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The end of the twentieth century was marked by dramatic changes on the geopolitical ground, which was generated, first of all, by the USSR collapse. Political confrontations that accompanied the process of USSR collapse caused in the early 90's violent conflicts at the periphery of the former Soviet empire (in the Republic of Moldova, for example). The path pursued by the Republic of Moldova from 1992-2003 to settle its conflict was reduced to negotiations with the Transdniestrian separatist administration and to signing of a great number of documents with the participation of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). After some events (for example, refusal of signing the "Kozak Memorandum") the negotiation format was changed. Two new negotiator representatives of USA and European Union were involved in the process; they expressed their own positions and interests, provided new visions. The Transdniestrian conflict reached an international level and actually is has been discussed within the Council of Europe, European Commission and other international bodies, which is significantly important in the politics of conflict resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past five years, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission has been implementing its mandate, partially in an environment of ongoing violence. This article describes ways in which the conflict continues to impact the lives of civilians and describes the humanitarian-security nexus in the Ukrainian conflict. As well, the article draws conclusions, which contributions an international monitoring mission can make to mitigate the human cost of the conflict and pursue a comprehensive concept of security and to prevention, even while operating under the conditions of an ongoing conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since independence and up until now Ukraine has tried to shape its security priorities and to define and implement key policies into its main security-related documents: laws, strategies, and defense policy ("military doctrine"). Ukraine also invested its hopes into the development of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), planned to enhance its participation in the activities of North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), and the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), expecting that the activities of these institutions would contribute to shaping the new architecture of pan-European security and assuming that belonging to the latter would be crucial for Ukraine's national security. First, in 2010 the pro-presidential majority in the Parliament of Ukraine passed the Law No 2411-VI "On the Basics of Internal and External Policy."[12] The document stated that Ukraine, as a European country that did not belong to any military block, had an open foreign policy, and sought co-operation with any interested partners, whilst avoiding dependence on any country, groups of counties, or international organisations. Ukraine was the first non-allied country to contribute military capabilities to the NATO Response Force.[26]Under OSCE umbrella Ukraine has taken part in OSCE missions in Kosovo, Georgia, Macedonia, and Kyrgyzstan. [Extracted from the article]

Die Welt steht vor einer unvorhergesehenen Krise mit dem Auftreten mehrerer regionaler Konflikte und dem Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine. Vor diesem Hintergrund erörtert dieser Artikel, wie Europas Sicherheit sich nach dieser Krise entfalten könnte. Er unterstreicht hierbei, dass die gegenwärtigen Herausforderungen für den europäischen Sicherheitsdialog die europäischen Staaten dazu auffordern, gemeinsam mit der OSZE die diplomatischen Beziehungen und die Zusammenarbeit zu stärken. Die Situation in Europa und dessen enge zwischenstaatliche Verflechtung betont zudem die Notwendigkeit und den Bedarf an Reformen, besonders im Sicherheitsbereich. Ferner ist es von entscheidender Bedeutung, sich in den Friedensbemühungen auf historische Entwicklungen zu stützen. In Anbetracht der aktuellen Situation werden die Lehren aus den Helsinki-Vereinbarungen und die Stärkung bestehender Rahmenwerke sich als entscheidend erweisen bei der Förderung von Frieden sowie von regionaler und internationaler Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit. Die Rolle der zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen ist hierbei von zentraler Bedeutung, da sie eine Fülle wertvoller Informationen und Forschungsanalysen bereitstellen, die einen entscheidenden Beitrag dazu leisten, Anliegen von Konflikten betroffener Regionen und der internationalen Gemeinschaft als Ganzes zu enthüllen und zu berücksichtigen. The world is facing an unprecedented crisis with several regional conflicts and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Against this background, this article looks at how Europe's security could unfold after this crisis. In doing so, it underlines the current challenges to the European security dialogue and calls on European states and the OSCE to jointly strengthen diplomatic ties and cooperation. The situation in Europe and its states' interdependencies also underscore the need for reform, particularly in the security domain. Furthermore, it is paramount to draw on historical developments in peace efforts. Given the current situation, borrowing lessons from and strengthening existing frameworks such as the Helsinki Accords will prove decisive in promoting regional and international peace, security, and cooperation. The role of civil society organizations is crucial in this regard, given their importance in providing a plethora of valuable information and research analysis that is instrumental in addressing concerns of conflict-affected regions and the international community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The military invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation since February 2022 has led to widespread international condemnation and close scrutiny. Among the various key aspects of this phase of the conflict, one of the most pressing legal issues is