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The main goal of this paper is to present and compare the main developments in the Russian wars in Ukraine and Syria by considering the main patterns, parallels, and changing trajectories that could shed more light onto both of these war zones, which are highly interlinked due to Russia's leading role in both. It analytically, comparatively, and contemplatively approaches those developments by highlighting multiple similarities and the main differences in global responses to these conflicts. Both conflicts should be seen as highly unpredictable, dynamic, and unnecessarily extended asymmetric proxy wars in which global powers test their new military doctrines and their competitors' responses to their unconventional actions and other unsolicited and indirect interferences in the local dynamism of both wars. Unlike in Syria, the Ukrainian war zone is wholly transformative and ready for the adoption of partial hybridization and the utilization of the new software-defined warfare in combination with conventional weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Bulletin of Ablai Khan KazUIRandWL: Series 'International Relations & Regional Studies' is the property of Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations & World Languages and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Introduction: The Russian army is developing some reconnaissance and interceptor vehicles such as the S.300 systems to defend strategic areas belonging to some of its allied countries. Another defensive shield system was also produced on a regional scale, such as the S-400 which is more capable than the S-300 system. During this process, the Russian military began production of the S-500 defense system. Production sites of S-300 and S-400 missile systems were established in some vital regions of Russia (in Kaliningrad and Crimea) and the territory of some allied countries. However, the Russian defense shield is technically weaker and more limited compared to the Western countries defense shield, but without a doubt, this plan will not remain at these levels. The development of Russia's defense shield means that Russian leaders intend to defend their country against the threat of Western ballistic missiles. Of course, these equipments increase the offensive power of Western countries, especially by carrying tools and increasing missile defense systems. One of the main tools of Russia's defense shield is the S-300 missile system. The PMU S-300 model is capable of countering an attack missile with a speed of Mach 2-8 and a range of 1000 km. This system was established in Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The S-400 system is also capable of shooting down stealth aircraft, ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles and drones with a range of 400 km. But two tools only work on atmosphere. The S-500 system is also in the final stage of production with a range of 600 km and a speed of Mach 7, which is capable of shooting down hypersonic missiles and spy satellites. It is expected to be fulfilled by 2025. In addition, the Russian military has developed some ground-based early warning radars called Voronezh. The Voronezh MD model has an inspection area of 6000 km and has the capacity to detect 500 targets. Of course, this radar is only an early warning system and is not compatible with any interceptor device. Reconnaissance satellite technology has also been used for defense. Currently, several Cosmos class satellites are in service and will be deployed in outer space for this purpose. The Russian military plans to upgrade this technology and surveillance. The plan to deploy Russian missile defense systems appears not as a tactical plan, but as a strategic plan. This plan is simultaneously qualitative and quantitative in the development of detection and interception systems as well as early warning systems. Research Question: "Why is Russia thinking of creating a missile defense shield? Research Hypothesis: The hypothesis of the article is that "the concern of Russian leaders about the Western plan to create a missile defense shield has led to the development of their own missile defense tools." Methodology (and theoretical framework if there are): This is a historical and descriptive method with an emphasis on monitoring Russia's anti-ballistic systems, as well as examining the country's official doctrine in the field of security and foreign policy. This research also deals with the situation of the Russian authorities. Results and Discussion: The research results show that the US and NATO defense shield was the main motivation of the Russian authorities to create missile defense systems. The US and NATO missile defense shields consists of SM3 interceptors, Aegis radars and early warning satellites. However, each part is separated but they are connected by all. They will be deployed in four stages in the mentioned areas, which can defend the American forces and its allies. Those regions are American homeland, Alaska, Greenland, South Persian Gulf and South Korea. They are also carried by destroyers in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. In parallel, NATO is building its own defense shields in some places in the center and east of the continent, which are: The radar station in Turkey, the Aegis radar system in Poland and the THAAD system in Romania and the command section in Germany. The four Aegis radar systems installed on the ships they command are in the port of Rota (Spain). Some say that the third and fourth parts of the defense shield are capable of targeting Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. The defensive shield also protects Western countries that have developed their offensive capacity in conjunction with defensive tools. Due to the withdrawal from the INF Treaty, there are no restrictions against the West. Putin's opposition to Trump's extension of the New Start Treaty without any conditions and Trump's insistence on concluding a comprehensive agreement annoyed Russian authorities. In addition, Russian authorities are not happy about the establishment of a Western defensive shield near the country's western borders. These actions cause Russia to react in the same way. Conclusion: Russia's action in the development of defense systems is one of the main factors of change in the military doctrine of this country. Previously, the Russian military organized its strategic tools around the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and parity. But Russia is trying in the same direction in response to the deployment of Western missile defense elements in some strategic parts of the continent. As a result, Russia's new doctrine is based on an offensive and defensive strategy. Nevertheless, the current interactions between the West and Russia have created a new round of arms competition, especially in strategic defense tools. Russian defense systems are not at the level of their Western counterparts either in terms of content or technical quality. But these are accompanied by offensive tools that have been developed in strategic areas to pose the same threats against the West. According to this emerging trend, the Russian missile defense zone will also cover more strategic areas in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1991, when they regained their independence, the Baltic States have made a concerted effort to become part of the Western alliance system. The article is based on the idea that the primary reason for this orientation cannot be explained solely by normative elements such as identity or culture. Undoubtedly, the West has always been a world to which these countries in question did not belong. