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During the Syrian War, the US and other Western countries trained, equipped and paid Syrian rebels to fight the government and, later, root out the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). When states use armed groups to attain foreign policy objectives, control is a key concern. The US sought to enforce such control over providers and recipients of lethal military assistance in the period from 2013–18. We investigate the parallel CIA and Department of Defence assistance programmes. We challenge theoretical assumptions related to the application of the principal-agent model to explain the dynamics of foreign assistance to rebels. We argue that, in the US strategy to control rebels, co-ordinating the providers and dividing the recipients of security assistance were essential conditions. Meanwhile, the delays in recruitment, the limitations on the number of soldiers trained, the short supply of weapons and the strict regulation of the actions carried out by the rebels all reduced the efficacy of the assistance. This way of instrumentalising security assistance helped the US and its Western allies to crush ISIL while avoiding a collapse in Damascus. However, this happened at the expense of rebel cohesion, autonomy, and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractMilitant groups delegate operations to contingent, short-term, and freelance agents. Informal and ad-hoc employment patterns have wide-reaching consequences, yet the literature lacks a systematic vocabulary and framework to analyze these practices. Using primary and secondary sources, I introduce a descriptive typology of informal employment patterns in militant groups. This contributes to scholarship and practice by establishing a basis for a systematic comparison of variation in militant employment models, particularly highlighting how these practices can have far-reaching implications for conflict and post-conflict settings. Case studies of informal militant hiring practices in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria support the typology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the distinct pathways and roles played by former rebel leaders in conditions of conflict transformation. Focusing on southern Syria, it offers a comparative analysis of the mediation undertaken by remobilised and demobilised rebel leaders to articulate the concerns and demands of local communities to state officials in the aftermath of insurgency. Drawing on multiple waves of fieldwork conducted in southern Syria between June 2018 and December 2023, it illustrates how factors such as legitimacy and effectiveness have shaped civilian preferences to engage with external powers through intermediaries. Furthermore, it reveals the underlying factors that shaped the diverse state approaches to rebels-turned-intermediaries, ranging from pragmatic collaboration to outright marginalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories of interaction among rebel groups in civil wars, like other works in the armed conflict literature, continue to see force as foundational to the trajectory and outcome of conflict. But evidence from inter-rebel conflicts in the Syrian war, which has been one of the major civil wars of our times, shows that military force is not always the preferred tool even in situations where violence is presumably cheap: in conflicts between dominant rebel groups and weaker rivals. Rather than using force, Jabhat al-Nusra, one of the strongest groups in the Syrian conflict, frequently chose to negotiate with rivals. Existing theories of inter-rebel conflict fail to explain such variation in responses. As an explanation of this puzzle of non-force, I argue that the constraint emanating from the conflict with the main enemy determines rebels' strategies towards rivals. To investigate this argument, the paper draws on the triangulation of original data on inter-rebel conflicts in Syria, encompassing written agreements between Jabhat al-Nusra and other rebel groups, a database of important military operations in the Syrian civil war since 2011, and interviews with civil and military participants in the insurgency. The findings have important implications not only for our understanding of inter-rebel dynamics in the Syrian conflict but also for other complex civil wars concerning the relationship between inter-rebel negotiation, cooperation, success, and war duration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the dangers and threats faced by Syrian journalists covering the conflict since the pro-democracy protests erupted in March 2011. While most Western research on the Syrian Revolution has focused on the working difficulties faced by correspondents, parachutists or foreign freelancers, this article scrutinizes the working conditions for Syrian content providers. Syrian journalists' testimonials of fear and their perception of danger and vulnerability provide a humanistic lens not only on the scope of what revolution and war mean to many who have lived it and been transformed by it, but also on the reality of informing in dangerous contexts. The study contemplates the practitioners' working risks and perceptions of fear and threats, as well as their personal security measurements. The characterization of fear during the militarization of the rebellion as a semi-normalized way of life, suggested by Pearlman's article, 'Narratives of fear in Syria' (2016), allows the authors to place their study in a conceptual frame. The implementation of a survey answered by 82 Syrian journalists was complemented by semi-structured interviews with a selected group of 12 participants. In a context in which 86.6 percent of