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Surveys empirical research conducted in the 1990s on the influence of organized interests in the Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Emergence, development and present state of Scandinavian corporatism; Impact of corporatism outside the traditional areas of the labor market.

This essay provides a critical assessment of an important contribution to the debate on institutional efficiency and inefficiency in European policy-making: the thesis on the ‘joint-decision trap’. This trap was identified by Fritz W. Scharpf, first in German federalism and later in policy-making in the European Union. The essay argues that joint-decision traps may be a much more prevalent phenomenon than envisaged by Scharpf. However, the essay demonstrates that joint-decision traps are not inherent to joint-decision systems. The basic argument of the essay is that the effects of joint-decision systems on public policy is contingent upon the central government's ability to threaten intergovernmental actors with exit. If this is possible, joint-decision systems turn into an asset. This argument is made on the basis of an analysis of intergovernmental relations in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark and a comparison of the Scandinavian systems with those of France and Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The three Scandinavian countries have been able to radically decentralize their public sectors without losing the ability to control macroeconomic performance. The explanation of this puzzle is that, in all three countries, institutions have been established to coordinate economic activity levels at the local level with macroeconomic policy goals at the central level. The article investigates how these institutions were established, and pays special attention to the precise nature of these institutions since they show interesting differences among the otherwise very similar Scandinavian countries. The article pursues the thesis that institutional legacies in intergovernmental relations shape institutions like these, unless decision makers face an institutional tabula rasa. Alternative explanations are briefly considered, but the article concludes by supporting the historical approach to politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]