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the main priority of the Baltic States, which are categorised as small states, is to preserve their independence. As a result of their historical experiences, Russia is the biggest obstacle that the Baltic countries see in front of these goals. In order to balance the renewed and intensely felt Russian threat, the West has been seen as the only real strategic choice for the region's countries. This article argues that the countries of the region have no alternative option in this process, which resulted in membership in NATO and the EU. Indeed, historical experience has shown that these countries' strategic choices, such as bandwagoning to preserve their independence, which would mean aligning with the threatener, or avoiding being the centre of attention of the adversary by remaining neutral have not yielded results. Therefore, this article aims to try to understand the logic of the Baltic states' strategic choices based on the balance of threat theory. This is because by turning towards the West, the countries of the region have sought to balance not Russian power but the threat they perceive from this country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security strategy documents are the main sources of a state’s threat perceptions, interests, and possible foreign policy steps. These documents include national security concepts, foreign policy concepts and military doctrines. In light of these documents, it is also possible to clearly predict how a state can respond to regional and global developments. In this context, these documents highlight the outlines of the policies of the Russian Federation (RF) toward post-Soviet geography and its relations with the Euro-Atlantic Bloc (NATO and the European Union). Ukraine is also one of the factors determining relations between the RF and the Euro-Atlantic Bloc. Within this frame, relations between the RF and Ukraine are generally assessed in the context of the eastward enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic Bloc. However, in addition to this enlargement, historical-symbolic and military-geopolitical relations between the two states should also be considered. In other words, the annexation of Crimea should be reduced not only to current geopolitical realities but also to the place of Ukraine and Crimea in Russian historiography. After all, the RF’s perception of Ukraine was crucial to the occupation process. Within this framework, the annexation of Crimea will be analyzed in light of geopolitical and historical developments and the context of the RF’s security strategy documents. This analysis will undoubtedly guide the study of the RFUkraine War that began in February 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's decision to carry out an attack on Ukraine by conducting a special military operation or invasion was carried out on the grounds of protecting its national interests. Military doctrine, which is defined as a guideline and strategy, becomes one of the bases for formulating a country's defense policy and foreign policy in establishing cooperation or conducting conflict. This study aims to understand Russia's post-cold war military defense doctrine, which became the basis for its actions to carry out military attacks on Ukraine. The method in this research is descriptive by referring to the literature and reliable documents. Collecting data using literature review of various documents, journals and news as well as data analysis using qualitative. The results of the study show that the military operations carried out by Russia in Ukraine are inseparable from changes in military doctrine carried out after the cold war which made the nature of defense more offensive. This military doctrine later became one of the cornerstones in formulating its defense policy, including the decision to invade Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does Russia need so many nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), which are considered by some observers to be an irrelevant relic of the Cold War with little use in actual, present-day warfighting? The question is all the more acute given that Russia has conducted a sweeping military modernization program since 2008, significantly improving its general-purpose forces and thereby seemingly reducing the need to rely on nuclear weapons. Yet Russia's nonstrategic (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons continue to play a central role in its military doctrine -- and if anything, the weapons' role has increased in the post-Cold War security environment. Initially, they were viewed as a way of compensating for Russia's military-technological inferiority after the collapse of the Soviet Union, giving the country some breathing space until Russia would have the wherewithal to boost its conventional power -- especially in the research and development of high-precision conventional weapons that could be an alternative to nuclear munitions. Indeed, in recent years, Russia has increased its focus on developing nonnuclear deterrence capabilities. That said, NSNWs remain an integral element in the evolving Russian military strategy, combining a set of cross-domain deterrence options including strategic and nonstrategic nuclear, strategic conventional, and nonmilitary ways and means. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under President Lukashenko, three Belarusian national security strategies have been announced: the first in 1995, the second in 2001 and the third in 2011. The first proposal, formulated after Lukashenko's victory in the presidential elections in 1994, outlined Belarus as a neutral state, unbound to any military block in the absence of external enemies. The direction of the foreign policy pursued by the president of Belarus was reflected in the second strategy, where security against NATO and EU member states was sought in a federal state with the Russian Federation. Under the third national security scheme Belarus was to remain in Russia's military security system. Nevertheless, an important security factor was considered to be the modernisation of the economy with foreign capital participation and the need to diversify the supplies of fuels, thus reducing the country's dependence on its earlier partner. The subsequently issued documents: the military doctrine of the State, whose assumptions were published on 20 July 2016, and the Concept of security of the Belarusian state borders for the period 2018-2022, prioritised further development of relations with the Russian Federation and the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. A new element of the 2019 defence plan is the prevention of external aggression and internal disturbance that contribute to the destabilisation of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The conflict in Ukraine and the subsequent worsening of relations between Russia and the West has left a strong imprint on Russia’s strategic security documents. Starting with the renewal of military doctrine in late 2014, Russia has approved changes to all the major security documents within the pace of few years (2014-2016). This article analyzes how the key parameters of the national security strategy have evolved in comparison with the previous versions of the strategy. Revisions made to the text highlight Russia’s vision of world politics as struggle for resources and power, as well as a heightened sense of danger toward Russia. The analysis draws attention to the importance of an ‘asymmetric approach’ in Russia’s thinking on contemporary conflict situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian nuclear problem is real and serious - but it is political more than it is military. