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Examines the new configurations in global relations and the centrality of knowledge as the emerging currency in that relationship. Argues that the centre-periphery fault line and dichotomy may be less obvious to the younger generation, taking into account the vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Includes references. (CMK)

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a growing literature promoting the Ukrainian national cause, framed in decolonial terms, has influenced public discourse about the Russia-Ukraine War in the West. Filtered through the activist interpretation of cultural epistemologies, with their emphasis on the centring and decentring of knowledges, the war has been imagined primarily as a colonial emanation of a Russian narrative. We argue that the heavily moralized notion of epistemological and mental decolonization has impeded critical investigation into the degree of responsibility for, and the NATO powers’ involvement in, the Russia-Ukraine War. In order to attain a rigorous analysis of all actors’ motives and rationalities, we argue for the need to understand the conflict's structural and historical dimensions, and thus to draw from the classical, structural approaches to analysing imperial power that predate the cultural turn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes the concept of 'imperism' as an analytical tool apt to describe political processes in Putin's Russia and beyond. Imperism denotes an ontological orientation, or nomos (the term derives from theories of religion and politics by Berger and Schmitt), that undergirds a plurality of civic positions, informs policy, and fundamentally casts imperialness as a political entity's normal, desirable state. Russia's imperist nomos shall be explored in its key dimensions, including cosmology, authority, sociology, and aesthetics. However, imperism's analytical purchase is not limited to the Russian case. In particular, this paper considers the merits of this category vis-à-vis an array of related but distinct concepts: imperialism, authoritarianism, fascism, nationalism, and irredentism. On those grounds, it will be argued that Putinist Russia's military adventurism manifests a peculiar, imperist form of imperialism; that the Putin regime, albeit hard to categorise, appears to share an imperist nomos with historical fascisms; and that imperism's ultimate scope exceeds that of nationalist irredentism. The paper ends with a reflection on the advantageous epistemological potentialities of imperism as a category. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the decolonization of the history of the Soviet Union and late Russian empire and explores developments on the Russian Revolution amid the war between Russia and Ukraine. Topics tackled include histories of empire and the internal colonisation of Russia with its territorial expansion from the 16th-century onwards, depoliticisation of the Russian Revolution and its connection to the European decolonisation, and Ukraine's fight for national self-determination.

In this article I merge the three of the nineteenth century's dominant markers of modernity—gender, science, and modernity—in the person of Praskovia Sergeevna Uvarova. Arguably the most influential character in prerevolutionary archeology through her multiple functions at the Imperial Moscow Archeological Society, she is at best a shadow figure in the history of Russian science. Although Uvarova herself must be held to blame in large measure for this, the connections that this female draws between science and empire are crucial to our understanding of the implications of the three analytical categories come together in late imperial Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has prompted calls for canceling Russian cultural figures, both contemporary and historical, who are denounced as mouthpieces of imperialist aggression. Even if justified in some cases, such sweeping condemnations overlook diverse Russian voices and identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On February 24, 2022, the world was surprised by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and, perhaps even more so, by Ukraine's fierce resistance to it. In this article, we examine mainstream and feminist International Relations (IR) debates that have emerged in response to Russia's invasion, as well as the older debates revived through them. Building on decolonial and feminist scholarship, prominently centering feminist debates from Europe's East and Central Asia, we argue that dominant Western IR debates on Russia and Ukraine are shaped by inter-imperiality. We trace issues of epistemic injustice, epistemic imperialism and coloniality of knowledge production in mainstream IR and see them replicated in feminist debates, including from global South perspectives. We conclude with a contemplation on the structural changes warranted across academia to eliminate the coloniality of knowledge production about Ukraine and fellow societies as well as Indigenous nations affected by Russian colonial and imperial violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vladimir Putin seeks to build a modern Russian empire on the post-Soviet space, as confirmed by the invasion of Ukraine. In the present article, the author shows why modern Russia represents a geopolitical project called "Putin's Empire," and what the ideological justifications for this empire are. The author also proposes to consider what is happening as a clash of different forms of imperial orders—neoliberal democracy and the concept of the "Russian world." The author concludes that Russia, as an empire, is in a protracted political crisis, but this does not mean the empire will disintegrate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay reviews new books on the fraught relationships between Ukraine, Russia and North Atlatic Treaty Organization countries since 1990, and on comparative studies of quasi-colonial subjugation, the development of anti-imperial nationalism and