the respondents had colleagues who had died while working, the findings illustrate that Syrian reporters and media activists perceive their work as extremely dangerous. In the perception of fear, the adoption of personal safety measures by practitioners does not always contribute to decreasing it; the trauma experience can act both as a paralysing and empowering working factor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exploring the role of foreign-sponsored pro-government militias in counter-insurgency efforts, this article shows how the proxy war concept maps onto the Syrian conflict as we demonstrate both its contributions and limitations. Drawing on rare access to Syrian and foreign security actors inside Syria, we argue that the Syrian war, while rightly labelled a proxy war, sits uneasily with and at times even contradicts a set of scholarly assumptions and emphases on proxy wars when looked at from a counter-insurgency perspective. Accordingly, proxies were relevant not just as rebels but also as counter-insurgents. Sponsors included state and non-state actors alike, were manifold, and did not necessarily have exclusive relations to their proxies. They were also much more intensely involved with their proxies than generally expected from a war at arm's length. Principal–agent relations this way ceased to be dyadic and hierarchical. What emerged was a heterarchical order, with parallel hierarchies tying proxies to their sponsors fiercely in competition with one another. This allowed and encouraged proxies to carve out leverage and agency of their own just as it fed into the Syrian regime's resilience in averting a 'double crisis of sovereignty'. Given the scale and success of its counter-insurgency efforts, the Syrian case calls for reconsidering proxy wars of the past while it may constitute a watershed development for how proxy wars are to be waged in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a result of the debilitating situation that the Syrian state reached during the Syrian Civil War, the government relies heavily on paramilitary groups to confront security challenges. Existing studies imply that all the paramilitary groups in Syria were formed in a largely top-down process. Focusing on the rise of al-Baqqer Brigade in Syria and relying on a series of in-depth interviews with members of the al-Baggara tribe who make up most of this militia, this paper challenges that assumption. The paper shows that the emergence of tribal militias is principally a grassroots phenomenon stemming from competition over local resources. It argues that the Syrian state has seized this opportunity and outsourced some of its security and counterinsurgency tasks to the group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the administrations of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad employed torture regularly as a tool of authoritarian governance, this usage changed dramatically in nature as the revolution moved from protests to insurgency, which posed an increasingly significant threat to the regime's survival. In the counterinsurgency literature, torture's function is generally tied to intelligence gathering. In the context of Syria's post-2011 Counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, torture functioned more as a way to intimidate the population, forcing them to explicitly choose a side—especially in contested zones. The threat posed by the uprising amplified the scale, form, targeting, and purpose of torture, expanding it significantly. This article traces these dynamics, not only to explain the changing logics and practices of torture in Syria, but also to identify key actors, structures, and sites of analysis. It attempts to avoid falling into the normative trap of simply condemning torture, by moving its examination into a more analytical space, thereby demonstrating how torture can perform a critical function beyond intelligence gathering within an authoritarian COIN campaign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on narrative theory and theories of paratext, this article examines the translation of Samar Yazbek’s 2014 Bawa:ba:t ard alʿadam into English, paying close attention to how this text is translated, packaged and circulated for the consumption of Anglophone literary market. It argues that the translation and packaging of Yazbek’s text becomes a means of foregrounding or suppressing certain narratives and of positioning and enacting agency. Considering the metamorphosis of a once peaceful, secular revolution into radicalised insurgency hijacked by Daesh and other extremist groups, this article argues that translatorial agents demonstrate a proclivity to feed entrenched stereotypes and public narratives about the protagonists of the Syrian civil conflict through translation and translation peritexts. Through the use of various textual, contextual, and peritextual framing strategies, the translation appears to be entangled with pre-existing and ideologically motivated public narratives circulating in the West. These narratives include Orientalist depictions of the Arab World and contentious discourses on veiling, oppression, and terrorism, which are reflected in how the highly politicised narratives of the source text are translated, and the way peritextual materials are designed and packaged by the publisher. These effects have ultimately produced the text for the Anglophone readership both familiar and exotic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Armenians who lived with the Turks in peace for centuries had begun to involve in separatist activities against Ottoman Empire since the second half of the 19th Century. They tried to gain several achievements by organizing revolts, and