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In view of today's physical threats, Poland has adopted a new security doctrine. This publication in its assumption intends to outline the thesis on the centralized management and command of the unified military structure, in the context of the systemic approach to our country defense strategy. The study contemplates the Russia's policy, aimed at strengthening its position of a global great power in terms of weakening ties within North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with a particular focus on the regional interests of each of its members. The presented concept of the contemporary army based on joint task forces, characterized by close co-operation of various types of forces and efficient logistics, managed by the modern chain of command, is the major development direction in the field of defense. It is of crucial importance to reorganize our military forces in correlation to the hybrid dimension of contemporary war conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay investigates the relationship between habits of news consumption and geographical imaginations in Russia. It uses results from a survey of students at a Moscow university to demonstrate an association between the news sources used by respondents and their acceptance of the Russian authorities’ narrative about the West. Students who used at least one state-aligned news source were inclined to express greater agreement with the official (negative) narrative about the West than students who did not use any state-aligned news sources. However, some of the Russian authorities’ anti-Western claims resonated strongly even amongst the non-users of state-aligned sources. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents itself an attempt of assessment theory and practice of hybrid warfare exploited by the Russian Federation (RF). It presents the conclusions resulting from the National Security Strategy and the military doctrine. It sums up the methods and solutions of the armed forces RF as well as forecasts their role in reaching future political goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Applying a military sciences' methodology namely DOTMLPF, this paper examines the 2008 Russian military reform to determine whether or not it will prepare Russia to face contemporary threats and challenges. Analysing published studies with the results of a DOTMLPF assessment and essentials of modern military thinking, this paper offers conclusions on the effectiveness of the reform. Besides, it provides a new perspective when analysing military reforms and emphasises the significance of Russia and its military capability for the global balance of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the middle of the last decade the Russian leadership has conducted a strategic overhaul, publishing a cascade of new concepts, strategies and doctrines that attempt to frame plans in a long-term horizon to 2020 and beyond. Following Vladimir Putin's re-election in 2012, a series of presidential instructions and new plans have been published to update this overhaul. This article examines this commitment to strategic planning and whether it is tantamount to a grand strategy. The article explores the various understandings of Russian strategy in the existing literature, before sketching a definition of grand strategy. It suggests that Moscow has shaped a broad horizon and made some progress towards achieving the goals it has set out. But a grand strategy is more than formulating plans, it is also the coordination of relevant organizations and resources-'conducting the orchestra'-to execute effectively the plans. The article thus concludes by exploring the difficulties Moscow faces: on the one hand, an evolving and competitive international context and, on the other, a domestic context burdened by a heavy inheritance from the USSR and contemporary Russian problems. Taken all together, these suggest that although Moscow is committed to strategic planning, a grand strategy remains a work in progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article considers developments in 2012 in the armed forces and military policies of Russia and former Soviet republics. The impact of an inability to recruit sufficient numbers of military personnel on the plan by Russia' Ministry of Defense to reduce its dependence on conscription is examined. The effects of increased military spending by the administration of Russia's President Vladimir Putin are considered. Military policies of former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the South Caucasus region are examined in relationship to those countries' foreign relations with Russia.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) conducted by the United States has become an important element of the US-Russian relationship, for the policies set during the review process directly affect Russian officials' perceptions of their security environment and provide a framework for the domestic debate on security issues. From Moscow's point of view, the most important outcome of the NPR process was the resumption of the bilateral arms control negotiations and the US willingness to work with Russia to resolve the dispute about missile defense. These developments helped strengthen the domestic institutions in Russia that support a cooperative US-Russian agenda, securing Russia's cooperation with the United States on a range of nonproliferation issues. Additionally, the renewed US commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons has apparently had an effect on the new Russian military doctrine, which somewhat reduces the role of nuclear weapons in Russian national security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks into the need to review the system of categories and concepts in Russian military science, particularly in areas such as warfare, combat actions and military operations and recommends new approaches to the development of the system. Concepts such as military operations, combat actions and warfare reportedly have different essences and content. The author focuses on the role of warfare in war and concludes that the essence of warfare is armed violence.