conflict, and protracted and violent transitions to full national independence in Ireland and Ukraine. There are comparisons of the ways in which four centuries of recurrent tension, conflict and divergence between Ukraine and Russia either resembled or differed from the five centuries of fraught relationships between Ireland and Britain. Ireland's Great Famine (1846–1849) is compared with Ukraine's Holodomor (1932–1933). The essay also assesses conflicting attributions of responsibility for 'squandering' the opportunity to enhance European security and global peace during the 1990s, and for bringing about dramatic escalations of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 – initiating a 'Second Cold War' from 2014 onward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the Marxist theory of imperialism to analyze the war in Ukraine that broke out in March 2022. It analyzes the evolution of the socioeconomic system of post-Soviet Russia, the evolving relationship between post-Soviet Russia and the US government, and the history of relations between Russia and Ukraine. It considers the role of nationalist ideology in Russia both before and after the demise of the Soviet Union. The article concludes that a relation of inter-imperialist rivalry played a key role in the conflict that led to the war in Ukraine. JEL Classification: B51, N40, P52 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The participation of the Cossack formations in the military operations of Dniester in 1992, together with paramilitary forces recruited locally and supported politically and militarily by the Russian Federation, remains a topic known superficially at the level of public opinion and approached almost entirely by chance by qualified researchers. This article aims to put into circulation hitherto unused information; to systematize and interpret the information dissipated in the memoirs, contemporary media, and chronologies drawn up by the participants in the events; and to open the phenomenon (much better developed later) of the mercenary engaged in the interest of the great powers. The authors apply interdisciplinary methodology, borrowed from historical, military, political, sociological, and psychological sciences. Consequently, the conclusions will reveal ideological motivations, tactics, and strategies; alliance and subordination policies; but also serious ethical slippages—all specific to mercenary behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the range of strategies adopted by various states vis-à-vis the symbols of the Russian war against Ukraine—the St. George ribbon and the letters Z and V. First, it analyzes their genealogy, illustrating how the St. George ribbon reflects Russia's new authoritarian-imperial identity, while the Z and V originate from ultranationalist Telegram communities promoting white supremacist and genocidal ideas. Second, the concept of semiotic resistance is proposed to explain how states and societies counter Russia's pro-war narratives by implementing diverse semiotic strategies. Finally, the in-depth analysis of the identity politics accompanying the symbolic ban in Moldova reveals how competing definitions of nationhood lead to divergent assessments of Russia's war narratives. The dispute over the St. George ribbon in Moldova is embedded in longstanding domestic culture wars, fought in the legal-political domain as well as in urban spaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text discusses Alexander Etkind's controversial work, Internal Colonization: Russia's Imperial Experience (2011), and proposes a way to study the Russian Imperial structures in terms of self-colonisation without diminishing the importance of Russia's colonisation and subjugation of indigenous peoples in Siberia, Central Asia or the Caucasus. It proposes to study the colonisation of the self, not as similar to the colonisation of peoples deemed in colonial discourse to be other, but rather as the subjugation of people belonging to the Russian self. As such, it is not to be conflated with the colonisation of others. Drawing upon examples from Russian literature, the article then offers some examples of how representatives of the Russian self, particularly the peasant class, were othered and subjugated by reforms and by discourse that show how discriminatory and arbitrary laws were when it came to the treatment of peasants in both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few predicted the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and especially its brutality. Similarly, Ukraine's capable and determined resistance came as a surprise to many. Ukraine, viewed through the Russian lenses, was erroneously characterized as "weak" and "fragmented." In turn, Russia was seen as a modern power seeking a "sphere of influence" through attraction and occasional meddling in neighbors' affairs. The Ukraine–Russia relations were misconstrued as "brotherly." I argue that Russia should be understood as a colonial power whose aggression aims to re-establish supremacy over the Ukrainian nation. This desire arose from Ukrainians' increased acceptance in Europe, which Russians perceived as a transgression of hierarchies. The brutality of the invasion was aggravated by the Russian forces' realization that Ukrainians not only rejected their "rescue mission" but did not need one in the first place. Misconceptions about the Russian invasion can be addressed through interdisciplinarity, engagement with postcolonial scholarship, and attention to facts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine represents a critical juncture for the role gender plays in European security. We argue that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is not only gendered in the way other conflict are, but the war's essential novelty lies in the fact that it is explicitly fought for the so-called traditional values, against gender and sexual equalities. Drawing on local decolonial insights and theoretical concepts of liberal/illiberal gender orders, we contrast the Russian neo-traditionalism