by putting themselves on the agenda both in conferences and agreements which was focused on solving international problems of the Ottoman Empire. Armenian nationalists who were encouraged by the support of Britain, France, and Russia, believed that the idea of "Greater Armenia" would be achieved. This belief in Armenians, with the political support of major states and their contribution to the arming of Armenian gangs, was the main impetus for the rebellions. During the period of national struggle, Armenians, on the one hand, strived for the idea of Greater Armenia, on the other hand, aimed to establish a "Autonomous Armenian Administration" in Çukurova (Cilicia) under the auspices of France. To achieve this goal, they joined the French occupation forces as volunteers, while at the same time forming gangs with the support of weapons and ammunition of which they received from the French occupation forces. Armenian gangs encouraged by the support of the French occupation forces implemented a policy of oppression and intimidation against the Muslim population and carried out many robberies, burglaries, and massacres. These attacks forced Muslim people to migrate to other regions, and on the other hand, by encouraging Armenians who were resettled in Syria to emigrate back in World War I, they tried to gain the upper hand in Çukurova in terms of population. Yeni Adana Newspaper is one of the important newspapers of the national struggle period. Our research includes an assessment of the attacks carried out by Armenian gangs on Muslim people and news and comments on the Armenian issue in this newspaper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ongoing use of landscape-based conflict commodities -- diamonds and other minerals, timber, wildlife, etc. -- to finance wars continues to evolve. The success with which such commodities can be transacted to support militaries, militias and insurgencies has led belligerents to innovate with additional commodities. Housing, land and property (HLP) rights within war zones have belatedly joined the list of conflict commodities that are subject to transaction, and to such an extent as to warrant significant concern. However, the use of 'conflict HLP rights' has not yet been operationally described in the way that other conflict commodities have been. This is a necessary first step towards deriving and designing countermeasures. This article makes a preliminary attempt to delineate the exploitation of conflict HLP rights by examining how they are transacted to support belligerent groups in three conflicts: Darfur, Colombia and Syria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the height of the Syrian civil war, many observers argued that the Syrian state was collapsing, fragmenting, or dissolving. Yet, it never actually vanished. Revisiting the rising challenges to the Syrian state since 2011 – from internal collapse through external fragmentation to its looming dissolution by the 'Islamic State' – provides a rare opportunity to investigate the re-enactment of both statehood and international order in crisis. Indeed, what distinguishes the challenges posed to Syria, and Iraq, from others in the region and beyond is that their potential dissolution was regarded as a threat not merely to a – despised – dictatorial regime, or a particular state, but to the state-based international order itself. Regimes fall and states 'collapse' internally or are replaced by new states, but the international order is fundamentally questioned only where the territorially delineated state form is contested by an alternative. The article argues that the Syrian state survived not simply due to its legal sovereignty or foreign regime support, but also because states that backed the rebellion, fearing the vanishing of the Syrian nation-state in a transnational jihadist 'caliphate', came to prefer its persistence under Assad. The re-enactment of states and of the international order are thus ultimately linked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Insurgencies are routinely conceptualised using a binary opposition between states and rebels. However, this neglects the complexity of their interaction, especially their collaboration. Although rebel-state collaboration is found throughout the history of insurgency, we lack a full explanation of why it occurs. This article endeavours to take the first step in developing a comprehensive theory by analysing rebel-state collaboration in two heuristic case studies: Afghanistan and Syria. Through process tracing, we find four mechanisms that can explain collaboration: 1) to prevent a costly military stalemate, 2) to gain or maintain legitimacy, 3) because external threats incentivise a mutually beneficial alliance, and 4) because both have to operate under the constraints of the pre-existing political economy. The relative weight of each varies, reflecting the fluid and contextual nature of wartime political orders. Contrasting with more popular explanations, we argue rebels and states are willing to collaborate even when the other benefits too, providing they believe their relative gains would be higher than their opponents, or the costs of competing would be too large. In providing a fuller explanation of rebel-state collaboration, we advocate a rethink about how to capture and analyse the complex and dynamic interactions between rebels and states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of eHealth in conflict settings is increasingly important to address geographic, epidemiologic and clinical disparities. This study categorizes various forms of eHealth usage in conflict and aims to identify gaps in evidence to make recommendations for further research and practice. The