In this article, the author discusses aspects of the threats posed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the military doctrine of Russia and its nuclear weapon policy. He says that the military doctrine of Russia reserves the right to create and develop nuclear weapons to utilize them according to Russia's plans and manipulative defense. He explores the context of the doctrine, its impact, and conflicts with the new strategy of NATO on the U.S. military strategic offensive force.

The article summarizes the results of twenty years of reforms of the Russian defense-industrial complex. It shows that the reforms have not created an effective economic mechanism of the sector's development. The state, as a basic owner, has hampered the sector's inclusion in market processes. Real management has been passed into the hands of enterprise directors, but their possibilities are limited due to the absence of industrial policy and clear military doctrine. The author concludes that defense enterprises are still not fully reformed and future reforms are necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relations between Russia and the EU countries have undergone an important distancing last years; even though, it is since 2007 when the bilateral ties reached the lowest level in the last two decades. Both the Russian and the European governments, still maintain different interests and priorities on international order affairs and have opposite postures in the way they must tackle many of the current regional and global problems. In addition, the energetic pressures and the bilateral negotiations with every European country represent strategies which Russia maintains toward Europe and have brought positive results. Nevertheless, the containment policy carried out toward Russia has prompted the beginning of the Russian rearmament. Both parts have a clear relation of dependence between themselves, and the current conditions might be adequate to change their situation of tension and prevailing mistrust. The major mistake of Europe toward Russia has been not considering a place for this Slavonic country inside the regional and international order, after the end of the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The key to understanding civil--military relations in polities such as Russia and the United States is military culture. Military culture includes a variety of characteristics or norms of behavior. Some such as executive leadership, respect for military expertise, and a clear chain of command are critical and exist in both the American and Russian militaries. Looking at two periods in both countries (Yeltsin and George Bush II, and Putin and George Bush I), this article maintains that in those instances when military culture was ignored in either country (e.g., a lack of executive leadership, little respect for military expertise, and lack of a clear chain of command), conflict not only existed but also was acerbated. Conversely, in cases where the civilians were firmly in charge but respected military culture, conflict was minimized. Senior military officers felt free to express their opinions and had the perception that their views were always taken seriously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the development and implementation of a national marine policy in Russia. It states that the government approves the implementation of Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation as a comprehensive and long-term policy that deals with the country's marine domestically and international activities. It also presents the development of new methods and technologies used for hydrographic works and nautical activities.

