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This article explains the survival of the AKP in Turkey's late stage of autocratization (2017-present) through its strategy of shifting the primary drivers of competition from individual parties to pre-electoral alliances. Confronted with a decline in popular support in 2015 June elections, the article argues that the AKP created uneven patterns of competition via the system of pre-electoral alliances so that it could institutionalize a 'Rikerian offense' on the salient Turkish-Kurdish cleavage and establish an authoritarian power-sharing mechanism with its former challenger, the Turkish nationalist MHP. To illustrate the shift toward uneven patterns of electoral competition via such incumbent strategies, the article conducts a two-part analysis: It first examines the landscape of competition among parties (2002-2015) and second, evaluates competition among both parties and alliances (2018-2023) at the national and district levels in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Turkish economy presented a complicated picture ahead of the 2023 election, with significant currency depreciation and soaring inflation yet robust growth and stable employment levels. How did voters' economic perceptions shape election results in such a context? Drawing on Turkish Election Study surveys, this study reaches two main conclusions. First, while the average evaluation of the economy in the electorate was quite poor, there is a sharp divergence across incumbent supporters and others: The incumbent Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) supporters' evaluations have changed little since the previous election in 2018, yet those of other voters have deteriorated significantly. Second, the opposition seems to have failed in convincing large parts of the electorate that they would manage the economy better than Erdoğan. Overall, economic voting appears to have worked as expected, and the unwavering economic evaluations of likely AKP voters and the perceived incompetence of the opposition seem to have helped Erdoğan to win another term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elections under authoritarian regimes rarely deliver democratic outcomes. Still, most observers and pollsters expected Turkey's May 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections to be different. A deepening economic crisis, a botched rescue effort after a devastating earthquake, and discontent with a ruling party in power for more than two decades seemed to fuel the rise of a united opposition. But the return to democracy did not happen, and this cannot be credited solely to an unlevel electoral playing field. Turkey offers a case study in electoral autocracy, with incumbent tactics of repression and co-optation that disarm opposition parties by drawing them into the logic of autocratic politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines patterns of voter defection from Turkey's incumbent AKP amid major economic and democratic decline. As in other electoral autocracies, defectors constitute a small but politically significant group in Turkey, where the opposition's ability to secure a transition from authoritarianism depends on reducing the incumbent's vote share. Based on survey data gathered in November 2021 and February 2022, we find that while the high level of partizanship among AKP voters hinders defection, persistent economic and democratic decline still reduces incumbent support. We also found that defections are higher outside of the lowest income group. Our findings have important implications for opposition strategies in electoral autocracies. Directing public debate away from identity issues to economic and democratic problems increases the likelihood of defection. In addition, offering voters clear superior alternatives decreases the cost of uncertainty that comes with change and increases the likelihood of defection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As internet penetration rapidly expanded throughout the world, press freedom and government accountability improved in some countries but backslid in others. We propose a formal model that provides a mechanism that explains the observed divergent paths of countries. We argue that increased access to social media makes partial capture, where governments allow limited freedom of the press, an untenable strategy. By amplifying the influence of small traditional media outlets, higher internet access increases both the costs of capture and the risk that a critical mass of citizens will become informed and overturn the incumbent. Depending on the incentives to retain office, greater internet access thus either forces an incumbent to extend capture to small outlets, further undermining press freedom; or relieve pressure from others. We relate our findings to the cases of Turkey and Tunisia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once voted into office, populist governments have often found undemocratic means to prolong their stay. The literature on populists in power is evolving and expanding. However, it has mainly focused on how the populists in power attack institutions such as the judiciary, rule erosion, and dirty institutionalism. How populists make use of the law and the judiciary to prolong their authoritarian rule remains an area that is under-researched. The populists' use of informal institutions such as the unofficial law when in power has not been studied either. This paper addresses these gaps in the populism literature by studying Turkey's Islamist populist ruling party's use of informal law in prolonging its authoritarian rule. The paper argues that the Islamist civilisational populist AKP has been using informal Islamist law for both the legitimation of its rule and the repression of the opposition. It shows how the AKP officials, the state's Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the pro-AKP Sharia scholars, and other informal religious authorities employ the civilisational populist Islamist legal narrative to argue that according to Sharia it is obligatory to choose the side of the God that is represented by the AKP and to vote against the infidel opposition that is an existential danger to the pure Muslim people of Turkey and their religion. The paper combines and contributes to two theoretical strands. The first is civilisational populism, and the second is the informal institutions, with a focus on informal law and legal pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In competitive authoritarian regimes, forming a pre-electoral coalition (PEC) provides a mean for opposition parties to defeat the incumbent party. In Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party initiated a PEC by forming the People's Alliance with two other parties. Like the opposition in other competitive authoritarian regimes, Turkey's opposition parties also formed a PEC, namely the Nation Alliance. Looking at the political affinity of these parties by using their election manifestos and Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data, the paper argues that while the People's Alliance was formed by ideologically close parties, the Nation Alliance was composed of ideologically distant parties, whose main aim, under a competitive authoritarian regime, was to prevent the incumbent from gaining a parliamentary majority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To consolidate a predominant party system, an incumbent party will attempt to anchor voting behavior to social cleavages, a strategy called cleavage enclosure. However, does this strategy actually work? In Turkey, the incumbent AKP government has focused its campaigning on conservatives and nationalists. The analysis of the 2018 post-election survey reveals that the cleavage enclosure worked for conservatives but not for nationalists. Of the incumbent supporters in the previous election, conservatives replicated their support, whereas nationalists were less likely to support the incumbent than