Search

The research is focused on the emerging practices of digital photojournalism in war contexts, in relation to the use of user-generated content from social networks. The focal point is the coverage of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict by the two main online newspapers of the belligerent countries: Ukrayinska Pravda and Rossiyskaya Gazeta. From the analysis of an initial sample of 7,194 articles (6,646 Ukrainian and 548 Russian), published during the first semester of the war, the preferred type of graphic content and the degree of presence of images from the different social platforms will be determined. Likewise, the article offers a theoretical innovation on the current state of the routine of war digital photojournalism, introducing the definition of the concept of "false collective source" due to the appropriation of mechanisms of collective intelligence for potential propaganda purposes. The informative use of the social web has generated a transition from "gatekeeping" to "gatewatching" that makes it necessary to review the state of the art to avoid a possible instrumentalization of the role of users. Finally, a decalogue is proposed to combat digital illiteracy and identify new appropriation practices, by distinguishing the use of the social web as an information source versus its use as a mere distribution channel.

In the fifteen Russian textbooks of the 1990s examined in this article, the Second World War is subject to three levels of reflection: language, narrative templates, and the representation of contested events. The language used in the textbooks represents an amalgam of Soviet propagandistic clichés and uncritically adopted Western terminology. These textbooks also retain the same "schematic narrative template" of the Second World War, based on references to the expulsion of foreign enemies, found in Soviet textbooks. Significant transformations can be observed only in the representation of events, in which the authors' harsh criticism of Stalin's crimes comes to the fore. Yet these superficial changes did not alter the basic structures of history learning, which was one of the main reasons why working through the past during the Yeltsin era almost failed.

Since the mid-2000s Russian authorities banned lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) education propaganda domestically. However since at least 2014 Russia promoted both pro-LGBT and anti-LGBT education propaganda memes internationally, with a strong focus on LGBT youth. This article aims to explore Russia's double-use of LGBT education propaganda. It outlines Soviet, Neo-Soviet and Eurasianist information operations concepts contextualizing Russian propaganda strategies and LGBT ideology for both defense and attack. It reports on a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) study investigating what 3,519 Facebook propaganda memes released by the US House of Representatives in 2018, and related US indictments, reveal about Russian online disinformation tactics. Analysis showed that the memes targeted both progressive and conservative 'patriot' groups using oppositional discourses on LGBT youth. Patterns of engagement began with relatively innocuous-looking memes the article names 'Membership Calls' and 'Identity Celebrations', linked to group pages and data collection forms further snowballing target group numbers. Increasingly, 'both sides' were pitched against each other and government(s) in destabilizing ways, through memes the article terms 'Division Provocations' and 'Political Influence Attempts'. The memes reflected both existing and novel Russian information operations concepts and tactics on LGBT people; and exploited opportunities unique to social media to devastate democratic 'majority rule' debates.

This historical study explores how educators in the United States responded to the rise of fascism between the World Wars. By considering and then ultimately rejecting the fascist approach to education and philosophy, American educators defined democratic education in contrast to fascist/totalitarian approaches to education by rejecting indoctrination and propaganda. The author argues that fascism provided a catalyst for pushing epistemological issues surrounding propaganda, indoctrination, relativity, and absolutism to the center of their collective consciousness in ways that parallel the controversies of today over "fake news" and "alternative facts."

This article examines the role of the "izba-chital'nia" (rural reading room) in the 1920s Bolshevik efforts to construct a system of political education for the Soviet countryside. It focuses on the development of a system of political training of the people who ran these reading rooms--the so called "izbachi" or "educators of the peasant masses." The article unravels the cross-purpose strategies of the authority in charge of political education--the "politprosvet," and its employees in the countryside. While the politprosvet organized its courses in order to select and guide the izbachi, ensuring contact within the network by means of a vast correspondence, the izbachi themselves used these courses, and especially the acquisition of "Bolshevik-speak" in them, either to escape the village or to gain greater authority within it. This new authority that they acquired was based on their ability to undo the script of the new Soviet laws while passing on "politically correct" information about the local situation to the higher authorities. (Contains 1 table and 76 footnotes.)