The article discusses the development of the principles of the military art in Russia. The author stated that the principle of suddenness acquired multifarious forms and methods of application in modern operation. In addition, the principle of maneuver has undergone significant evolution, in which it assumes global character in the strategic operation. Moreover, the protection of military forces becomes the all-embracing task to decrease losses in man power and materiel.

The article focuses on the Russian Federation's military strategy in the early 21st century. It states that identifying the character of modern war, defining objectives for the armed-forces, and strategic planning of armed forces are among the element that are high-priority issues at the current stage in the development of both Russia and its military organization.

This article explores Russia's increasing reliance on nuclear weapons from three perspectives. First, it seeks to demonstrate that the phenomenon is not exclusively limited to Russia and represents a broader trend, which is ultimately rooted in the nature of the contemporary international system or, more precisely, the uncertainties of the transitional period between the Cold War system and a new emerging one. Second, it analyzes the role assigned to nuclear weapons in Russia's doctrinal documents, in particular the emergence of a new mission - limited-use of nuclear weapons to deter or, if deterrence fails, to de-escalate large-scale conventional conflicts. Discussions of the new doctrine, which have begun recently, suggest that this new mission will likely remain unchanged. Finally, this article looks at the apparent discrepancy between Russia's nuclear modernization programs and the roles assigned to nuclear weapons in the military doctrine, as well as the causes of that discrepancy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the transformation of the Interior Ministry Troops' construction and development planning approach with the used of program-and-target method in Russia Federation. It aims to develop and implement comprehensive programs and plans to achieve a balance and rational development of the country's military system. Also given are the tactical tasks of the Interior Troops.

The article focuses on the Soviet military doctrine of both the prewar and war periods and its implications on the strategy and planning of the country's defense system. The success and failures of the system has led to the development of the Russian Federation Military Doctrine. It concludes the doctrine determines the ideology of military organization of the state and its development should be based on scientific verification, precise formulations, and postulate inviolability.

The article focuses on the development of the state air and space defense (ASD) doctrine by the Russia Federation upholding the principles stated in the country's military doctrine. It examines the integration of ASD systems and its composition including reconnaisance and early air attack warning, effective engagement and air attack assets, and effective command and control of the system. It concludes that the inclusion of air defense propositions is of principal importance.