with the Ukrainian account of the Russian invasion, while seeking to uncover how an imagination of Europe is constitutive for these gendered discourses. We show that the construction of the narratives is a circular process of ever more pronounced neo-traditionalism by Russia which sees Europe as its decadent Other. We demonstrate that these discourses have real consequences as the Russian illiberal gender order justifies and wages real war against Ukraine and gender is turning into the central battlefield both in the figurative and the literal sense of the word. Russian accounts contrast with Ukraine's hybridised, but increasingly emancipatory discourses and practices which have been playing a fundamental role in Ukraine's resistance to the Russian invasion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (CFPJ) is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Politica y Sociedad is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The war against Ukraine, decided by President Putin in February 2022, stimulated an old controversy: who has the responsibility of the growing tensions, since 1992, between Russia, the United States and Europe? For Moscow, NATO, and behind NATO the USA, by its unjustified expansion, exercised a real and dangerous provocation. For the other side, the expansion of NATO resulted of the fears of Russia's neighbors, fears justified a posteriori by the «neo-imperialism» of Moscow. The Kremlin understands the democratic movements in Georgia, Ukraine etc. as a complot of the West, a war against the «Russian World» and its civilization. The West justified its military interventions against Serbia as «humanitarian», The Russians condemned that as aggression against the Slav and Orthodox brother. The actual war in Ukraine confirms and radicalizes the points of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's military invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the Kremlin's imperial ambitions. The invasion was not only a shocking event, but also a process of geopolitical transformation. Russia, which has a long history of imperialism, in the 21st century is trying to break the established global world order and propose an alternative one. But the tools it uses are tools of violence, domination, blackmail, and intimidation. This is particularly important to explore in the context of the Russian leadership's construction of imperial sovereignty, a form of political power used to expand and consolidate the empire's influence in a particular geopolitical space: the post-Soviet space. This article aims to show the nature of Russian imperial sovereignty as well as the mechanisms of its dissemination, which are modus operandi – dynamic structures of reproduction of the system of power relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Footnotes 1 Viktor Taki, "Between Polizeistaat and Cordon Sanitaire: Epidemics and Police Reform during the Russian Occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, 1828-1834", I Ab Imperio i 4 (2008): 75-112. Russia on the Danube: Empire, Elites, and Reform in Moldavia and Wallachia, 1812-1834 Russia on the Danube: Empire, Elites, and Reform in Moldavia and Wallachia, 1812-1834. [Extracted from the article]

This article argues that there are two main roles for the authoritarian regime of state capitalism in post-socialist transition: a constructivist one, in which the state moves market-based national economy toward greater equality, democracy, and social justice, and a predatory one, in which a powerful state leverages its control over the national economy to primarily serve the political needs of the state and advance its geopolitical ambitions. Using modern Russia's predatory order of state capitalism as a case in point, the paper situates the analysis of these differing models of state capitalism within traditional institutionalism and demonstrates the need for a careful re-evaluation of some standard institutionalist positions. More specifically, the paper advocates for constraining existing particularistic bias in favour of more robust acknowledgement of what is not culturally specific but rather universal and intrinsic to democratic institutions. Furthermore, it calls for rehabilitation of the much- maligned concept of teleology in heterodox institutionalism in order to accurately situate the analysis of potential associated with a positive vision for state capitalism and its role in constructing socially just, democratic and humanist economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the Russian viewers' interest in Turkish TV series, only a few Turkish TV series got aired on a federal channel in Russia. One of them is 'Kurt Seyit and Shura.' It was broadcast in Turkey between 4 March and 20 November 2014, coinciding with the beginning and the acute phase of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The historical context of the events depicted in the TV series (especially St Petersburg and Crimea in late imperial Russia) aligns to the highest with the new Russian ideology, which began to consider Crimea a part of modern Russia. Soon the series got translated into Russian and broadcast in Russia on a federal channel. Ironically, for the Russian audience, it exemplified the historical integration of Crimean Tatars in the history of the Russian Empire. The article considers perception of the TV series in Russia as 'misunderstanding' between two cultural hegemonies: Turkey and Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In post-soviet Russia, sobornost' has been a historic ideal and cultural resource that diverse actors have used in order to construct anew the nation's dignity and status. This study analyses the promotion of the (imperial) culture of sobornost' by Patriarch Kirill and Patriarch Alexy based on 36 speeches they delivered from 1993 to 2022 at the World Russian People's Council, in a forum purposefully established to enhance the culture of sobornost'/solidarity in Russian society. The findings of a qualitative thematic analysis of the speeches identified common themes (such