other identity holders. Nationalists tend to punish but not reward the incumbent party for its economic performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Monitoring is the formal instrument through which the Council of Europe imposes social sanctions on its member countries by publicly exposing their wrongdoings. As a soft governance tool, monitoring is argued to have a limited impact on state policies. Yet, in Turkey, Council of Europe monitoring worked to promote pro-democratic change and then backfired through the escalation of authoritarian practices. This article shows that being subjected to Council of Europe monitoring can lead to democratic change if and when its sanctioning requirements fit the political agenda of the incumbents and empower them against domestic opponents. In the case of misfit, the political costs of aligning with the Regional Organisations' sanctions increase for governments at home. Yet, as the Turkish case indicates, the outcome has not been inertia but rather the reverse as the government used the Council of Europe's social sanctions to legitimise its undemocratic measures until it regained power in internal political struggles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data collected from an embedded survey administered to a nationally representative sample in Turkey, we test three common explanations for the re-election of corrupt politicians: Lack of Reliable Information, Efficiency Corruption Trade-Off, and Co-partisanship. We find that when voters receive reliable information that the incumbent mayor is corrupt, an electoral punishment (a decrease in the incumbent's vote share in the coming elections) follows. This decrease, however, does not necessarily result in the incumbent being voted out, as we also find that many voters sufficiently value efficiency and co-partisanship in a corrupt politician to vote to re-elect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the snap general elections in 2018, Turkish voters again went to ballot-box to cast their verdict on local elections on 31 March 2019. While the electoral playing field remained heavily skewed to the benefit of the incumbent bloc as it has been during the recent rounds of electoral contestation, the opposition, for the first time, broke the winning series of the incumbent AKP and won nearly all the major metropolitan municipalities including Ankara and Istanbul. This article aims to delineate the dynamics of polarization/depolarization in a competitive authoritarian setting. Through an analysis of political and economic context and campaign discourses of main parties in recent local elections, this article argues that under a regime level cleavage, performance failure of incumbent enabled the opposition to initiate a depolarizing and inclusive campaign discourse while captivating its core constituency. Secondly, this article assesses the possible ramifications of recent electoral loss for the sustainability of competitive authoritarian regime in Turkey through an analysis of AKP's politics of patronage and clientelism and party organization. Such an analysis demonstrates that despite its local character, the recent elections will have important ramifications for the sustainability of competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the non-contributory health insurance program ("green cards") in Turkey with RDD (Regression Discontinuity Design) and show that more citizens receive green cards in municipalities controlled by the national incumbent party, AKP (Adalalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). Our explanation for the finding emphasizes the role of local party organizations and sub-national incumbency. Local government control provides additional resources to the party to strengthen its organization, which then helps the party to target the beneficiaries of central government programs like green cards more effectively. Theoretically, we join the literature that uncovers the significance of incorporating local actors into the analysis of central government programs. Our contribution lies in depicting the mediating role of political parties and their local organizations. Even in a highly centralized context like Turkey, parties' informal role affects program implementation. Unequal access to free healthcare results from the asymmetry between national and opposition parties in how their local organizations interact with the central government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Incumbent parties are often able to control state resources in ways that allow them to garner support in a clientelistic fashion. When regulatory institutions cannot restrain the incumbent's discretionary control over these resources, monopolistic control can give these parties a major political advantage. Focusing on clientelistic strategies employed by Turkey's ruling AK Party in comparison to opposition parties, this paper discusses mechanisms through which the incumbent party garners advantages through clientelism. While doing so, it presents evidence from an original fieldwork conducted in an Istanbul neighbourhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For a long time, governments have delegated their regulatory powers to independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). The aim is to reduce transaction costs and to ensure a credible commitment in the regulatory institutional structure. This paper discusses transition to IRAs in Turkey in terms of independence and accountability. To this aim, we firstly analyze the institutional foundations of transition to IRAs in Turkey from a political economy perspective and then measure their formal independence levels. We find that the pragmatic policies of the incumbent government regarding IRAs negatively influence their independence. This injures the credibility of regulatory commitment and increases the political transaction costs of regulatory process in Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature largely neglects whether individual politicians or political parties in proportional representation enjoy a similar incumbency advantage to the established democracies with SMD. We suggest that institutional settings provide incentives for political parties to field incumbent candidates strategically, depending on district size; and high levels of party system instability in consolidating democracies create conditions under which political parties benefit more from the incumbents' reputations. By using a new dataset, we test whether the incumbency advantage exists, and depends on the district size and the level of political instability in Turkey. Our results indicate that the incumbency advantage in Turkey is largely conditional on the district size. The effect of the party system instability is also substantial. The higher the party system instability, the more political parties benefit from fielding incumbents in party lists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic voting studies have repeatedly shown that voter's assessment of incumbent economic performance is important for the vote decision. However, there is little work explaining how individuals form their economic assessments. Utilizing individual-level data from Turkey, we find that variation in retrospective assessments can actually be predicted by individual income growth rates over the previous year, and the association is stronger for pocketbook assessments. Nonetheless, partisanship and media are important sources of bias, especially for sociotropic assessments. Controlled for partisanship, viewers of pro-government media are more likely to think that the national economy has done better than their own household over the last year, and also more likely to believe that the economy would fare worse if the incumbent is replaced. The findings testify both to the capacity of the individuals to anchor their assessments to personal experience, and to the media's ability to weaken this anchor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]