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On 26 April 1986, one of the most important events in the history of nuclear energy took place: the Chernobyl accident. This historic event marked the decline of the Soviet Union, an environmental agenda and new geopolitics of the world. It has been portrayed in literature, film, photo-reportage and documentary, among others. This paper seeks to analyse and contrast the HBO series Chernobyl (2019) and Svetalna Alexievich's Voices from Chernobyl (1997), specifically the relationship between reality and literary and filmic reconstruction. For this purpose, we use a descriptive-argumentative logic and a visual analysis with a mixed methodology. The analysis reveals a conflictive relationship between the two works, since the testimonies recorded in the book are easily recognisable in the series, although the latter has never specified that they are based on the book. Among the conclusions, the narrative structure carrying ideology (which seeks to strengthen a collective imaginary over the commonly accepted biases about the Soviet Union and its model of socialism), carried out with remarkable art direction, stands out. Finally, the series comes at a time of widespread debate in civil society about the use of nuclear energy, just as the end of the current model of fossil fuel-based energy generation for society and heavy industry approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Internet made an enormous amount of information on Fukushima available, far more than was provided by the media during the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. While journalists contributed much of the news about Fukushima, citizens actively participated in blogs and on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, exchanging views and directing others to important news articles or videos. The Internet also gave the traditional media many opportunities for better coverage, with more space for articles and the ability to publish interactive graphics and videos. Coverage in The New York Times, for example, included an abundance of background and explanatory information about the Fukushima accident and radiation releases in multiple formats and gave readers the opportunity to better understand technical information. Consequently, radiation coverage of the Fukushima accident was better than that of the Three Mile Island or Chernobyl accidents. Television reporting, however, still presented some problems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author describes the experiences of Ukrainian clean-up workers, resettled families, and parents of exposed children in the decade after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. The period was marked by a confused state response, lethal radiation doses to clean-up workers, and fragmented research efforts. The unraveling of the Soviet system in 1989 contributed to an atmosphere of chaos and left a legacy in Ukraine of incomplete accounting of the full public health and sociological consequences of the disaster. Being accountable to those people affected, the author writes, is a key challenge of our time, and the present and future consequences of Chernobyl’s health risks are not closed matters. Understanding the scope of the impact will hinge on what kinds of studies, technologies, and funds we are willing to apply, and over what time frame. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author focuses on the Chernobyl nuclear power accident of 1986 and the lessons that have been learned from the incident. He states that initial reports to the Soviet Union government about the breakdown were unclear and talks about the need for increased transparency in the nuclear industry. He comments that the cost-effectiveness of nuclear energy is exaggerated and does not account for hidden expenses that can be disguised by subsidies. He talks about the need for care in constructing and operating nuclear power plants and his concerns over the danger of terrorist attacks on reactors.

The threat of global climate change has pushed governments around the world to consider alternative energy sources, including nuclear energy. As the interest in nuclear power increases, serious discussions on safety must resume before moving forward. There is no better time than now, the twenty-fifth anniversary of Chernobyl, to revisit the causes of the worst civilian nuclear disaster in history in an attempt to prevent future accidents. The author reviews initial reports that accused operators of violating instructions, but also looks at evidence that surfaced in the early 1990s, which suggested that the reactor design, combined with a lack of information sharing, were to blame for the explosion. While it is imperative to address human error, design flaws, and communication failures, the author argues that organizational characteristics of the Soviet nuclear power sector deserve more attention by scholars and policy makers. Chernobyl was not a disaster waiting to happen, the author writes, but occurred despite ongoing efforts to improve technical design, operator training, and inter-organizational communication. Chernobyl, in this interpretation, illuminates that what the nuclear industry considers “safe enough” is always linked to specific historical periods, cultural settings, and institutional arrangements, and that even the best efforts to ensure nuclear safety may not be good enough. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses the health uncertainties pertaining to the April 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Soviet Republic of Ukraine. In April 1986, Pripyat was a new city of about 45,000 young inhabitants, four kilometers from the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Ukrainian republic of the Soviet Union. "Wait and see" is a watchword for Chernobyl. Four years after the accident that destroyed a nuclear reactor and spread radioactive fallout across Europe, we know little more than when it happened. The remains of reactor number four are entombed in an elaborate concrete structure which includes radiation-and temperature-monitoring devices, a complex series of filters for radioactive gases, tanks of boric acid to stop a possible nuclear chain reaction, and liquid nitrogen to cool the reactor core. Substantial radioactive fallout also occurred far from the accident site, in Lapland, southern Germany, northern Italy, Wales, and some parts of eastern Europe.

Analyzes the information policy implemented during the nuclear accident that occurred in April 1986 in Chernobyl by the Soviet Union. Administration's initial response to the accident; Influence of communist leader Joseph Stalin's instrumental attitude toward information on the country's domestic and international policy making; Misinformation about the accident.