This article explores the extent of cyber-electronic operations in Russia’s conception of hybrid warfare by analyzing its interventions in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014), and Syria (2015). The concept of hybrid warfare, which combines conventional and irregular tactics, asymmetric warfare, act of terrorism, propaganda, and information warfare, has gained prominence in recent years. The study provides a conceptual framework by reviewing the literature on hybrid warfare and presenting different perspectives on the concept, and focuses on cyber-electronic operations as a crucial component of hybrid warfare. Based on the case studies, the findings suggest that cyber-electronic operations are a vital part of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy. This article introduces a novel aspect to the existing analysis by regarding Russia’s cyber-electronic operations not merely as a tool, but also as a decisive element of its hybrid warfare strategy. Within this context, it conducts a thorough examination of Russia’s utilization of these operations to procure a strategic advantage across political, economic, informational, and conventional warfare domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From disinformation to cyberattacks, Chinese and Russian military units’ digital operations have gained increasing international attention over roughly the past decade. Less studied are some of these units’ historical antecedents, the military-political directorates of the Soviet military and Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the 20th century. The political officers, or commissars, who staffed these directorates played a large role in shaping the development of psychological warfare beyond the Cold War and into the information age. This article summarizes this history and demonstrates its relevance to modern PLA and Russian military psychological warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on propaganda often focuses on strategies that autocrats can use to persuade skeptical citizens. I outline a different function of propaganda—reinforcing regime support and building trust through identity-consistent messages. Such affirmation propaganda results in more positive perceptions of propaganda outlets and skepticism about independent media. I test this argument using three studies in Russia. In two randomized experiments, I demonstrate that pro-regime citizens trust reports from state media more than reports from independent media; however, state media lose trust if they send more critical messages. Additional survey evidence suggests that regime supporters often find state media accurate despite recognizing the pro-government bias of these outlets. My analysis suggests that autocrats are more constrained by public opinion than previously thought. It also helps to better understand the role of persuasion and censorship in authoritarian regimes, and it highlights that independent media have limited power to challenge authoritarian rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disinformation is not as intuitively understood in the security disciplines as those speaking about it seem to believe. Where we do find definitions, they vary considerably. As a result, the term has become politized and, instead, has lost value. Given the shallow roots behind classifying content as disinformation, it is not surprising that it has been sucked into the hyperpolarized maelstrom of politics and the media. That is unfortunate, given that disinformation is a demonstrated element of national power. Adversaries such as Russia have wielded the concept as an effective weapon to undermine and weaken rivals. Incorporating a framework through which disinformation can be identified anchors the term for security professionals. Without such an anchor, disinformation will continue to blow about aimlessly. I identify three criteria that a piece of content must successfully be passed through to qualify as disinformation. The first criterion is that the identity of the content originator is intentionally masked; second, the released information is harmful or destructive content intended to influence an outcome; and lastly, the originator has a predetermined political, military, economic, or social objective. Failure to defend disinformation and frame it properly leaves a confused homeland apparatus and weaker national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study presents a systematic review of the scholarly literature on Russia–Ukraine Propaganda on Social Media over the last ten years. This study performs a bibliometric analysis of articles published in the last ten years (2012–2022) and acquired from the Scopus database, followed by a brief content analysis of top articles from leading sources. Furthermore, the study aims to find gaps in the literature and identify the research area that could be developed in this context. VOSviewer application was used for data mining and data visualization from Microsoft Excel. Some interesting facts were found in the bibliometric analysis regarding research and other perspectives. Though the study was related to the propaganda of Russia and Ukraine, the USA is identified as the most attentive country in terms of research and publication on the topic. On the other hand, Russia published many articles regarding its own propaganda on social media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 20th century, authoritarian regimes willingly embraced sport as a vivid arena for demonstrating their superiority. Prior research on postage stamps issued by such regimes revealed certain patterns associated with periods of aggressive internal and external rhetoric, whereby postage stamps served as a channel for government propaganda. In the current study, we looked at sports, military, and national identity stamps. Applying the social-semiotic method, we first examined the messages sports stamps have conveyed in Soviet Union and Russia. Then, the quantitative paradigm was employed to evaluate the trends in the issuance of propagandistic stamps by post-WW2 USSR and Russia. Finally, we expanded the