the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. These acts represent not only egregious violations of international law but also pose significant threats to peace, security, and the sovereignty of Ukraine, a recognized subject of international law. The need to address and delineate the legal responsibility of those guilty of committing these violations is both urgent and critical. This scholarly article aims to analyze the individual criminal responsibility of Russian state representatives for their involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine. By looking at specific cases and the framework of international criminal law, the article seeks to propose realistic avenues for bringing perpetrators to justice, thereby contributing to the broader discourse on accountability and the enforcement of international legal standards. The research methodology adopted in this article is characterized by a relevant analysis of international legal instruments, jurisprudence, and some international cases. Through a brief examination of the criminal acts committed by Russian troops in Ukraine, the article leverages both qualitative and quantitative data to categorize and assess the nature of these crimes within the ambit of modern international criminal law. The article's research elucidates the categorization of war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined by international law, providing their clear differentiation from one another. By systematically reviewing incidents since the military invasion of Ukraine, the article qualifies multiple acts by Russian forces as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, the article provides a brief review of the individual criminal responsibility for the commission of core crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity and look at how it should apply to the Russian perpetrators. It concludes with a strong advocacy for the expedited identification and utilization of an appropriate judicial mechanism to address the criminal responsibility of Russian state representatives. It highlights the imperative need for swift action to prevent further impunity and ensure justice for the victims of these heinous crimes. Additionally, the article warns of the risks associated with delays in the judicial process, emphasizing the potential for prolonged suffering and instability in the region. Ultimately, it calls for a concerted international effort to uphold the principles of international law and human rights, thereby safeguarding the sovereignty and dignity of Ukraine and its people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International election observation has been scrutinized over the past two decades by scholars trying to explain its aim, scope, and consequences. As it is now a standard practice in democratizing countries, scholarly literature has almost reached a consensus on the ability of observers to deter election-day fraud, one of the most positive unintended consequences of election observation. Using data from the 2004 Ukraine presidential election, this article extends our knowledge through a natural experiment on polling station-level election results. I will show that observation during counting does not have a stronger effect than observation during opening and/or polling. Results support previous studies showing the usefulness of election observation in reducing election-day fraud but add an important finding that deserves further scholarly attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an overview of propaganda during the war. It is well known that war generated different methods of manipulation and techniques to manipulate public discourse. We offer a view on the current method of computational propaganda and one of these methods, robotrolling. We offer a brief description of the robotrolling technique. The purpose of this work is to broaden our knowledge of war propaganda and to describe the current relationship between Russia and Ukraine and their previous effort to cooperate on some issues. The study has presented a difference between the propaganda on the Russian side and the propaganda on the Ukrainian side. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The resilience approach has recently emerged as a new topic of EU foreign policy debates and research. This paper adopts a complexity theory perspective to analyze the operationalization of the resilience approach in the EU response to crisis in Ukraine during 2014–2021. Building upon this theory, this paper distinguishes between resilience-as-quality of a complex system and resilience-as-thinking about a complex system. The empirical analysis focuses on the complexity features of non-linearity and self-organizing localization of EU interventions undertaken in the framework of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). It concludes that the emerging system of intervention displays some complexity qualities, yet the EU crisis response follows the linear and top-down logic embedded in the project-based practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following years of grievances, Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022 and sparked the largest military conflict in Europe since World War II. Conversations between Soviet and Western leaders in the final days of the Cold War are at the center of the Kremlin's justification for these actions. Russia claims the West exploited a weakened Russian state by rapidly expanding NATO in former Soviet and Warsaw Bloc nations, despite a promise not to expand. This research seeks to answer how Russia's NATO-expansion justification for invading Ukraine is inconsistent with the historical record. Findings reveal that the West never provided assurances on NATO expansion and Russia accepted and advocated sovereignty, international borders, states determining their security arrangements, and not using coercion to settle international disputes. