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Copyright of Investigaciones Historicas is the property of Universidad de Valladolid, Facultad de Filosofia y Letras and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Ukrainians' resilience in the face of Russia's 2022 invasion can be explained by cumulative identity change through successive revolutions: the Orange Revolution in 2004, the Maidan Revolution or Revolution of Dignity in 2013–2014 and the current as yet unnamed war. The two phases of the war, from 2014 and 2022, have accelerated both the civic and the social construction of Ukrainian identity. Post‐post‐Soviet Ukraine is now a consolidated civic and political nation. But there is also an increased consensus on traditional nationalist mythology, defined by opposition to Russia's aggressive reimperialisation and autocratic political culture and by Ukraine's hyper‐Europeanisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Euromaidan revolution was the start of a process of profound change in Ukrainian identity. Russian aggression has completed this turn to a pro-Western, anti-Russian orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Russia, the main reason for starting the war with Ukraine on February 24, 2022 was the genocide of the Russian-speaking population by the Nazi government of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In this paper I investigate the Russian claims about genocide. These claims are shown to be part of the rhetorical frame Russophobic Nazi Ukraine government commits genocide on Russians, an aspect of Russian propaganda which builds on the Second World War. I demonstrated that this frame is itself an aspect of a more abstract frame, where any perceived enemy of Russia, is portrayed as a fascist or Nazi force that aims to destroy Russia and Russian culture. I investigate how this frame emerged and developed over time in five stages, starting in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, and in Russia after the Orange and Maidan revolutions in Ukraine. Russia tries to provide argumentation for the validity of the frame by referring to a number of objectively established facts relating to the situation in the Donbas, Ukraine's language laws, and the presence of right-extremists in Ukraine. In doing so, some ideas are made more salient than others (the language laws that diminish the official status of Russian in Ukraine and the hostilities in the Donbas region), while other ideas are suppressed altogether (e.g. the juridical meaning of genocide, the actual status of right-wing extremism in Ukraine, the role of Russia in the hostilities in the Donbas, and the actual status of the language laws in Ukraine). In all of these cases, the arguments used by Russia are not valid, being based on exaggerations, hyperbolic use of terminology, and lies. The main goal of this frame is to acquire and retain support for Russia's policy toward Ukraine, as well as to deflect any potential criticism on Russia itself. Ultimately, the Russian propaganda is part of the concept Russkij Mir 'Russian World', where Russian language and culture are a means to restore President Vladimir Putin's Russian sphere of influence from Soviet times or earlier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia reacted in markedly different ways to comparable upheavals in Ukraine: the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013/2014. This paper argues that a combination of important external and internal factors led to a change in Russia's dominant national role conceptions, which contributed to Moscow's more assertive foreign policy, exemplified by divergent reactions to these two upheavals. Consequently, the paper aims to contribute to the existing scholarship on role change, demonstrating mechanisms behind such changes and examining the necessary scope conditions. The analysis reveals two types of role change: long-term, comprehensive ones that may lead to shifts in foreign policy behavior and swift changes motivated by contemporary events that result from role conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Maidan Revolution in 2014, the competing interests of the main actors in Ukraine and globally stalled the process of conflict resolution. The geopolitical view of the situation prevented focusing on the regional challenges such as the humanitarian situation and were unlikely to facilitate positive developments in the peaceful settlement of the conflict. The Minsk Agreements were questioned by both sides, although they were the only existing framework for the settlement of the conflict. The United Nations efforts in conflict management were limited due to controversial views between the West and Russia. This paper uses DIME conflict analysis to examine the various actors involved in the conflict between Ukraine and the separatist movements in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine from 2014 to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. DIME is an acronym for Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic. The various parties and stakeholders involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine are listed and characterized under these four descriptors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Euromaidan protests of 2013–14 and the subsequent conflict with the Russian Federation and issue of the division in Ukrainian Orthodoxy and also substantially contributed to deep changes in the policies on religion pursued by the new post-Euromaidan political regime. It mentions constant scrutiny in the public sphere, aimed at determining these churches' true loyalties and political preferences and declarations of full loyalty to the Ukrainian state.

The proximity of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (2004) andEuromaidan Revolution (2014) provides an opportunity to considerwhy some individuals remain active across protest cycles whileothers defect. Many social movement scholars explain differentialparticipation in terms of micro-structural, biographical, or cognitivefactors. Others rely on rational choice theories of collective actionbased on coordination. Testing competing explanations arecomplicated because the variables included in structural andagency-based models are often the same, although the underlyingcausal mechanisms are different. In this article, I argue that thekey to understanding the role of agency and structure in protestparticipation is to relax strong assumptions about the unified natureof society and consider the multiple paths to participation. Thisapproach suggests that both structural and agency-based causalmechanisms can influence political engagement depending onindividual experiences, identities, and perceptions of events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's views on the legacy of the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Topics include the leaderships of Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin, World War II, the historical memory of the Gulag, and anti-communist liberalism. Also discussed are the landscape of opposition politics in Russia, its left-revolutionary history, the Maidan revolution in Ukraine, the rejection of Russian imperialism in Ukraine, how Lenin and Stalin repressed and annihilated native intelligentsias.