scope by looking at stamp issuance in Germany, Italy, and USSR in pre-WW2 and WW2 years. This heavily militaristic "landscape" was used mainly as a basis for comparison with the issuance policy of Putin's Russia. The results shed light on some striking similarities across the different countries and periods. These findings are discussed in the context of the recent geopolitical situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on transcripts from the television network Channel One, a popular news source in Russia, this article addresses the question: “How was Vladimir Putin covered by state-controlled media while the regime became increasingly centralized?” The literature on the subject is scarce and inconclusive. Dictators create different images of themselves, and the portrayals of present-day spin dictators — those who primarily rely on the power of propaganda to persuade rather than dominate — are understudied. While some analysts point to Putin’s omnipresence in mass media, others uncover the lack of media personalization and relatively neutral coverage. Using 385,981 news transcripts from 2000–2022 and relying on techniques from natural language processing, I examine how a present-day autocrat attempts to optimize the intensity of state-controlled propaganda. I uncover three main tendencies. First, during all the years in power, the ruler has been more frequently referred to through positive stories. Second, there is only partial evidence that the relative references to Putin on Channel One have significantly increased over time. Third, during all his years in power, Putin has been more frequently mentioned in domestic news rather than in stories about foreign affairs. However, I also demonstrate that the share of news about foreign affairs and events abroad that mentions the ruler has been increasing every year since 2013. By focusing on the supply side of propaganda, this article contributes to the literature on autocratic resilience and spin dictators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Athenaeum: Polskie Studia Politologiczne is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Security Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Athenaeum: Polskie Studia Politologiczne is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Security Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article investigates over 130,000 Telegram messages, 15,000 Telegram forwards, and 750 news articles from Russian-affiliated media to assess the information supply chain between Russian media and Telegram channels covering the war in Ukraine. Using machine-learning techniques, this research provides a framework for conducting argument and network analysis for disambiguating narratives, channels, and users, and mapping dissemination pathways of influence operations. The findings indicate that a central feature of Russian war reporting is actually the prevalence of neutral, non-argumentative language. Moreover, dissemination patterns between media sites and Telegram channels reveal a well-cited information laundering network with a distinct supply chain of covert, semi-covert, and overt channel types active at seed, copy, and amplification levels of operation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Russia's propaganda discourse on Twitter during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The study employs network analysis, natural language processing (NLP) techniques, and qualitative analysis to identify key communities and narratives associated with the prevalent and damaging narrative of "fascism/Nazism" in discussions related to the invasion. The paper implements a methodological pipeline to identify the main topics, and influential actors, as well as to examine the most impactful messages in spreading this disinformation narrative. Overall, this research contributes to the understanding of propaganda dissemination on social media platforms and provides insights into the narratives and communities involved in spreading disinformation during the invasion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea for this research note emerged in the aftermath of a survey that we conducted with Kazakhstani experts about their perceptions of the Western and Russian vectors in Kazakhstan's foreign policy. We found that most of our respondents felt uncomfortable and tended to avoid answering questions related to Russia. In this research note, we seek to discuss and explore the challenges that Kazakhstani researchers experience while studying Russia. While doing so, we find that Kazakhstani academics are facing now what we call a wave of new-Sovietism from Russia that not only instils anxieties but also silences scholarly voices in Kazakhstan and beyond. We call for robust academic dialogue to foster understanding of issues faced by academics within and beyond the country. By highlighting these challenges, we aim to enrich discussions on studying Russia and emphasize the importance of safeguarding academic freedom and intellectual diversity in research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent transformations in the media and communications environment have prompted states to invest heavily in external communications to pursue inter-state competition. Among authoritarian countries, Russia and China have invested particularly heavily in international news, through outlets like RT and CGTN. However, few comparative studies have examined the differences between authoritarian states' use of international news for geopolitical purposes. This article conducts a comparative, mixed-method, multi-platform content analysis of RT and CGTN's 2020 US election coverage. Based on multiple differences between the outlets' content, it argues that they adopt two distinct international propaganda models. RT operates a "partisan parasite" model, imitating a partisan outlet in the US' media ecology, while CGTN employs a "surface neutrality" model, which cloaks pro-China propaganda with a superficial impression of impartiality. Explicating these models using original empirical evidence, the paper advances theory on the evolving use of