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia also increased cooperation with an already expanding NATO, which only further exposes the hypocrisy of their disinformation campaign and ultimately invalidates their war justification. This analysis is critical to understand how Russia changes the historical record to justify military action and threatens the geopolitical balance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding why the Minsk process failed is essential both for explaining why Russia invaded in 2022 and for ensuring that a new peace settlement does not prove similarly ineffective. Many analyses point to the conflicting goals of the combatants as the basic obstacle to peace. However, rationalist approaches show that some peace agreement should always be preferable to war. The commitment problem represents an obstacle to peace in Ukraine that is distinct from the territorial questions at the center of the war. The failure of Minsk reflects the actors' inability to credibly commit to fulfilling their promises. Third-party guarantees are essential to solving the conflict, but external guarantees have their own credibility problems. Therefore, further conflict was the only route to a settlement. Unless better solutions for the commitment problem can be found, a peace deal will rely either on one side being defeated or the two sides fighting to exhaustion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 ended the hybrid stage of conflict that emerged in 2014, following the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and proxy aggression in East Ukraine. Empirical data demonstrate a two‐fold interplay between grey zone strategies and applicable rules. 'Lawfare' instruments affect jus ad bellum, permitting multiple political choices and the deployment of different means of hybrid warfare. A grey zone conflict itself develops conflicting and overlapping sets of rules supported by different actors. Eventually, additional rules may emerge due to the actions or interactions of conflicting parties; these rules focus on conflict management or settlement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU as an actor in international affairs does so far have only limited experience in conflict management. Nevertheless, it has formulated the goal of playing the role of a 'comprehensive' conflict manager already in 2013. In the post-Soviet region, the Union until recently hardly lived up to that ambition and has mostly restricted itself to a technical profile. This article asks for the EU's contribution to conflict management in Ukraine since 2014 and for its respective development as a foreign policy actor. It finds that the Union in Ukraine largely remains wedded to the 'partial-indirect' type of conflict manager but that it has also demonstrated some progress towards a more political and less technocratic profile. In the Ukraine conflict, the EU has shown remarkable pragmatism, a willingness to invest resources on an unprecedented level, and the ability to securitize its policies in substance. It can be argued that the EU, based on its comprehensive support to state building projects in Ukraine, is on the way towards the establishment of a 'state building–security nexus' in the ENP framework. Yet, there exists a dangerous gap between the level of investment on the one hand and the low political profile of the institutions and the lack of strategy on the other hand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has put significant pressure on the European Union's (EU) role conceptions, challenging its self-perception as a normative and civilian power. This article explores the impact of the invasion on EU role conceptions through the lens of ontological security theory. We differentiate between ontological insecurity and crisis, elucidating the EU's responses to acute shocks that disrupt the connection between its self-image and social roles. Drawing on role theory, we examine how the invasion has prompted the EU to reconsider its roles. We identify adjustment, adaptation, innovation, and abandonment as key types of role change, exploring how these responses vary across individual roles within the EU's role set. By combining qualitative and quantitative content analysis of EU documents, we empirically investigate changes in EU role conceptions pre- and post-invasion. Our analysis contributes to a deeper understanding of role theory's application to international organizations (IOs), bridging gaps between foreign policy analysis and IO research. In addition, we advance methodological approaches to studying role changes, offering insights into the complex interplay between external events, institutional identity formation, and ontological security in the context of geopolitical crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Católica Law Review is the property of Catolica Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In Ukraine, the regulatory framework for the functioning of the judiciary system is the newly revised Constitution of Ukraine, and other updated and newly adopted laws related to the constitutional reform of 2016, particularly, to issues of justice. The major challenges of the judicial reform in Ukraine have already become the focal point for scholars and scientists. The purpose of the article is to make a comprehensive analysis of the main updated provisions of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine relating to the new judiciary system, the types of general jurisdiction courts, the composition of courts of new levels, and their powers ensuing from their place in the court system, in the context of today's constitutional reform in Ukraine and international standards. International requirements to the system of judiciary are set out in a number of international and European documents. According to these documents, amendments were made to the Constitution and the Law of Ukraine "On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges", new laws were adopted. Our country's judiciary system has undergone significant changes both in content and in form. Its content has been filled with provisions which largely correspond to international standards, as noted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The principles underlying the judiciary system have been expanded. Following the repeated insistence by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), the