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Research has indicated that many organizations are located at complex boundary zones which are guided by differing institutional logics. As varied institutional logics overlap, there may be strains on organizations which are trapped within shared boundaries. To reduce such strains and to respond to institutional logic clash, organizations within different fields tend to resort to hybrid strategies of action. However, despite the plethora of studies, there is still a lack of a coherent body of research that addresses the question of how and why organizations experience institutional complexity differently. In response to calls for research on how particular organizational attributes of firms would matter to the experience of firms in situ, we examine how a particular organizational attribute – organizational size— matters, by conducting comparative research on a large versus small Singapore law firm. We thus contribute to the research by showing how hybrid strategies enable organizations to resolve institutional logic clash. Also, we reveal the structural condition underlying the firms' hybrid strategies in response to commodification pressures. Contrary to extant research that suggests otherwise, our findings demonstrate that small, rather than large firms, are in fact better suited to adapt to institutional change, so long as they can carve out a particular niche market for themselves. Additionally, unlike extant research in international business that may have hypothesized a rather large impact of MNCs on a country's competitive landscape, we find that there are limits to the influence that an MNC has, especially on smaller local players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how Anglo-American capital market logic penetrated into Singapore where relational logic tends to guide business activities and illustrate how domestic banks reacted to this imported logic in the corporate governance field. We argue that the banks' ability to accommodate competing logics was enhanced by state agencies' willingness to modify Anglo-American standards to fit the local context. Given the resulting institutional ambiguities in rules, local banks, while incorporating higher outside representation on their boards, reinterpreted the meaning of independence and emphasized the resource provision role rather than the monitoring function of outside directors. The resultant institutional change has been gradual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is based on an interpretive content analysis of oral history data and documentary data on ethnic Indian and Chinese entrepreneurs in Singapore and their enterprises. This data is complemented by personal interviews with family members, informants and business community leaders, as well as historical analysis. The data reveals that most ethnic Indian entrepreneurs maintained their trade specializations and family management, whereas most ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs pursued unrelated diversification and incorporated outsiders into theft operational management over time. What is particularly intriguing is the existence of an intra-ethnic division in business structure among the ethnic Indian enterprises. I argue that the opportunity structure in the country of residence and ethnic resources play only a limited role in shaping the differential management and business structures of the two ethnic groups. Rather, I attribute such differences primarily to the differential strength of ties of the entrepreneurs to theft region/dialect-based networks. The strength of the ties reflects the degree of intra-community homogeneity and inter-community heterogeneity. These arguments are presented in the form of hypothesized relationships for future validation. The paper concludes with a critique of the structuralist, culturalist and interactionist perspectives on ethnic entrepreneurship, and suggests directions for future research into intra-ethnic entrepreneurship, comparative business systems and the paradox of embeddedness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both the proponents and critics of Asian economic organization have been preoccupied with the ideal-typical management models of family businesses, and have rarely identified their changing management structures. We, instead, identify the change and continuity in these management structures through an analysis of family-controlled business groups in Singapore and South Korea before and after the Asian currency crisis. In our view, these business groups professionalized their management, but retained family control and corporate rule before the crisis. The crisis, however, increased the pressure on such groups to relinquish family control and corporate rule. Singaporean Chinese business groups tended to loosen their tight grip on corporate rule by absorbing more professional managers into their upper echelons. The surviving Korean chaebol, however, intensified family control. Only a few chaebol, which were on the brink of bankruptcy, relinquished corporate rule to professional managers. We argue that other than the market, cultural, and institutional factors as suggested in the existing literature, state capacities and strategies do matter in shaping the changing management structures of business groups. Drawing on our analysis, researchers will be able to conduct comparative studies of family businesses across East Asian societies, of organizational imitation, and of the role of the state in influencing management models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]