international news media as a geopolitical tool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In transitional democracies, the boundary work of defining journalism and through this, ousting certain media actors as illegitimate and threatful to national security and/or democratic stability can hold a particular urgency. This article considers the sanctions against three Russia-affiliated TV channels by the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council adopted in February 2021 – and the ensuing public debate on this decision – as a particularly informative case of such boundary work. Using thematic analysis of materials from Ukrainian news sites and TV talk shows, the article maps out how media regulators and representatives of the sanctioned and non-sanctioned media outlets competed over the authority to define the boundaries of legitimate journalism in Ukraine amid growing security threats. The findings show that the regulator labeled the sanctioned TV channels as "parasites of journalism," situated within the Ukrainian media system, yet functioning in the interest of a foreign state. In turn, the sanctioned media actors styled themselves as repressed opposition media, attacking both regulators and non-sanctioned media for undemocratic intervention and a lack of professional solidarity, respectively. Lastly, non-sanctioned media actors have largely supported the sanction decision and detached from the sanctioned actors' self-legitimation discourse. The study contributes to the literature on boundary work in journalism and showcases how a novel theory of parasites of journalism can enhance the analysis of complex discourses surrounding antagonistic media actors, including in non-Western contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Education Sciences: Education - Research - Innovation / Neveléstudomány: Oktatás - Kutatás - Innováció is the property of Education Sciences: Education - Research - Innovation and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The research builds on the previous findings on the number of hate crimes against LGBTQ in Russia before and after the introduction of the so-called "gay propaganda law" in 2013 and significantly enriches them. The previous research studied hate crimes between 2010 and 2016 and was limited to using 2 databases of court decisions. The current research expands both the timeframe and the use of sources: it analyzes such crimes across 11 years (2010–2020) while adding 2 new databases of court rulings to achieve more comprehensive results and generate more accurate statistics of violent acts against LGBTQ in Russia. The previous research identified 263 cases of hate crimes, which was not sufficient to generate accurate statistics and indicated a trend only. The results of the current research significantly expand the existing knowledge by identifying 1056 hate crimes committed against 853 individuals including 365 fatalities. The greater number of cases enabled the current research to present a more thorough descriptive analysis of the crimes committed against LGBTQ in Russia. The paper introduces 3 main categories of hate crimes (Premeditated attacks, Not premeditated attacks, and the so-called "Gay panic defense" cases) and establishes that the number of cases when LGBTQ victim was purposefully selected and targeted grew substantially across the decade. The overall number of victims increased by three times after the introduction of the "gay propaganda law" in 2013 – from 34 in 2010 to 138 in 2015 and remained at relatively the same level for the remaining of the decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The media can cause concern in the context of national security: they are described as potential tools and targets of attack that can be "weaponised", and as a space where "information war" is waged. Governments may try to block media that are deemed a security threat, but the rationale for taking such an action deserves careful consideration, given the tension between media restrictions and the democratic principle of free speech. This article scrutinises the security rationale for restrictions imposed by Ukraine on Russian and "pro-Russian" media from 2014. When justifying restrictions, Ukrainian officials highlighted the threat of media content both distorting perceptions of reality and weakening the foundations of Ukrainian nationhood. We, therefore, analyse survey data to investigate whether the use of the banned media was associated with variation in Ukrainian citizens' perceptions of truth and national values. We find that the use of the banned media was linked to mistaken beliefs about the veracity of news headlines, both true and false; it was also associated with lower support for democracy in Ukraine (a key national constitutional value). This evidence from the Ukrainian case informs our discussion about the media's impact on national (in)security and rationales for media restrictions in democratic contexts more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 ignited propaganda efforts from the U.S. executive branch of government and the U.S. media, as the country tried to position itself towards the war not just in the eyes of its citizens but of the entire world as part of its geopolitical power position. A comparative quantitative and qualitative analysis of official U.S. communications and U.S. partisan media coverage in the first week of the invasion aims to uncover how the U.S. government set the agenda and framed the events, and to what extent the media copied or diverged from this agenda-setting and framing. The results suggest a narrow focus and distinct framing on the part of the U.S. government, partly taken over by partisan media. The latter also touched on other topics that fit media logic and provided some counter-frames in line with their ideological positions, yet overall confirmed the dominant framing of the war as unjust, unprovoked and premeditated, as Putin's choice, and the position of the U.S. as the leader of the free world and defender of democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on autocracies often posits that propaganda