transition has been made from a four-level judiciary system (local, appellate courts, higher specialized courts, the Supreme Court of Ukraine) to a three-level system (local courts, courts of appeal, the Supreme Court). The revised Law of Ukraine "On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges" eliminated the higher specialized courts and expanded the structure of the Supreme Court which now comprises the cassation courts that consider cases of the categories previously referred to the terms of reference of the higher specialized courts which existed within the framework of civil, criminal, administrative and economic law. This position of the Parliament of Ukraine was approved by the OSCE. For consideration of cases of certain categories, in the judiciary system the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court has been established, on a competitive basis, and operates now, and the competitive selection to the Supreme Court for Intellectual Property and its Chamber of Appeal is underway. Their authority is to consider cases referred to their jurisdiction by procedural law. The article describes the procedure of their establishment as the first- and appellate-level courts which consider cases of separate categories, as well as the structure and the specific features with which they are formed. The author emphasizes the importance of establishment of the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court, and the special role played in its establishment by the Public Council of International Experts. One of the most essential elements of the judicial reform is the liquidation of the Supreme Court of Ukraine and the establishment of the new Supreme Court. Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine improved its structure and updated the content of operation. Today, the Supreme Court is the only court of cassation. It remains the highest court in the judicial system of Ukraine which ensures the consistency and unity of court practice, and this was positively assessed by the OSCE. The powers of the Supreme Court have been expanded, a new composition has been formed in terms of quantity and quality, and there is the intent of its further update according to the amendments of October 16, 2019; the Court's structure has changed radically, the role of its Plenum has been enhanced, etc. In order to depoliticize and eliminate pressure on the judiciary and in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission, the entity establishing and liquidating courts has been changed (currently, it is the Verkhovna Rada, not the President of Ukraine). While endorsing the positive elements of the reforms of the judiciary system, the OSCE noted in its Opinion of June 30, 2017 that some provisions of the Law on the Judicial System and the Status of Judges should be revised or further improved. The Commission emphasized the need to create detailed procedural legislation which would regulate the functioning of the new judiciary system. The author notes that in the course of judicial reform, many problems have arisen: qualification assessment of the candidates for the position of judge is slow and not always transparent, the newly established local courts and courts of appeal are sorely lacking judicial staff, the case load of judges increases and this leads to the declining efficiency and quality with which cases are considered, and negatively affects the principle of citizens' access to justice. The author believes that amendments to the laws of Ukraine on the judicial system and the status of judges and the Supreme Council of Justice of October 16, 2019 will be conductive to improvement of the composition of the Supreme Court and judicial administration, etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2007, Serbia is considered to promote a model of foreign policy based on maintaining an equal distance between Brussels and Moscow. This strategy became more evident after the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, when on the one hand Serbia supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and on the other hand it abstained from voting the UN resolution which was meant to reaffirm the territorial integrity of Ukraine and did not impose sanctions on Russia. These contradictory decisions were followed by numerous other political events that required Serbia's clear-cut positioning in the Ukrainian conflict in 2015 and 2016. The paper assesses the impact of the conflict in Ukraine to be found in the main discourses around Serbia's foreign policy of 'sitting on two chairs' between its European perspective and maintaining its close ties with Russia, as viewed by elites in the period between 2014 and 2016. First, the paper explores the various meanings attached to Serbia's military neutrality in scholarly and policy debates. Next, it looks at how those meanings have been enacted in discourses and practices along the first three years of the Ukrainian crisis. The conclusions discuss the paradoxes of Serbia's positions, pointing towards the 'politics' of the neutrality policy as revealed in the discourses that surrounded the Ukrainian crisis and various East-West divides that it triggered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russia–Ukraine conflict is also being fought in the maritime dimension. Regarding methods of warfare, of particular note has been the possible existence of a Russian naval blockade in the Sea of Azov and off the coast of Odessa in the Black Sea. The blockade played a significant role in the emergence of the grain crisis, and has been opined to be the main reason why vessels were not able to safely sail out of the Black Sea and deliver grain to areas in other parts of the world that were in much need thereof. This paper explores whether Russia imposed a blockade in a legal sense based on the law of naval warfare—allowing belligerent rights to be exercised—or whether the Russian activities should in fact be regarded as another form of maritime control or dominance over certain maritime areas during an international armed conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction to an article on Ukraine crisis is presented.