Ever since the accident that destroyed unit 4 of the Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant on April 26, 1986, became public knowledge, the Soviet government's response to this catastrophe has been the subject of bewilderment and withering criticism. The exact sequence of events that unfolded in the days following the disaster and the forces that shaped it have, however, remained obscure. While the USSR's civil defense organization urged prompt and decisive measures to inform the population of the accident and move people out of harm's way, other Soviet institutions, such as the Communist Party and the KGB, feared the accident's threat to their legitimacy more than its implications for public health. Drawing on declassified archival documents from Ukrainian archives and memoir literature, I explore the political and institutional logic that prevented the USSR from acting appropriately to protect citizens from the consequences of the nuclear accident. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The full text of the Letters in this issue is given in the PDF file. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the politics of formal representations of environmental hazards. Certain environmental hazards are made publicly invisible when their formal representations are misaligned with what can be measured in practice under the existing socioeconomic and technoscientific conditions. Conversely, better aligning formal representations and measurement capabilities helps reveal the scope of such hazards. Such (mis)alignment of formal representations is a relative, dialogical, and historically specific process. It requires not only experts and their specialized knowledge, but also contextual knowledge of the actual local conditions. The work of alignment of formal representations requires public ‘un-black-boxing’ of these formalisms. It also depends on much infrastructural work, which I describe as the invisible work of making visible. (Mis)alignment of formal representations is illustrated here with the examples of three successive concepts of radiation protection in Belarus, a former Soviet Union republic that was covered with much of the Chernobyl fallout. Revisions to the radiation protection concept first expanded and then dramatically shrank the scope of the officially recognized and publicly visible radioactive contamination in Belarus. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Some of the scholarship on the former Soviet Union—specifically that of Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff as well as that of David Kotz and Fred Weir—has given inadequate attention to the role of the Chernobyl disaster in its collapse. While Kotz and Weir understand the former Soviet Union as a system of state socialism, Resnick and Wolff analyze it as a system of state capitalism. Though they provide different explanations for its collapse, neither set of authors adequately addresses the role of Chernobyl. This is unfortunate, as the Chernobyl disaster may have been a significant contributing factor in its collapse and transition to private capitalism. The Fukushima disaster may have similar implications for Japanese society and may lead to a deeper questioning of its capitalist system. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the factors involved in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Topics include economic and national factors such as the Soviet war in Afghanistan, which ended in 1988 to 1989, the expense of dealing with the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, and decentralization of the Soviet Union; international relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, and discussion of the factors related to the rise of national republics, the coup d'état of August 19-21, 1991, and the struggle between Russian leaders Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin.

An essay is presented on the organizational culture of the Soviet nuclear power industry. The author notes how the Chernobyl nuclear disaster reflected the distinct professional identities of nuclear engineers and specialists who operated power plants. Civilians in the Soviet nuclear power industry cooperated in the development of nuclear weapons under the leadership of physicist Igor Kurchatov and developed technical expertise for nuclear power plant operations.

Abstract??Long-term mental health sequelae of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster have been documented for exposed populations who remained in the former Soviet Union (FSU) (Havenaar et?al., 1997), and in a cohort migrated to Israel (Cwikel et?al., 1997). This paper reports on Chernobyl disaster sequelae in ?migr?s (n?=?321) to the United States. Demographic characteristics, migration factors, and self-reported physical health were considered. Both geographical proximity to the 1986 disaster, and perception of radiation risk stood as long-term indicators of current psychological distress. Proximity was related to poor self-perceived physical health, as well as current symptoms of depression (p<.05), anxiety (p<.01), and Chernobyl-related trauma distress (p<.001) on standardized measures.Environmental contaminationas a reason for migration was also associated with greater mental health symptomatology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the Chernobyl nuclear accident of April, 1986. Political and economic aftershocks which continue to reverberate throughout the Soviet union, Europe and the larger international community; How Chernobyl is without parallel as a technological disaster; Regulatory changes underway in the Soviet Union to revamp the nuclear plant licensing process.

Analyzes the nuclear power controversy in West Germany since the Chernobyl accident, focusing on the responses to Chernobyl by government, parties, the general public, and the protest movement. Three factors are stressed to explain why, despite society-wide mobilization, the quest for a nuclear moratorium failed. First, the growth of the nuclear power sector was already completed, minimizing the stakes of conflict. Second, the nuclear opposition became deeply split over goals and strategies. Third, the CDU/FDP coalition government remained steadfastly pro-nuclear.

This article reports that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has declared that the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident had no significant health effects on the local population. Citing difficulty in obtaining accurate and useful data from wary Soviet scientists, IAEA researchers seemed content with a method that relied on filtered analysis rather than an examination of the raw data. Critics point out that the IAEA reached its rosy conclusion by omitting the two populations most likely to be at risk-the 100,000 people who lived within 30 kilometers of the Soviet nuclear power plant and the 245,000 members of clean-up crews. Soviet scientists explained, and a research team member agreed, that it would have been too logistically difficult to include clean-up crews in the study.

Presents results of a report by the International Chernobyl Project on the radiological and health situation in the areas of the Soviet Union affected by the Chernobyl atomic power station nuclear accident in 1986. Limitations of study; Five tasks of project; Look at health effects attributable to Chernobyl accident; Protection of Soviet citizens.

This section summarizes an article in the August 17, 1991 of New Scientist highlighting a report released by the Soviet government's state commission for extraordinary situations which details the government's total expenses since the Chernobyl nuclear accident.

This article reports how a team of computer experts are now engaged in a "last-ditch" effort to recover the information on two floppy disks containing dosimetric data on 670,000 people who were exposed to radiation from Chernobyl. According to New Scientist (September 22,1990), the disks were stolen three months ago along with two Western personal computers owned by the Research Institute of Oncology and Medical Radiology in Minsk. Byelorussian authorities conducted a media campaign urging the thieves not to destroy or erase the disks. But by the time the disks were finally located, they had been wiped clean of data.

Reports on a major expert study being done under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assess the USSR's continued cleanup of the Chernobyl nuclear plant explosion site. Scope of study; Report on contamination in Ukraine; Contamination of farmlands and forests; Defective reactor design; Economic implications; Modifications being done to make other reactors safer.

Comments on the nuclear disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the Soviet Union. How the closed societies of the Eastern bloc promote pollution in the absence of effective political checks; Analysis of pertinent topics and relevant issues; Implications on economics.

Announces that almost five years after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant prompted the Soviet government to close down nearby villages, officials are considering a plan to offer tours through the most contaminated area to foreign visitors and thus bring in hard currencies from the West.