can manipulate citizens' beliefs, but existing work does not systematically investigate how well individuals recognize misinformation in authoritarian environments and whether susceptibility to propaganda is related to vulnerability to false news. I present the results of four surveys in Russia, in which more than 60,000 participants evaluated 74 true and false news headlines. I find that Russians' capacity to discern falsehoods is comparable to discernment found in other political contexts, and they could often detect false news stories. However, consumers of state media gave less accurate evaluations than consumers of independent media, and government supporters were substantially more susceptible to proregime misinformation than opposition-minded citizens. Supporters also strongly rejected true messages inconsistent with their political dispositions. These results help understand why in environments dominated by propaganda individuals can be quite vulnerable to information manipulation. At the same time, regime critics in my study often fell for propaganda-inconsistent falsehoods. These results highlight the broader challenge of fighting misinformation and propaganda in a situation when many citizens exhibit political biases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of protests around the world poses challenges for authoritarian media outlets. While censoring news about protests abroad may push audiences to alternative news sources, their coverage could motivate citizens to take to the streets at home. To explore whether and how authoritarian media outlets cover foreign protests, we leverage evidence from Russia. Combining evidence from a decade of news coverage with protest-event data, we show that far from censoring news on protests abroad, authoritarian outlets afford them extensive coverage. The coverage of foreign protests, however, declines on days of large Russian protests, when the costs of encouraging mobilization are potentially greater. We also show that authoritarian media selectively use protests abroad, especially those in democracies, to convey the image of citizen activism as threatening and disorderly. Findings, which speak to research on authoritarian propaganda, have implications for scholarship on protest management and authoritarian resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Persuasion, disinformation, manipulation, censorship, which are elements of propaganda, can be regarded as central terms of the language of politics, especially during conflict situations and wars. The question of interest is in what ways the specific language techniques are used by the Russian Foreign Affairs Department for the purposes of propaganda in the context of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The paper analyzes the official statements of Maria Zakharova, the Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation that are available on the web page of the Embassy of Russia in Berlin. The following examinations are confronted with the well-documented nature of the persuasive language in Nazi propaganda before and during World War II. The aim of such analysis is to examine in what ways and to what extent the specific propaganda techniques they are used to justify the war that Russia has started by invading Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose is a comparative analysis of Ukrainian and Russian narratives of the history of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA; also UPA) in 1992--2023. Methodology. Problem-chronological and historical-comparative methods and historiographical analysis and synthesis methods were used. The scientific novelty consists of the comparative analysis of the defined narratives of the two countries of the last three decades. Based on a wide range of sources, the historical policy and the policy of memory concerning the OUN and UIA were analyzed, and the state of study of the topic, peculiarities, and characteristic features of national historiography were determined. The fundamental diff erence between the Ukrainian and Russian narratives of the history of the OUN and UIA, created in the period 1992--2023, is emphasized. Conclusions. It has been determined that during the reign of V. Putin in the Russian Federation, a purposeful historical policy was implemented designed to justify the imperial ambitions of the Kremlin regime. Historical politics was gradually replaced by historical expansion, the goal of which was attempts to forcibly impose one's views on the past on own population, scientists, and other states. An important element of this expansion was the mythical narrative about the OUN and UIA, which is mostly unscientific and propagandistic. In the conditions of the gradual introduction of repressive commemorative legislation, an objective study of the history of the Ukrainian national liberation movement of the 1930s--1950s in Russia became impossible. On the other hand, in Ukraine, despite the attempts of the authorities to influence the scientific environment, historians generally studied and presented to the people a complete picture of the history of the OUN and UIA. At the same time, the absence of state censorship led to a wide variety of views on the problem and an active scientific discussion around its controversial aspects. Based on these scientific studies, a process of radical changes in public consciousness and collective memory, the formation of a generally accepted historical narrative, which strengthens national and interregional consolidation, is observed in Ukraine. The symbolism and heroics of the OUN and UIA became an important unifying factor in rebuff the Russian invasion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through comparative historical analysis, we find that Russia's strategic communications regarding nuclear weapons use in Ukraine broadly reflect Soviet strategy during the Cold War. The Soviet Union employed a combination of aggressive and defensive propaganda narratives regarding nuclear weapons; the former aimed to coerce the West away from interfering in Soviet military interventions abroad, while the latter sought