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The authors describe Taiwan's successful strategy in achieving control of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) without economic shutdown, despite the prediction that millions of infections would be imported from travelers returning from Chinese New Year celebrations in Mainland China in early 2020. As of September 2, 2020, Taiwan reports 489 cases, 7 deaths, and no locally acquired COVID-19 cases for the last 135 days (greater than 4 months) in its population of over 23.8 million people. Taiwan created quasi population immunity through the application of established public health principles. These non-pharmaceutical interventions, including public masking and social distancing, coupled with early and aggressive identification, isolation, and contact tracing to inhibit local transmission, represent a model for optimal public health management of COVID-19 and future emerging infectious diseases.

The COVID-19 pandemic has strained health care system resources and reduced the availability of life-sustaining and medical-grade personal protective equipment (PPE) though the combination of increased demand and disrupted manufacturing supply chains. As a result of these shortages, many health care providers have temporarily used largely untested, improvised PPE (iPPE). Lack of quality control for makeshift PPE and frequent repurposing of used items to conserve supplies increase both the risk of provider infection and nosocomial spread to uninfected patients. One strategy to reduce risk of infection and preserve existing equipment is the implementation of secondary barrier devices placed directly over patients or providers. The authors describe an inexpensive, disposable, positive-pressure head isolation unit that can be rapidly constructed from materials readily available in nearly all health care settings for under five US dollars. The unit was successfully deployed in Taiwan during the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak, and again during the COVID-19 pandemic. The iPPE worn directly by the health care workers (HCWs) can be donned prior to patient contact in the presence of an air source. This strategy may be more protective than a covering placed over the patient in an aerosol-generating environment, which requires the HCW to be in close contact with the patient prior to securing the protective device.

This article discusses Taiwan's experience in managing surge needs based on recent events, including the 1999 earthquake, severe acute respiratory syndrome in 2003, airliner crashes in 1998 and 2001, and yearly typhoons and floods. Management techniques are compared and contrasted with U.S. approaches. The authors discuss Taiwan's practices of sending doctors to the scene of an event and immediately recalling off-duty hospital personnel, managing volunteers, designating specialty hospitals, and use of incident management systems. The key differences in bioevents, including the mathematical myths regarding individual versus population care, division of stockpiles, the Maginot line, and multi-jurisdictional responses, are highlighted. Several recent initiatives aimed at mitigating biothreats have begun in Taiwan, but their efficacy has not yet been tested. These include the integration of the emergency medical services and health-facility medical systems with other response systems; the use of the hospital emergency incident command system; crisis risk-communications approaches; and the use of practical, hands-on training programs. Other countries may gain valuable insights for mitigating and managing biothreats by studying Taiwan's experiences in augmenting surge capacity.