The article presents a comment on the observations of Presidential election of Ukraine held in the December 2004 by several international organization. An unprecedented number of election observers descended upon Ukraine to monitor the re-run of the second round Presidential elections. They refused to accept the results announced by the Central Electoral Commission which had declared prime minister Viktor Yanukovich the winner. And they were strengthened in their resolve by the preliminary findings of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's election monitoring mission.

Die zwischen der Ukraine und Russland unter Vermittlung von OSZE, Deutschland und Frankreich abgeschlossenen Minsker Abkommen waren Ausdruck von Völkerrechtsnihilismus und Aggressionsverschleierung. Im Gegensatz zu einer weitverbreiteten Auffassung waren die Dokumente, die Moskau der Ukraine im September 2014 und Februar 2015 aufgezwungen hatte, keine Lösung, sondern Teil des Problems. Die in sich widersprüchlichen Minsker Abkommen hatte Kyjiw unter massivem russischem Druck unterzeichnet. Die Unterzeichnung erfolgte nach verheerenden militärischen Niederlagen, die reguläre und irreguläre russische Streitkräfte der Ukraine beigebracht hatten. Für den Kreml waren die Abkommen Instrumente, geo- und hegemonialpolitischen Früchte seiner anfänglich verdeckten militärischen Aggression gegen die Ukraine zu ernten. Westliche Staaten – insbesondere Deutschland und Frankreich – billigten stillschweigend Russlands offensichtliche Infragestellung der europäischen Sicherheitsordnung. Berlin und Paris drängten Kyjiw, die widersprüchlichen Bestimmungen der Minsker Abkommen in fragwürdigen Sequenzen umzusetzen. Eine völkerrechtlich teilakzeptable Interpretation der Übereinkunft durch die Ukraine unterstützte der Westen nur unzureichend. Moskau wurde für seine Verletzungen der Vereinbarungen, Verballhornung völkerrechtlicher und demokratischer Grundprinzipien sowie unkooperative Haltung bei den Verhandlungen nicht sanktioniert. Summary: Until 24 February 2022, the Russian-Ukrainian agreements signed in the capital of Belarus in 2014–2015 were seen, by many observers, as a path to a settlement of the Donbas conflict. However, the contradictory Minsk deals were signed by Kyiv under enormous duress. Contrary to common belief over years, the various documents that the Kremlin forced upon Kyiv in the context of devastating Ukrainian military defeats from regular and irregular Russian forces, in September 2014 and February 2015, were not a solution but part of the problem. They were manifestations of international legal nihilism, undermining basic democratic standards, and Kremlin instruments to harvest the fruits of Russia's initially covert military aggression against Ukraine. Oddly, Western states furthered the Kremlin's obvious subversion of the European security order, by condoning the conclusion of the Minsk Agreements, pressuring Ukraine to implement its dubious provisions, insufficiently supporting a normatively acceptable interpretation of the agreement, and not punishing Moscow for its violation of the agreements as well as uncooperative negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Social Sciences Research / Sosyal Bilimler Arastirmalari Dergisi is the property of ODU Journal of Social Sciences Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This book examines the main stages and authoritarian obstacles of NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War, which gradually transformed into a hybrid conflict. In the various chapters of this book, the authors compare the main advantages and disadvantages of NATO enlargement in terms of the results of defending democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. The authors analyze the relationship between NATO enlargement and U.S. foreign policy on democracy and security in Central and Eastern Europe, which are indicators of NATO's resilience as a political and military intergovernmental organization. The book analyzes the challenges of democratizing political regimes from the perspective of political security, including the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politologija is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Purpose. Numerous facts of the harmful impact of military actions caused by the military aggression of the Russian Federation on the environment of Ukraine were recorded and documented by many Ukrainian and foreign scientists and other specialists. The purpose of this work was to form a reference list of publications on the impact of war on water resources and hydrobionts, as well as the aquaculture industry of Ukraine in general and fisheries in particular. Methods. The complete and selective methods were applied in the process of the systematic search. The bibliographic and we bliographic core have been consisted of publications in Ukrainian and English, including monographs, materials of round tables, conferences and meetings, public reports, articles in collections of scientific collections and journals, as well as reviews, chronicles, news on the subject of the work, posted on publicly available websites. Results. A thematic list of publications with a total quantity of 97 