to convince international audiences that the West was primarily to blame for escalations in tensions. Russia continues to employ this same strategy to provide protective cover for its ongoing war on Ukraine. In both cases, actual Soviet and Russian nuclear posture remained significantly less bellicose than its propaganda narratives imply. Our analysis suggests that Russia's aggressive rhetoric about nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine has thus far been primarily intended to shape Western decision-making, rather than a genuine expression of intent to use such weapons. In Ukraine, nuclear 'red lines' advanced by Russian propaganda have consistently been eroded without response, including significant strikes on Crimea, advanced weapons supplied to Ukraine, and the re-taking of illegally annexed territory. Nevertheless, Russia's nuclear propaganda has been one of its most successful cognitive warfare efforts in limiting or delaying critical Western military support to Ukraine, on the grounds of avoiding potential escalation. While Russia's nuclear arsenal remains a significant threat to Ukraine and the West, an overly cautious response to Russian rhetoric also risks potentially significant geopolitical consequences by tacitly rewarding nuclear threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of the Russkiy Mir (Russian world) has cultural and geopolitical implications. Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the concept has started to play a significant role as a propaganda instrument and as a justifying tool for Russian military aggression in Ukraine. However, this was not always the case. It was not until 2007 that the Kremlin institutionalized the concept by creating a foundation called Russkiy Mir. Until this time, the concept was not widespread among the Russian elites. Later, Russian politicians articulated the Russkiy Mir differently and without its exact meaning. Three different understandings of the Russkiy Mir have emerged: a global sphere of the Russian language and/or Russian-speaking diaspora, the geopolitical sphere of influence of Russia, and an ideological sphere of the new conservative right-wing forces. By analyzing the idea's roots in the Russian context using published sources, the article shows how the Russkiy Mir has developed from a nonpolitical and loose idea that should unite all Russian-speaking people around the globe to a geopolitical tool Russia uses to justify its influence in the post-Soviet space, particularly in Ukraine. Moreover, the article aims to answer the question of to what extent, from a Russian state view, Ukraine plays a role in this concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russian influence operations on social media have received significant attention following the 2016 US presidential elections. Here, scholarship has largely focused on the covert strategies of the Russia-based Internet Research Agency and the overt strategies of Russia's largest international broadcaster RT (Russia Today). But since 2017, a number of new news media providers linked to the Russian state have emerged, and less research has focused on these channels and how they may support contemporary influence operations. We conduct a qualitative content analysis of 2,014 Facebook posts about the #BlackLivesMatter (BLM) protests in the United States over the summer of 2020 to comparatively examine the overt propaganda strategies of six Russian-linked news organizations—RT, Ruptly, Soapbox, In The NOW, Sputnik, and Redfish. We found that RT and Sputnik diverged in their framing of the BLM movement from the newer media properties. RT and Sputnik primarily produced negative coverage of the BLM movement, painting protestors as violent, or discussed the hypocrisy of racial justice in America. In contrast, newer media properties like In The NOW, Soapbox, and Redfish supported the BLM movement with clickbait-style videos highlighting racism in America. Video footage bearing the Ruptly brandmark appears in both traditional and new media properties, to illustrate, in real time, civil unrest across the US. By focusing on overt propaganda from the broad array of Russian-affiliated media, our data allows us to further understand the "full spectrum" and "counter-hegemonic" strategies at play in contemporary information operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public Relations is an essential part of modern warfare as Hiebert (1991) stated, and the war in the Arabian Gulf provided - at the time - an excellent Public Relations case study of its successful use. The war to win people’s minds over, insinuates that PR mutates into propaganda. Propaganda is all about a conscious way to shape, influence or transform the way people think and act and is greatly disseminated nowadays through social media. Sharing videos, tweets and posts have ensured that news spreads faster than wildfire and can quickly mobilise public opinion . Propaganda has always been used by military as a strategy, therefore as Russia waged war against the country, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has been releasing a series of videos via social media which have been seeking support from the international community. They helped throw the spotlight on Ukrainians, and the international community warmed up to them as Russia was seen as the big aggressor . The current study aims at amalgamating the power of the two most important strategies of modern warfare, Public Relations and social media. Uncovering PR strategies and tactics utilized via social media platforms amidst the Russian Ukraine conflict, through submitting presidential videos and verified twitter accounts to thorough investigation, reveals that warfare tactics have taken a drastic turn in this era. To achieve that end, a quick review of the history of the Russian Ukraine Conflict since its escalation in 2014 will be presented followed by the role of Public Relations and social media as strategic PR tools in warfare situations and propaganda mutations. Review of the most important studies tackling the conflict via various social media platforms will follow. Three