as 'true historical path'), thematic changes (such as the adoption of geopolitical discourse on family), thematic emphases uniquely present at particular 'times' (such as at the EU enlargement of 2004), themes related to the promotion of sobornost' at the level of the trans-national church, and its correlates—Russian state-civilization, globalization, and confrontation with the West. The findings demonstrate agreement in the messages of Patriarch Alexy and Patriarch Kirill as well as specific content and style that were articulated only by the latter. In the conclusion, we compare Kirill's culture of sobornost' with Roman Catholic synodality and with Russian 19th century applications of the same concept, and Kirill's entrepreneurial construction of national identity from the perspective of glocalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With Russia's attack on Ukraine the decline of the imperialist rule of the United States and its subordinate allies has accelerated, while the emergence of a multipolar world draws nearer. The author first describes how the structure, toolkit, inherent contradictions of imperialism, as well as the role of fascism, have altered in the last century, then explains the challenges imperialism faces today. This is followed by a discussion of the reasons for the Ukrainian war and the unhuman reactions of the North Atlantic powers. The author argues that only the defeat of imperialism and the emergence of a multipolar world will open the road to socialism at global level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the role of politics and ideology in post-Cold War imperialism, focusing on the current conflict between Russia, Ukraine, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union. The article argues that primary causes are not economic but primarily political and ideological. While there are clear raisons d'etat that explain all sides' decisions, the article claims that there is a contradiction between the raisons d'etat and an objectively rational assessment of the stated goals and the actors' ability to attain them. The article concludes that while the Marxist understanding of imperialism includes a focus on both its political and economic dynamics, they can sometimes over-emphasize the economic and objective rationality of political decisions. The current conflict in Ukraine, the article will argue, is a paradigm example of raisons d'etat becoming unhinged from objectively rational strategies and economically rational capitalist motives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the heart of this conflict of Ukraine war is the American threat to break Russia into multiple states; alongside the Russian threat to create a new global trading currency with China as equal partners. These two contrary themes find themselves in mortal conflict in the land of Ukraine. The argument is that this bigger picture of this war explains why both sides are likely to fight to the end. Neither think that they can concede. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Monroe Doctrine, which represents a formative trauma for Latin American states, is infl uencing both their attitudes to the war in Ukraine, in which they distance themselves from both Russia and Western states, as well as their role as a neutralizing and stabilizing power in the international system. Since its beginning, most Latin American governments‘ assessment of the war in Ukraine has diff ered from Western countries in various important respects. On the one hand, all Latin American states condemn Russia‘s military intervention in Ukraine, yet, on the other hand, they diverge from the “West” on the causes of the war, on questions of sanctions and guilt, and on end scenarios. In this article, I investigate how Latin America‘s experiences with the Monroe Doctrine has infl uenced its independent attitude to the war in Ukraine, its intermediate position in the new tension between the great powers, and its peace-promoting potential in the newly forming international system. Theoretically, I deal critically with imperialism and strategic development approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Colloquia Humanistica is the property of Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Slavic Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper reviews analyses of the implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for the global food system and food security. Key critical agrarian studies-affiliated accounts, like mainstream ones, conceptualize Russia's war primarily as a 'shock', and the paper shows how accounts name, describe, explain the origins and causal impacts of, and assign responsibility for that shock. While CAS studies make essential contributions, the literature treats Russia's invasion as exogenous to the global food system in ways that should be questioned. CAS studies should apply other established CAS framings – geopolitics, imperialism and colonialism, and land/resource grabbing – to Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Political Science Studies / Studia Politologiczne is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Ukraine has been, since its independence in 1991, located between two qualitatively different types of geopolitical environments - modern to its east and post-modern to its west. Given the tendencies of both to growth, nonetheless, using different means and seeking divergent goals, Ukraine turned into a geopolitical battlefield that due to the internal developments in Russia stepped into a hot phase in 2014 with further escalation in 2022. The article presents an interpretation of the events through neomedieval and imperial lenses, explaining the behaviours of both the West and Russia and the consequences their foreign policies had for the current situation in the country. It concludes that the mutual misunderstanding about the nature of the respective projects - mainly of the voluntary enlargement of the EU and NATO - led to unnecessary clashes and escalation of the contest by the Russian modern