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In this article, the authors explore this new level of tribal political sophistication and how the tribes sought to pressure state legislators by pursuing a public relation campaign centered on issues of economic interest and sovereignty. Though they have been unsuccessful in recent legislative sessions, there is evidence of a growing sophistication in how Texas Indian tribes implement interest group strategies to influence policy. However, the authors theorize that tribes will engage in learning behavior and continue to engage in more complex political behavior at the state level. The data from this analysis involved two of the three American Indian tribes in the state of Texas: the Alabama-Coushatta tribe and the Tigua of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo. The Texas tribes were chosen based on a variety of factors, including their recent ventures into the gaming industry and subsequent litigation with the state of Texas. These data provides a great opportunity to investigate the extent to which Native American groups are behaving like interest groups. Findings from this analysis theorize that as American Indian nations transition from a legalistic political approach to an interest-group strategy, their campaign contribution behavior will reflect a change from a naive view of political influence to a more sophisticated reward-and-incentive legislative strategy. (Contains 2 tables and 40 notes.)

The increased devolution of federal responsibilities to states coupled with lack of programs and income is heightening the need for economic development among Native American tribes. The fastest growing and most profitable investment is reservation casino gambling. However, the inability of many tribes to successfully negotiate gaming ‘compacts’ with state governments as prescribed by federal law is creating a new dynamic in state politics. Tribal governments are increasingly engaged in interest group behavior, such as narrowing the scope of conflict, and inside and outside lobbying, to try and create favorable policy decisions. Using a case study of two Texas tribes, an analysis of interest group learning is conducted. We conclude that, in order to survive, tribal gaming interest groups must gain access to state political venues instead of relying on the federal government and the courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]