models of communication and PR strategies and tactics utilized in drastic escalations from crises to conflicts will be applied in this study followed by the most important findings and recommendations pertaining to PR ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the existence of multiple propaganda campaigns from around the globe, most scholarly attention has been primarily given to those operated by Russia. This focus on a single country has limited the scope of propaganda research. We offer a systematic comparison of six campaigns, examining the issues they engaged with, and their deployment strategies. Using a computational analysis of more than 9.5 million tweets released by the Twitter Moderation Research Consortium, we show differences across campaigns. Some operations were massive in scale while others were modest. Some focused on US domestic affairs, while others emphasized global issues. While some campaigns showed high levels of sophistication in terms of persona crafting and account deployment, others did not participate in pre-propaganda. We conclude by discussing the practical and theoretical implications of these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China signed a formal agreement to cooperate on the creation and dissemination of a jointly constructed propaganda narrative for a global audience. There is some anecdotal evidence and some very basic research to suggest this cooperation might be happening. However, this study aims to use scientific research methods from the Agenda Setting Theory to prove or disprove this alleged propaganda cooperation. The author assessed a N = 600 sample of articles from English language versions of Russian Sputnik and the Chinese Global Times and People's Daily. The evidence indicates a low level of propaganda cooperation. Russia and China appear to be pursuing their own strategic goals with propaganda. This finding has important implications for information warriors' and strategic communication professionals' task and counterpropaganda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Russian active measures in cyberspace, focusing on the implications for across security sectors. Initially, the study contextualizes the increasing reliance on cyberspace for conducting subversive activities that target military, political, societal, and economic structures, particularly after the Ukrainian Euromaidan in 2013. Utilizing a qualitative analysis of open-source data, the research identifies the diverse tactics employed by Russian actors, including sophisticated use of code and content to manipulate public perception and governmental processes. Key findings reveal that while activities in the military and political sectors are characterized by a high degree of technological sophistication, societal sectors predominantly face threats from disinformation campaigns. Notably, no significant cyber active measures were detected within the environmental sector. The study concludes that Russian cyber tactics are deeply embedded in their broader geopolitical strategy, necessitating robust countermeasures. Enhanced cybersecurity policies and international cooperation are recommended to bolster resilience against such foreign malign influences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the verification of the contents related to the coverage of the Russo-Ukrainian war during the first year of the conflict. We address the analysis of false information collected from the EDMO database by the Spanish fact-checking organizations: AFP Factual and Comprovem, EFE Verifica, RTVE Verifica, Maldita.es, Newtral and Verificat. Based on the results obtained, a typology has been established to identify the style, format and content of the misinformation under study. In this way, we follow the main trends in the manipulation dynamics that shaped the media coverage of the latest war in European territory. In total, up to 307 verifications by verifiers working in the Spanish context are analyzed. Unlike the hoaxes related to the origin of the coronavirus, in which the preferred format was the text message, in the invasion of Ukraine visual evidence has prevailed in the media coverage of the conflict during the initial phase of the conflict. We will see which are the social networks in which the greatest traffic and viralization of false news is detected, exposing users to manipulative content to a greater extent. Likewise, the potential implementation of a transnational network to combat disinformation in war contexts will be assessed. We will pay special attention to the important role of Spanish fact-checkers both at the European level and in identifying false information, avoiding its dissemination in Latin America. And, finally, we will detect the new challenges that war fact-checking faces, as a result of the evolution of falsification strategies in the construction of the collective narrative about the Russo-Ukrainian war in the post-truth era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

THIS PAPER EXPLORES HOW REVISIONIST AUTOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS USE GLOBAL BROADCASTING NEWS CHANNELS TO COUNTER THE SO-CALLED WESTERN HEGEMONY NARRATIVE. IT FOCUSES ON HOW AND WHY THE SPANISH-SPEAKING WORLD WAS TARGETED BY INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTERS FOUNDED BY AUTOCRATIC AND REVISIONIST GOVERNMENTS AND HOW THE WAR WAGED BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST UKRAINE IS PRESENTED IN THREE SO-CALLED 'ANTI-HEGEMONY' MEDIA NETWORKS: CHINA GLOBAL TELEVISION NETWORK EN ESPAÑOL (CGTN), TELESUR AND HISPAN TV. BY USING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS SUCH AS CONTENT ANALYSIS AND CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF NEWS COVERING THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE PRESENTED BY TELESUR, HISPAN TV AND CGTN IN SPANISH SINCE 24 FEBRUARY 2022, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT ALL THREE MEDIA CHANNELS PROMOTE IN DIFFERENT SHADES A KREMLIN-BASED NARRATIVE. THE ARTICLE FURTHER DEBATES THE PROFOUND FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THIS TACIT MEDIA ALLIANCE