empire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides a discussion of various aspects of Chechen relation to the war in Ukraine, including oppositional voices as well as discourses and actions of those supporting the Russian position. The article compares and contrasts the war in Ukraine with the two wars Russia waged against Chechnya in 1994 and 1999. Commenting on the war in Ukraine, the author focuses on the phenomenon of the 'Kadyrovites' (Chechen auxiliary troops fighting on the Russian side) on the one hand and Chechen units fighting on the Ukrainian side on the other. It is argued that the silence of the international community in the Chechen war afforded Russia a sense of impunity, thus reinforcing its reckless military strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article introduces the 'League of Free Nations', which united earlier existing movements from various ethnic groups across the Russian Federation. The League is a horizontal network that brings together organizations, movements and individual activists who share its goals and views. Amongst the major aims is the consolidation of anti-imperial forces in the Russian Federation and enabling self-determination among its subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Tikrit University for Humanities is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Is Russia a neoimperial or postimperial state? In this paper, I compare two interpretations proposed by political commentators Marcel Van Herpen and Dmitri Trenin. Van Herpen holds that the Russian empire is literally being rebuilt, whereas Trenin believes that Russia is just ceasing to be an empire. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, the current war against Ukraine cannot be interpreted as an attempt to restore the Russian empire. This is because being an empire requires a universalistic ideology that can be accepted by other nations. Meanwhile, the ideological foundation of the current war is an obviously nationalistic conception of the "Russian world." Polish historians Andrzej Nowak and Włodzimierz Marciniak brilliantly argued that it was Russian nationalism that had previously led to the collapse of both Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Under this interpretation the current war in Ukraine can be seen not as the rebirth but rather as the dramatic end of Russian imperialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prince Nikolay Alexeyevich Orlov (1827–1885) was an aristocrat, a war hero and a prominent diplomat of the Russian Empire who enjoyed a prestigious position from a very young age. In his correspondence with Grand Duke Nicholas Alexandrovich in the early 1860s, Prince Orlov expounded his views on Russian politics, putting forward his liberal outlook of what the empire ought to be. His most crucial proposals were (i) revising Russian foreign policy and redefining imperial borders (which included solving the 'Polish Question'); (ii) adopting federalism with local representative institutions based on a notion of 'legitimate power'; (iii) introducing bottom-up reforms; (iv) abolishing 'backwards practices' (in particular, corporal punishment) and (v) guaranteeing civil rights and equality before the law. Based on letters and other writings that remain vastly under-researched in Russia and practically unknown to English-speaking audiences, I analyse Prince Orlov's correspondence as illustrative of a broader ideological turn to liberal imperialism and contextualise it from Russian and European perspectives. By positing that Russian liberalism was strongly impacted by the successes and shortcomings of the liberal imperialism of the 1860s, I invite the reader to rethink some ideological and chronological boundaries that are routinely taken for granted in discussions regarding liberalism, imperialism and their interconnectedness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Imperial Era," this special issue of the Journal of Finnish Studies, presents a selection of articles that describe Finland in the context of the Russian Empire. In this introductory article, "Finland in Imperial Context," the authors sketch the historical background for the specialized articles. They present key features in the history of the Grand Duchy of Finland during its period of Russian rule (1809-1917), that is, after the Napoleonic Wars and before the Russian Revolution, after Swedish rule and before independence. The importance of understanding Finland in imperial context--as a part of the wider context of the Russian Empire-- is highlighted. It is contrasted with a narrower national context. The complexities of studying this era and other aspects of Finnish-Russian history include the need for scholars to be multilingual and grapple with the legacy of Russian imperialism--which still burdens the world today. Multi- and translingual considerations are described, orienting the reader to standardizations employed by the authors for maximum accessibility and comprehensibility of the issue's articles, which are each introduced in summary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Writing Is Russia Fascist? was a difficult intellectual exercise, as it feels counterintuitive to spend years working on a concept, only to refute its validity. Yet it eventually brought more than I envisioned, helping me conceptualize the notion of illiberalism as a more accurate term for capturing the pre-war Russian regime's ideological nature. Another important take I got from writing this book has been the centrality of memory wars for the whole of Europe, and the need to analyze Russia while looking in the mirror at "our" (read "Western") own ambivalent, multi-voiced, memories of the 20th century. I am therefore grateful to the reviewers for their interest in the book and for bringing forward so many new arguments to the discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article "Russia: Hegemon, Empire or Just a Normal Nation-State?" by Hans-Heinrich Nolte, the question is raised whether Russia is a hegemon, an empire, or simply a normal nation-state. It