analysis was carried out via a narrative hermeneutic review methodology. Articles that fulfilled the following screening criteria were reviewed: (1) describing an eHealth intervention in active conflict or ongoing insurgency, (2) an eHealth intervention targeting a conflict-affected population, (3) an e-learning platform for delivery in conflict settings and (4) non-interventional descriptive reviews relating to eHealth in conflict. Of the 489 papers eligible for screening, 46 merited final inclusion. Conflict settings described include Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Chechnya, Gaza and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thirty-six studies described specific eHealth initiatives, while the remainder were more generic review papers exploring general principles. Analysis resulted in the elucidation of three final categories of current eHealth activity in conflict-affected settings: (1) eHealth for clinical management, (2) e-learning for healthcare in conflict and (3) eHealth for information management in conflict. Obvious disparities in the distribution of technological dividends from eHealth in conflict are demonstrated by this review. Conflict-affected populations are predominantly subject to ad hoc and voluntary initiatives delivered by diaspora and civil society organizations. While the deployment of eHealth technologies in conflict settings is increasingly normalized, there is a need for further clarification of global norms relating to practice in this context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Little is known about how air strikes influence insurgent behavior toward civilians. This study provides evidence that air strikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) by counterinsurgency forces were a contributing factor in its civilian victimization. I theorize that air strikes expanded the distribution of insurgent fatalities to include higher-echelon membership and, at the same time, imposed psychological impairments on its fighters. As a consequence, these changes relaxed restraints on civilian abuse at the organizational and individual levels. This theory is informed by interviews of ISIS defectors and translations of ISIS documents and tested through a statistical analysis of granular-level data on air strikes and one-sided violence during ISIS's insurgency. These findings contribute to our knowledge of insurgent behavior and provide important policy implications in the use of air strikes as a counterinsurgency (COIN) tool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been made of the threat of battle hardened jihadis from Islamist insurgencies, especially Syria. But do Americans who return home after gaining experience fighting abroad pose a greater risk than homegrown jihadi militants with no such experience? Using updated data covering 1990–2017, this study shows that the presence of a returnee decreases the likelihood that an executed plot will cause mass casualties. Plots carried out with American returnees from Islamist insurgencies abroad also decrease the likelihood that a plot will come to fruition. The presence of a known foreign fighter increases the likelihood of detection and disruption by law enforcement officials. These data also show successful attacks by any but lone-actors are becoming increasingly rare. However, attacks planned and executed by close-family members are the exception to the general rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do insurgents target certain groups for extermination? Despite a great deal of attention to the targeting of civilian ethnic minorities, comparatively little scholarship exists on insurgent violence against sexual minorities (lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transsexual individuals). This article maintains that the decision to target sexual minorities follows three distinct logics: two strategic and one ideological. First, insurgents face an incentive to outbid rivals by targeting sexual minorities when homophobic violence is politically and socially legitimated. Second, territorial control creates an incentive for insurgents to signal their ability to selectively punish, which they can accomplish through homophobic violence. Third, revolutionary ideologies provide legitimation for exclusionary violence in the pursuit of transforming society. Statistical analysis of insurgent violence against sexual minorities from 1985 to 2015 lends strong support for these arguments. Process tracing of the spread of violence against sexual minorities in Iraq and Syria clarifies the strategic causal mechanisms. When progovernment militias targeted perceived homosexuals with impunity, antigay violence was adopted by insurgent groups seeking to legitimize their claims to power; violence then quickly spread to competing insurgents. Two additional cases from Latin America demonstrate that ideology plays an important role in influencing which groups embrace homophobic violence even under these strategic constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social media have played an essential role in the jihadists’ operational strategy in Syria and Iraq, and beyond. Twitter in particular has been used to drive communications over other social media platforms. Twitter streams from the insurgency may give the illusion of authenticity, as a spontaneous activity of a generation accustomed to using their cell phones for self-publication, but to what extent is access and content controlled? Over a period of three months, from January through March 2014, information was collected from the Twitter accounts of 59 Western-origin fighters known to be in Syria. Using a snowball method, the 59 starter accounts were used to collect data about the most popular accounts in the network-at-large. Social network analysis on the data collated about Twitter users in the Western Syria-based fighters points to the controlling role played by feeder accounts belonging to terrorist organizations in the insurgency zone, and by Europe-based organizational accounts associated with the banned British organization, Al Muhajiroun, and in particular the London-based preacher, Anjem Choudary. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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To mark the tenth anniversary of the IISS Manama Dialogue process and to capitalise on the new light it has shed on security issues in the Gulf and the wider Middle East, thisAdelphibrings together the results of two workshops held by IISS in its Middle East office in Manama. Featuring essays by nine IISS analysts and a number of outside experts, the book examines the most important geostrategic issues in the region, including the myriad security challenges it faces. These interlinked papers focus in particular on the regional ramifications of the civil war in Syria and the effects of the United States changing posture in the Middle East. The aim of thisAdelphiis to both highlight and develop the ongoing discussions and debates about Gulf security that have taken place in the Manama Dialogue over the previous decade, and that will continue to do so over the next ten years. As such, it capitalises on the IISS's global reputation not only as the world leader in convening para-diplomatic events, but also as a provider of the best possible objective information and analysis on global military and political developments. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

One of the major policy concerns surrounding violent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Russia's North Caucasus region, Somalia, and Syria has been that these struggles may both attract and breed transnational insurgents, or foreign fighters. Yet despite this growing worry, relatively little is known about the ways in which transnational insurgents influence the domestic struggles they join. Existing scholarship assumes that such "outsiders" strengthen domestic opposition movements by bringing with them fighters, weapons, know-how, and access to financial resources. Indeed, access to such assets explains why domestic resistance leaders may initially welcome transnational insurgents. Foreign fighters, however, can also weaken domestic insurgencies by introducing new ideas regarding their objectives and how these struggles should be waged. The introduction of new goals and tactics can not only create divisions with opposition movements, but can also complicate the ability of local leaders to attract and maintain vital public support. Domestic resistance leaders' willingness and ability to adapt the ideas of transnational insurgents to local conditions is key to determining whether and how foreign fighters strengthen homegrown insurgencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the Syrian Civil War as of November 2013. Topics include the doctrine of Salafism, a fundamentalist interpretation of Sunni Islam, and the sectarian tensions between the different confessions in Syria. Other topics include the various armed groups that participate in the rebellion against the Syrian regime including the Free Syrian Army and the Jabhat al-Nusra, and the military potential of the regular Syrian army.

Information about the presentation of several delegates in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council is presented. The delegates talked about their perspectives on the impact of the crisis in Syria on its neighboring countries. They include Middle East Policy Council executive director Thomas R. Mattair, International Institute for Strategic Studies executive director Steven Simon, and Middle East, Stimson Center senior adviser Mona Yacoubian.

There is no doubt the current conflict in Syria has reached its tipping point. As hundreds of people die each week, the conflict continues to push the limits of the international community's ability to foster a successful resolution to end the suffering. In order to fully comprehend the chaotic nature of the conflict, one must first examine how the conflict reached its current intractable state, and what factors are stimulating the violence. Long standing political and social grievances by the numerous sectarian groups is not only prolonging the conflict but helping promote a cycle of violence that transcends years of intangible issues such as pride, identity and security. This paper addresses the sectarian cleavages that exist within the country and why these interactions are helping prolong the violence and becoming a barrier to de-escalation. The paper also examines the formulation and structure of both the rebel movement and the government forces. It addresses how the rebel movement is responding to harsh government repression by devolving into a religiously motivated struggle, prompted by foreign jihadist influence. Lastly this paper focuses on the regional implications of the conflict and what policy options may be available to the United States to help curtail the violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the civil war between the Syrian regime and the rebels of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). It states that during the war, the regime attempted to prevent the rebels using heavy ground weapon systems and bombed the populated areas and opposition forces using Syrian aircraft. It also mentions that the losses in the battlefield and problems of aircraft maintenance have crippled the largest air force and missile defense systems in Middle East.