This essay investigates the relationship between habits of news consumption and geographical imaginations in Russia. It uses results from a survey of students at a Moscow university to demonstrate an association between the news sources used by respondents and their acceptance of the Russian authorities’ narrative about the West. Students who used at least one state-aligned news source were inclined to express greater agreement with the official (negative) narrative about the West than students who did not use any state-aligned news sources. However, some of the Russian authorities’ anti-Western claims resonated strongly even amongst the non-users of state-aligned sources. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Russian strategic culture - security policy habits of mind - is what caused the Kremlin to intervene in Ukraine in 2014. The Maidan Revolution was perceived as threatening spillover into Russia, an event misperceived by today's chekisty to have been instigated by the US. Such groupthink is rooted in KGB groupthink about regime security in continuation of the Russian high-context strategic culture. The legacy from Andropov's 1956 trauma and the imprint of Primakov, Putin and Patrushev is explored, hereby updating research on Russian strategic culture. The Kremlin's threat perception evolved from a perception of vulnerability to the Ukrainian Orange Revolution of 2004. The Arab Spring inspired a domino theory of colour revolutions reiterated by other siloviki and found in military and national security doctrines. The recent formation of a Russian National Guard further testifies to the decisive inside-out logic behind Russia's intervention against Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines China’s position on the Ukrainian ‘Euromaidan’ crisis over Crimea, on the war in the southeast of Ukraine and on sanctions against Russia. A complex set of reasons (economic, political and geopolitical) have caused heightened interest on the part of China in the events in the Ukraine. From the start, China kept a very low profile and right up to late February 2014, made no strong statements on the crisis in Ukraine and shunned any diplomatic initiatives. Thereafter, China’s official stand began to exhibit increasingly frequent signs of anti-Western rhetoric, an indication of its position over the situation in Ukraine nudging closer to that of the Russian Federation. China has swung gradually, and somewhat ambiguously, towards support for Russia primarily due to geopolitical reasons. Also, China and Russia share the desire to put up a united front in response to attempts by the United States and other Western countries to impose their attitudes on other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author argues that the Maidan and subsequent coup in Ukraine were the product of a plan organized by Western intelligence services to subvert the country and turn it into a weapon aimed at destabilizing Russia. The conflict exposed Russian liberals as traitors who want to destroy Russia and are working at the best of the Western powers. As a result of the events in Ukraine, the Russian political leadership will mobilize the population against Russia's external enemies and clean out domestic traitors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the results of a survey of participants in the Maidan and anti-Maidan demonstrations in Kiev, in which he examined images of the West and Russia among respondents. He finds that irrational views and utopian ideas are commonplace among respondents in both groups. He also finds that respondents on both sides tended to be disenchanted with the political system in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the reverberations in Russia of the Euromaidan protests and the fall of the Yanukovych regime in Ukraine. It shows how the events in Kyiv provoked a major crisis in the Russian nationalist movement, which was riven by vituperative denunciations, the ostracism of prominent activists, the breakdown of friendships, the rupture of alliances, and schisms within organizations. Focusing on pro-Kremlin nationalists and several tendencies of opposition nationalists, it argues that this turmoil was shaped by three factors. First, the Euromaidan provoked clashes between pro-Kremlin nationalists, who became standard-bearers of official anti-Euromaidan propaganda, and anti-Putin nationalists, who extolled the Euromaidan as a model for a revolution in Russia itself. Second, the events in Ukraine provoked ideological contention around issues of particular sensitivity to Russian nationalists, such as the competing claims of imperialism and ethnic homogeneity, and of Soviet nationalism and Russian traditionalism. And third, many nationalists were unprepared for the pace of events, which shifted rapidly from an anti-oligarchic uprising in Kyiv to a push for the self-determination of ethnic Russians in Crimean and southeast Ukraine. As a result, they were left in the uncomfortable position of appearing to collaborate with the oppressors of their compatriots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How effective is Russian state television in framing the conflict in Ukraine that began with the Euromaidan protests and what is its impact on Russian Internet users? We carried out a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's “News of the Week” show, which allowed us to identify the two key frames he used to explain the conflict – World War II-era fascism and anti-Americanism. Since Kiselev often reduces these frames to buzzwords, we were able to track the impact of these words on Internet users by examining search query histories on Yandex and Google and by developing quantitative data to complement our qualitative analysis. Our findings show that much of what state media produces is not effective, but that the “fascist” and anti-American frames have had lasting impacts on Russian Internet users. We argue that it does not make sense to speak of competition between a “television party” and an “Internet party” in Russia since state television has a strong impact in setting the agenda for the Internet and society as a whole. Ultimately, the relationship between television and the Internet in Russia is a continual loop, with each affecting the other. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The events in Maidan -- the Independence Square in downtown Kiev -- marked the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, which we can place either on November 21st, 2013 -- the start of the pro-European popular reaction (known as the Euromaidan) to the President Yanukovych' s gesture of suddenly suspending the preparations for the signing of the political and economic Association Agreement between Kiev and the EU, either on February 22nd, 2014 -- Yanukovych' s light from Kiev and the seizing of power by the pro-Western political forces supported by the Maidan. This paper proposes a close analysis of the events that triggered the most important international crisis in the post-Cold War era, the implications of the key international players and the reaction of the Russian Federation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article shares the author's reflection regarding the impacts of the Euromaidan protest to the beliefs and practice of Russian Christian people in Russia. The author states the impacts of political disputes to the international ministries in Eurasia and the influence of secular mass media to Christian people in the country. She also stresses the principle of civic responsibility of Christians influenced by Orthodox and Protestant churches.

An introduction to the article is presented in which the editor discusses various reports published within the issue, including one on the dynamics of the relationship between church and states in the case of contemporary Russia and the history of Ukraine's fractious Orthodox churches in the context of Russian-Ukrainian relations in the period leading up to the EuroMaidan protest in the winter of 2013-2014.

A letter to the editor is presented in response to the article about impacts of the Ukrainian crisis to the religious beliefs and practices of Russian Christians in Ukraine and issues of h atred and animosity among religious institutions in the 2014 issue.