is argued that centralized empires no longer fit the complexity of the 21st century and that only unions can adequately deal with it. It is also discussed whether the confrontation between the West and the East, especially between NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), will continue to exist. It is speculated whether the war in Ukraine is Russia's last attempt to keep its own candidacy for leadership in the East open. It is pointed out that Russia has lost its leadership position in the international community through its own behavior and the use of limited military means. Despite its economic importance, Russia relies on the solidarity of other countries and cannot achieve a hegemonic position like the United States or China. It is also noted that Russia's politics are more post-imperial than global, and that a federated nation-state might be a better alternative. [Extracted from the article]

This essay engages with and revises the author's article titled, "Fateful Collision: NATO's Drive to the East versus Russia's Sphere of Influence," for the Institute for New Economic Thinking. In addition, it draws on his book, The American Way of Empire: How America Won a World—But Lost Her Way, particularly the chapter on "Europe: NATO Expansion versus the Russian Sphere." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Western imperialism played a crucial role in the creation of modern international law, it is ever more important to analyze the engagements of non-Western imperialist powers with the field so as to comprehend the changing global patterns of legalized violence and expansionism. In this Essay, we analyze Russia's international legal arguments in support of its use of force against Ukraine through the lens of inter-imperial rivalry. In so doing, we call for strict scrutiny of the deployments of jus ad bellum equally by all imperial powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine manifests a major crisis both for US imperialism in its struggle to maintain and expand its hegemony against challenge, here primarily but not exclusively, Russia and for international capitalism itself. How this crisis will play out is unknown but at this stage three characteristics are evident. Firstly, the use of proxies; Ukraine for the military struggle and Europe to a large extent for the economic one. Secondly, the primacy of economic instruments, such as sanctions rather than direct military power. Thirdly, undergirding and legitimizing the other two, the expanded role of information warfare. Information warfare sits on two pillars. One is cultural hegemony, the soft power to mold perception because of the esteem in which the provider of information is held by the recipient. The other is the organizational framework, or architecture of information collection, creation and dissemination to manage perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Al-Bahith Journal is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article discusses the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine from a postcolonial perspective. It argues that the structure of coloniality in the region is tripartite: besides Russia and Ukraine, the "West" is present as the main significant Other for both sides. With regard to the West, Russia is a "subaltern empire" and Ukraine is a "double subaltern," peripheral to more than one center of power. Within this complex of imperiality and subalternity, Russia is engaging in a "catching-up imperialism" driven by resentment against the West. Russia has subsumed neighboring states, or parts of them, in brutal violation of the existing international order. Its leaders claim it is only mimicking the hegemon's (i.e. the West's) imperialist modus operandi. This geostrategic pattern is captured by Erik Ringmar's notion of "recognition games." Fighting in those "deadly games," Zelensky's Ukraine is breaking out of its place as a mute subaltern. The rhetorical aspect of Ukraine's response to Russian aggression can be called a horizontal "populism of hope." Ukraine has attained global visibility and recognition in the Northern hemisphere as a beacon of grassroots democracy, resilience and freedom. Russia, however, has rebranded itself as the spearhead of a global fight against Western hegemony. The outcome of this military and discursive standoff will largely define a future normative international order displaying new hierarchies of symbolic power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay raises the issue of historians' responsibility to the communities that they study. While some purported version of history has been central to the Kremlin's justifications for Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the region's historians have failed to make a stand against this misuse of history. Moreover, in many instances they endorsed and disseminated the Kremlin's narratives about Ukraine's past and present. Aiming to explain the anti-Ukrainian biases that have become well entrenched in both Western academia and Western public opinion, this essay examines the regional subfield of area studies, to which Ukrainian studies are usually relegated, as well as the expectations and agenda of the Western-educated public. I argue that the subfield is dominated by Russian studies and frequently uncritically adopts the positions, concepts, and explanations of Russia's imperialist ideologists. At the same time, Western public opinion, while opening up to the historical injustices committed by Western empires, still sees the world through retrograde imperial lenses. The essay also discusses in detail what happens when researchers shaped by both these trends write Ukrainian history. Looking for ways forward, I suggest rethinking the issue of intellectual responsibility and "deimperialization" of Ukraine's Western historiography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is time to admit that while Russia remains an empire and has nuclear weapons, it will always be an existential threat to democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]