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Enterprise risk management (ERM) systems lessen the probability of risks harming a firm's reputation for a number of reasons. First, a high-quality ERM system makes it less likely a firm will suffer a risk-based reputational crisis. Second, ERM systems help companies to behave more responsibly towards all stakeholders, thereby ensuring firms meet stakeholders' expectations. Third, when a crisis stemming from an uncontrollable risk occurs, a high-quality ERM system helps to reduce the negative impact on reputation because stakeholders will not attribute guilt to a firm which has acted responsibly in its risk management. In this research, we explore the link between corporate reputation and ERM systems together with the role played by corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance as a mediator. Our results support the notion that ERM system quality enhances CSR performance as well as corporate reputation. The results also confirm that ERM systems have a positive impact on corporate reputation via the mediating effect of CSR performance. Companies should therefore use risk management policies to bolster both their CSR and their reputation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies have found that good corporate reputation benefits firm outcomes. Our research tests whether these benefits also hold for city reputation. We use a sample of 76 Spanish cities to analyse the effect of city reputation on city performance as measured by city economic activities, unemployment rates and net migration rates. After controlling for endogeneity and spatial autocorrelation, we find that good city reputation is positively associated with economic activities and negatively with unemployment, but not related to net migration. Our results may be of interest to local authorities, as they indicate the relevance of efforts to consolidate city reputation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical This study examines the influence of firms' ownership structure on corporate reputation. Using archival data from a panel of firms in Spain for 2000-2007, we found that ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder erodes corporate reputation, whereas contestability of the main shareholder's power enhances it. Insider ownership shows a non-linear relationship with corporate reputation, with lower corporate reputation at low and very high levels of insider ownership. Finally, if the largest shareholder is either a pressure-resistant or a pressure-sensitive institutional investor, as opposed to other types of largest shareholder, corporate reputation is lower. This last finding markedly differentiates our sample of firms in Spain, a civil law country, from firms in common law countries such as the US and the UK, where studies have found a positive relationship between institutional investors and corporate reputation. Drawing on signaling and agency theories, our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to analyze the influence of ownership structure on corporate reputation in civil law countries. This study suggests that managers and directors should recognize how each characteristic of ownership structure influences the expectations of stakeholders. Low levels of ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholders, low differences in ownership concentration between first and second largest shareholders, and moderate levels of insider ownership are positive signals that should be communicated to foster corporate reputation. High levels of ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholders or high differences in ownership concentration between first and second largest shareholders impair corporate reputation and should be compensated by introducing corporate governance mechanisms that favor corporate reputation, such as increasing the number of independent directors or avoiding CEO duality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is based on agency theory frameyork and gives an essential justification to the concept of reputation, adding to its function as in informative signal, that of guarantee of contracts. In addition, this contractual approach leads us to a new definition of corporate reputation, one that not only introduces the percep!ions of how the firm behaves towards its stakeholders, but also takes into account the degree of informative transparency with which the firm develops relations with them. Using this new and more complete definition, the authors designed a questionnaire to measure this asset, which was then applied to the Spanish banking sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]