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The study of small state perceptions of international order has been much neglected. Small state leaders are intellectual heavyweights in a disproportionate relationship to their respective sovereign territorial domains. To navigate the treacherous currents of international order, they rely on their own synthesised views of manoeuvrable spaces amongst great powers. Simultaneously, they are also reflective of the limits of global institutional governance. Moreover, small state leaders frequently weigh international order in moral terms. The intellectual propaganda of charismatic and authoritative foreign policy leaders from then-Czechoslovakia, Ghana and Singapore will be read to illustrate these insights. The conclusion will suggest that small state theorising can enrich mainstream IR theory as a result of these perspectives from small state actorness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While local Marxist and neo-Marxist parties attempted to synchronize their revolutionary struggles with the centers of world communism during the period 1945–1991, political currents on the ground in Malaysia and Singapore were pushing for the establishment of postcolonial authority, social peace, and economic prosperity. The Cold War struggle between 'communism' and 'democratic capitalism' was highly refracted, even distorted, on the ground in these two Southeast Asian countries. This refraction was largely manifested in the struggles by nationalists of all ideological stripes to achieve a multiracial society through interethnic decolonization under the banner of waging 'class warfare' against colonial authority. For many anti-colonial political parties, siding with or joining leftist movements was a façade for revolutionary agendas that were not necessarily Marxist-Leninist in orientation. Secondly, the biographies and civil society narratives of contending political figures of the time suggest that they were less inclined to define their thinking about development along Cold War ideological orthodoxy than to defy the latter to make things work for prosperity. Finally, the successor elites who took the place of the colonial rulers were consistently obsessed with burnishing sovereignty in spite of the international Cold War. This can be seen in their slippery practice of nonalignment in foreign policy. The Malaysian and Singaporean cases strongly present the thesis of indigenization of the Cold War for local purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Singaporean polity has created the ‘militarized civilian’. This policy phenomenon beckons the question: How is this cross-fertilization carried out in Singapore's civil–military relations? Militarization is in the first sense meant to inculcate a calibrated dual personality within the civilian whereby being an effective soldier requires indulging in simulated military suffering as a badge of pride; at the same time, the citizen soldier has to believe that military and civilian values are perfectly interchangeable and contribute equally to the maintenance of peace. In a second sense, militarization is equally about permanently ritualizing sacrifices for a communitarian defence. We argue that while mostly successful, militarization also produces the tension arising from the need to appear pugnaciously vigilant while avoiding the casualties that must logically arise from heightened simulated combat. This tension is explained through two dimensions of ongoing crises: the parameters of a politically dramatized National Service ritual; and the constant propaganda of geopolitical dangers threatening the Republic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A review of several articles, which includes "The ruling elite of Singapore: Networks of power and influence" by Michael D. Barr, "Goh Keng Swee: A legacy of public service" by Emrys Chew, and Chong Guan Kwa, and "We also served: Reflections of Singapore's former PAP MPs" by Chiang Hai Ding and Rohan Kamis.

The concept of soft power, or symbolic power, offers unexplored potential for analysing small state power. This article argues that it is a means of virtual enlargement of small states' foreign policy reach and presence. If one examines the bases of soft power, it becomes evident that small states can utilize their political economy potential, models of good governance and diplomatic mediation as forms of power that defy their territorial limitations. Case studies of the Vatican City State and Singapore illustrate 'small state soft power'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to uncover the nuances of Singaporean foreign policy's theoretical contributions to a local variant of realism in international relations, as sourced from the thoughts and discourse of the Republic's elite foreign policy-makers. Previously, pinioning Singapore within classical realism has meant that questions of hegemonic socialization of ideas have been ignored in analysing its foreign policy. It behoves the scholar to pose questions to ideological verities of policy doctrines: From where did it originate? What are its tenets? How is it chosen over other alternatives? The conclusion however hopes to reveal that in terms of discourse ‘Singaporean realism’ is less completely faithful to classical realist precepts than is originally believed by pre-existing scholarship. The theorizing of Singaporean foreign policy is likely to be reconciled in terms of an oxymoron such as ‘practical idealism’ and ‘weak state, soft power’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1992 and 2000, the international order witnessed a clash of discourses not seen since the height of the Cold War when both superpowers engaged in propaganda offensives to assert the superiority of their respective governing ideologies. However, unlike the Cold War, the Asian Values Debate did not involve a supporting cast of armed occupations, insurgencies and the preaching of revolution. It involved instead statements of difference couched in intellectual and material terms, and also relied heavily on persuasion by words and symbolic deeds. This article seeks to evaluate Singaporean foreign policy in the Asian Values Debate by using the concept of soft power as described by Joseph Nye. However, soft power, as the ability to obtain foreign policy ends through attraction or convincing rather than through coercion, is itself vulnerable to instances where the ideas propounded diverge from the practices they purport to inspire. Singapore's role in the Debate will be examined through three events at its zenith between 1992 and 2000: the clash between Asia and the West at the 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights at Vienna, the Michael Fay Caning Affair which directly pitted Singapore against the US in 1994, and the fate of the Asian exceptionalist argument in the face of the 1997-99 Asian Financial Crisis. The conclusion suggests that Singaporean foreign policy's experiment in soft power has had its successes, but it remains qualified in its applicability to other Asian foreign policies by certain limits inherent in the Singaporean discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]