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When Russia amassed troops in the winter of 2021–2022, many analysts deemed a large-scale invasion of Ukraine unlikely. Surveying the expert literature, we establish that these arguments largely relied on utility-based reasoning: Analysts thought an invasion was improbable, as it would foreseeably entail massive costs for Russia, its people, and its regime. We show that this regnant expert opinion had not sufficiently accounted for the Russian regime's tendencies to increasingly accept risks, coupled with an inadequate processing of information on Ukrainian and Western views and policies. We argue that analysts miscalculated partially because the most prominent facts, long-term trends, and causal mechanisms available to them jointly suggested Russian cost-sensitivity, but provided only weak signs of countervailing factors. We thereby showcase that good forecasting requires explicit theory with a view on multiple interacting causal factors, area expertise and Socratic humility on the extent, context and certainty of our findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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How does a security dilemma dynamic between parties deemed not to hold hostile intentions toward each other emerge and escalate? This article investigates Russian official discourse on NATO engagement in Europe post-Crimea (2014), and its impact on security interaction in the Arctic. We also examine how Russia represents NATO intentions and actions in a context seen by Russia as a relation of war. We identify the effect of these changing representations of self and other for the emerging securitization dilemma in relations between Russia and NATO, arguing that they have replaced uncertainty about NATO's hostile intentions with certainty. Although Russia still articulates the Arctic as a unique cooperative region, there may be little space left for non-conflictual Russian action when encountering NATO in the Arctic. We highlight the agency and importance of evolving political rhetoric in creating a dangerous situation where lethal conflict can occur between parties who do not seek it, and also suggest that adjustments to patterns of official speech could be a tool of mitigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Widely considered to be a landmark encyclopaedia for its time, the twelfth and thirteenth editions of The Encyclopaedia Britannica, supplements to the earlier eleventh edition, devote considerable space to the origins and consequences of the Russian Revolution. Incapable of maintaining the objective tone customary for works of reference, several of the contributors caught the essence of the turmoil and its impact across Europe, whether through a liberal or socialist lens. This article charts the evolution of the coverage of Russia in The Encyclopaedia Britannica and highlights how its earlier approach was overwhelmed by war and revolution as pre-war certainties were shaken and undermined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]