AND SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE CURRENT WAR WAGED BY RUSSIA IN UKRAINE IS USED IN DIFFERENT WAYS BY REVISIONIST AND ASSERTIVE GOVERNMENTS TO PROMOTE THEIR OWN REVISIONIST AGENDAS BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND ABROAD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the war discourse on Russian television, particularly in political talk show broadcasts aired after Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The question of how the two conflicting parties, Russia and Ukraine, are portrayed verbally and visually in these shows is specifically emphasized. While the quantitative analysis traces a massive increase in Russian talk show broadcasts since the beginning of the war, the Critical Discourse Analysis demonstrates which strategies are utilized to demonise and defame the Ukrainian side and to legitimise the war. By comparing the current war discourse with the Ukraine discourse in 2014, this study shows that talk shows have undertaken a significant role in supporting the war and have become a puissant didactic tool to influence and manipulate public opinion by perennially repeating key governmental messages and efficiently orchestrating all visual, verbal, and non-verbal means at their disposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war unleashed following the Russian invasion of the Ukrainian territory has provided an avalanche of information regarding military and strategic events, information which has conditioned policy making as well as the development of the current world order. Like any armed conflict, war not only takes place in the trenches and on the battlefields, but the weaponization of elements of disinformation and propaganda towards the general population and nation states can influence the outcome of the conflict as well. These elements might become powerful weapons that partly condition future events. This field study and research, carried out across Ukrainian territory, explores the perception by the Ukrainian people of information manipulation, taking into consideration different population groups. It should be noted that Ukrainians suffer from a constant and daily misinformation bombardment that seeks to undermine the morale of its people, yet elements of resilience in the form of a ‘strong and clear criterion’ regarding balance and imbalance of forces can still be found. As a result, this research examines the fundamental sources used by the Ukrainian population to obtain information, the use and reception of informative propaganda via social media, its critical analysis, the participation and interaction of the population in today’s global communication spaces, and finally, the level of credibility of both foreign and national media in depth. The themes discussed were explored via qualitative research during a series of oral interviews conducted with subjects directly related with the defence of the country, women, and higher education professionals. Our conclusions highlight the challenges that disinformation poses upon the Ukrainian population and its national and international organizations in the fight against information manipulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Die aggressive Propaganda der Kremlführung im Zuge des von Vladimir Putin begonnenen Krieges gegen die Ukraine ist zu einer wirksamen Waffe geworden und beeinflusst das kollektive Bewusstsein von Bevölkerungen inner- und außerhalb Russlands. Der Kreml verwendet dabei eine Vielzahl von Methoden und Werkzeugen, die auch die politische Führung der Sowjetunion einsetzte. Dieser Artikel beschreibt einige dieser Techniken und analysiert die kommunizierten Narrative und Mythen. Der Hauptfokus liegt auf der Propaganda im russischen Fernsehen, da es heute dem Großteil der russischen Bevölkerung als Hauptinformationsquelle dient. Die Analyse und Kategorisierung dieser Techniken und Narrative sollen es ermöglichen, die dahinterliegenden Motive und Elemente dieser sogenannten hybriden Argumentation offenzulegen und damit Modelle zur Erkennung, Identifikation und, wenn möglich, Neutralisierung ihrer Auswirkungen in der Zukunft zu entwickeln. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses some of the reactions to the war in Ukraine produced by French-speaking Ivorians on social media. Russia's increasing influence on the African continent has also led to the expansion of the Russian media, which promote a certain view of the war. Under this influence, part of the population tends to blindly support Russia, even in its most violent actions, and we are confronted with a discourse on the verge of extremism, in the common political sense, but also in the broader sense of a vision that only recognises the extremes, erasing all nuance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades the bulk of academic analyses and findings have maintained a linear interpretation of propaganda of the deed. Propaganda of the deed is linked to actions by non-state actors such as terrorists and militant groups. Indeed, the traditional interpretation has limited the expansion of the term and its application in different academic fields. In this paper, I show that propaganda of the deed should not be exclusive to explaining terrorist’s violent action. Hence, I argue that the military and academics should employ the term to explain a nation’s excessive use of violent action against a belligerent state in modern warfare. Therefore, arguing that non-state actors and states use the propaganda of the deed is not mutually exclusive. For this reason, I focus on the application of propaganda of the deed as a war termination strategy, again insisting that the concept can be successfully applied on the battlefield by a state to subdue its adversary to enter a war termination negotiation, thus bringing an end to the war. In its narrow sense, as a war termination strategy, the concept can assist in transforming our understanding of war termination from the battlefield. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Amazonia Investiga is the property of PRIMMATE and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)