Copyright of International Relations / Uluslararasi Iliskiler is the property of International Relations Council and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article presents the author's experience in February 2012 as a reporter following the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the rebel opposition to the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Topics include civilian opposition to the government, comments by opposition leader Lieutenant Bilal Khabir, requests by the Syrian rebels for international aid, morale among FSA fighters, and the combined political struggle in which the FSA uses its forces to protect protesters. Also discussed are Syrian army deserters who have joined the FSA, sectarianism, and support of the Assad regime by Iran and the militant Islamic group Hezbollah.

The article discusses the causes of the 2011 uprising and civil war in Syria, with a focus on the actions of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as of June 2012, the sectarian conflict in the Middle East, and the international divisions between countries who support the Assad regime, including Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, and countries who are supplying or sheltering the opposition Free Syrian Army, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Topics include the actions of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and an incident in March 2011 in Daraa, Syria involving 15 schoolboys arrested by local security forces and tortured for protesting the rule of Assad.

Upon the attack, which took place in Çukurca district of Hakkari; several dimensions of the fight against PKK terrorist organizaiton and terrorism, brought up to the top of the Turkish agenda, have been opened up for discussion. One of the most important of these dimensions is related to the part of the fight against terrorism, which stays out of the Turkish territories. This necessity led to Turkey's expectation of Iraq's cooperation in fight against the terrorist organization. However, the cooperation in fight against terrorism, which is the indispensable issue of the each talk between Turkish and Iraqi authorities in the past as well, could not be put into practice; despite the agreements between the two countries. As the developments in the past 8 years show again, Turkey is all alone in her fight against the PKK terrorist organization in Iraqi territories, to a large extent. And it is not realistic to expect from the Iraqi or the external powers, which are active in Iraq, to make any concrete contributions to the solution of the aforesaid problem. This study tries to prove this fact by basing this claim on the political and military situtation in Iraq; the relations of the actors with each others, and on the developments taking place in context of Iran and Syria in the Middle East. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an analytical discussion on the recent rebellion in Syria. It starts with a brief history and background of the rebellion, talking about domestic, as well as international conditions giving rise to the uprising. In this respect, particularly general and specific demands of the public rebelling are addressed in detail. The study reaches the conclusion that due to the bloody escalation, the issue is unlikely to be resolved by the parties themselves; nor can it be resolved by military force or further suppression. In managing and eventually resolving the conflict, third-party intervention in the form of mediation activities is proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper places in historical perspective the current Arab uprisings. It argues that the reasons behind them lie in the comprehensive political, social, economic and educational failures of the Arab regimes. It documents these failures statistically and analytically. It goes on to provides analysis of the current developments in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Yemen and the rest of the affected states. It concludes by drawing up the implications on the Arab future of these uprisings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two common strategies for maintaining military loyalty—individual incentives and ethnic preference—produce very different outcomes for defection of government troops when a rebellion arises outside the military. Since a strategy of individual incentives rests on a continuous judgment of regime strength, a rebellion can provoke a self-fulfilling prophecy that the regime will collapse. An ethnic preference policy identifies soldiers as loyal or disloyal based on group identity and gives those soldiers strong incentives to act accordingly. A rebellion by the out-group might generate out-group defection, but not in-group defection. Focusing on information about preferences, these outcomes are illustrated through a comparison of rebellions in Syria, Jordan, and Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author examines the financial support provided by Syria for Islamic jihad. The central focus of the article is on the role of Syria and on the part played by foreign terrorists based in Syria and their position in the insurgency against U.S. and government forces in Iraq. A number of issues related to Syria's support for terrorism are investigated including connections to the Al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorist organization, and the advantages and disadvantages accruing to Syria in its support for terrorists.

The article focuses on the issue of Syria still allowing terrorism including Lebanon being used by terrorists who seek to destroy peace and order in the region. According to the author, the destabilization of Syria will ease the re-modeling of the Middle East that fit the American and Israeli interests. It is the author's view that because Syria is located in the center of a hostile network including the Iraqi insurgents, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hizbullah and Syria itself, it is inferred that overthrowing Syria would mean the collapse of the terrorist network.