sources covering the time interval from 2015 to 2024, and showing the issues of the impact of military operations on natural hydro-ecosystems, as well as the aquaculture industry of Ukraine has been composed. In addition, the range of issues covered includes methods for calculating the damage caused by war and possible ways to overcome its harmful consequences. The literary sources were arranged in alphabetical order by author or title, and described according to DSTU 8302:2015 “Information and documentation. Bibliographic reference. General principles and rules of composition”, with the amendments (code UKND 01.140.40), as well as in accordance with the requirements of APA style — international standard of references. Practical value. The list may be useful for ecologists, ichthyologists, hydrobiologists, fish farmers — both scientists, specialists, and teachers, students, and everyone interested in the topic of the publication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Max van der Stoel's involvement in minority-related problems of post-Soviet Ukraine as High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It highlights the possibilities and limitations of quiet diplomacy, deemed an essential mandate for the position. Stoel reportedly used the mandate that contributed in the de-escalation of conflicts between the Ukrainian government and leaders of major national minorities.

The article "Finlandization and the Ukrainian question" discusses the relations between the West and Russia, as well as the possibility of "Finlandization" in relation to the Ukraine conflict. Finland is mentioned as an example of a neutral policy that takes into account the interests of a powerful neighbor. The article describes Finland's foreign policy doctrine during President Kekkonen's term, known as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. Finland hosted the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which led to the establishment of the OSCE. Historical parallels between Finland and Ukraine are pointed out, which could serve as a solution and stabilizer for the relations between Finland and Russia. It remains to be seen how Russia's invasion will affect the willingness of Ukrainians to strive for neutrality based on the Finnish model. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Perspektive Mediation is the property of Verlag Oesterreich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article offers information on the secessionist conflicts in Moldova and Ukraine. It further discusses dispute characteristics, inter-relationships among parties involved, mediator bias, international context and mediation style; the role of biased mediation in conflict management; the nature of the intervenor and disputants and the timing and scope of third-party involvement; and the pro-independence, nationalist movement in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic.

The article considers the issue of the creation and registration of religious organizations and the acquisition of the status of a legal entity. The main problems faced by religious organizations in the process of state recognition are considered. The methods of state registration of religious organizations depending on their type are described, the powers of regional and central executive bodies regarding the legal recognition of religious organizations are outlined. Proposals have been made to amend the current legislation to create a transparent process for registering religious organizations. The article defines religious organizations in Ukraine such as religious communities, centers, administrations, monasteries, church unions, missions, theological educational institutions, organizations, and associations. As the registration procedure of religious organizations has two stages of registration in Ukraine, the article describes in detail each of the stages of state registration of religious organizations. The article describes the state benefits that religious organizations in Ukraine can receive after obtaining the status of a legal entity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ukraine adopted its first National Action Plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security whilst facing an active military conflict on its territory. The country also invested in localising the Women, Peace and Security agenda through the development of regional and local action plans. Additionally, several ministries adopted sectoral action plans. This article looks at the context in which Ukraine developed its first NAP 1325 (post-Maidan) and assesses the NAP against global high impact NAP indicators. The authors then focus on connections between the national and regional/local-level plans and conclude that Ukraine's first NAP did 'trigger' localisation initiatives in the form of Regional Action Plans (RAP) on UNSCR 1325, with Local Action Plans having been initiated via a separate track. A certain level of synergy was realised between initiatives stemming from these plans. The authors do, however, conclude untapped potential remains to further nurture, facilitate and support bottom-up Women, Peace and Security initiatives in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]