The article focuses on the views, vectors, content on employment and organizational development of the Armed Forces in Russia Federation. It discusses the doctrinal approaches to the use of the Armed Forces and identifies the primary aims of Armed Forces employment. The views on organizational development of the Armed forces are examined including the three-level structure, development of combat-worthy general-purpose forces, and the mobilization deployment base.

The article focuses on some issues concerning military-technical principles of the Russian military doctrine. It discusses the development of armaments and military equipment as well as the primary goals of its system. These include the development of perspective armament systems, creation of integrated systems, and the development of basic and critical military technologies.

The article focuses on the aims, objectives and forms of the Naval doctrine and its relevance in the military doctrine of Russia Federation. It refers to the specifications of the role of peacetime employment of the Navy as part of the country's Armed Forces. This would define Navy's role in a multistage military containment of threats to national security and defense of the Russian Federation's national interests in the sea and oceanic sectors.

The article discusses principles and provisions that constitutes the military doctrine of Russia Federation. It presents the various threats to the national security of the country as well as solutions to aid positive tendencies in military security and neutralize existing and potential threats. It states that the doctrinal provisions are based on scientific advances on the area of military theory and practice, society's world outlook, and national interests.

The article presents a military doctrine of Russia Federation which is a declaration of the country's policy in the defense sphere. It aims to examines the modern threats to the country's security, enhance military organization, and determine the goals and objectives of military personnel training and education. Also provided are the structure that made up the doctrine including the threats to Russia, political and legal foundations, and the military-political foundations.

The article discusses the problems of priority assessment in working out the theory and practice of creation and implementation of the military doctrine in Russia. It points out that the priority tasks in the construction of the Armed Forces are determined by the nature of the tasks in the sphere of national security and by the geopolitical priorities of the country. The proper hierarchy of priorities should govern military construction at every level.

The article discusses the military organization of the Russian Federation which is responsible for ensuring military defense and security tasks. The authors explore on the factors that are to be considered to effectively institute military policy. The authors also cite problems related to the formation of military organization and present solutions to address such concerns.

The article informs that an appropriate state policy is formulated and put into effect in the Russian Federation to counter a wide range of threats to national security in the information sphere. A Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation has been developed and approved by the President of the Russian Federation. The Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation as the basic political document in the field of ensuring national security in the information sphere sets the basic reference points for state policy in various sectors and spheres of life of the individual, the society and the state.

Presents the text of the speech delivered by Anatoliy Filippovich Klimenko, lieutenant general of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, at the Conference on the Lessons and Conclusions of the Great Patriotic War and the Prospects for the Development of Modern Military Science and Military Art in Moscow, Russia on March 15, 2005 which deals on the evolution of China's military policy and military doctrine.

Reports on the Military Doctrine of the Red Army on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War in Russia. Actual course of the past events; Some of the author's military-technical revelations; Deployment, in May-June 1941, of large Red Army forces from the internal military districts to the west.

El artículo examina el Ministerio de Defensa de la Federación Rusa y el libro blanco llamado "Las fuerzas armadas rusas: Objetivos y perspectivas." El documento estudia la doctrina militar establecida en 1996 tanto como el estatuto de fuerzas logísticas y técnicas. Se menciona que el libro blanco tiene particular interés político y diplomático en al análisis de la política de defensa.

Discusses the security services in Russia. Background on Russian security services; Reasons for requiring a new information security doctrine that was adopted on September 2, 2000; Functions of a presidential decree signed by Vladimir Putin on August 11, 2003.

Se analiza la evolución que ha experimentado la doctrina militar rusa desde la disolución de la URSS. Se relaciona ésta con el proceso de creación y desarrollo de una política exterior propia de la Federación Rusa. Se estudia la forma en que la doctrina y la política exterior se han separado de la herencia soviética y han asumido la realidad de la existencia de Rusia como estado independiente. Tiene una posición internacional menos sólida de la que tenía en tiempos de la URSS.