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Objective: The objective of this study was to describe the capture-recapture method used by the Philadelphia Department of Public Health to enhance surveillance of perinatal hepatitis B virus (HBV), report on results and limitations of the process, and determine why some HBV-positive mother-infant pairs were not initially identified by Philadelphia's Perinatal Hepatitis B Prevention Program (PHBPP). Methods: We performed capture-recapture retrospectively for births in 2008 and 2009 in Philadelphia and prospectively for births from 2010 to 2014 by independently matching annual birth certificate data to PHBPP and HBV surveillance data. We compared the number of HBV-positive mother-infant pairs identified each year to the point estimates and lower-limit estimates calculated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for the Philadelphia PHBPP. Results: Of 156 605 pregnancy outcomes identified between 2008 and 2014, we found 1549 HBV-positive mother-infant pairs. Of 705 pairs that were initially determined, 358 (50.7%) were confirmed to be previously unidentified HBV-positive pairs. Reasons for failing to identify these mother-infant pairs prior to capture-recapture included internal administrative issues (n = 191, 53.4%), HBV testing and reporting issues (n = 92, 25.7%), and being lost to follow-up (n = 75, 20.9%). Each year that capture-recapture was used, the number of pairs identified by the Philadelphia PHBPP exceeded the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's lower-limit estimates for HBV-positive mother-infant pairs. Conclusions: Capture-recapture was useful for identifying HBV-positive pregnant women for Philadelphia's PHBPP and for highlighting inadequacies in health department protocols and HBV testing during pregnancy. Other health departments with access to similar data sources and staff members with the necessary technical skills can adapt this method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives. We assessed provider knowledge, attitudes, and practices for the management of breakthrough varicella and identified barriers to implementation of laboratory testing and reporting. Methods. We surveyed 145 health-care providers (HCPs) from 30 pediatric practices in Philadelphia who did not have a history of laboratory testing for breakthrough varicella. The self-administered survey instrument collected information on clinicians' practices for management of children presenting with rash, infection-control strategies, reporting to public health agencies, and laboratory testing. Results. Among the 144 HCPs who completed the survey, 73 (51%) had practiced for more than 10 years. While 115 HCPs (80%) would elect to evaluate a child with rash in the office, only 19 (13%) would submit diagnostics. When patients had a known recent exposure to varicella, 84 HCPs (58%) would use laboratory tests: 40% would use direct fluorescent antibody staining on a specimen from a cutaneous lesion, 24% would use polymerase chain reaction on a lesion specimen, 21% would use acute and convalescent serology, and 10% would use other tests. While waiting for test results, 82 HCPs (57%) would advise that the child be kept at home, 39 (27%) would notify the local health department, and 33 (23%) would inform the school nurse. Conclusion. As varicella becomes increasingly uncommon, laboratory confirmation becomes more critical for appropriate diagnosis, similar to poliomyelitis and measles. Our findings suggest that HCPs need further education regarding laboratory confirmation, containment, and reporting of breakthrough varicella. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a study on the high prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases among adolescents enrolled at a public high school in Philadelphia. The screening and treatment programs need evaluation. The program demonstrated the effectiveness of a school-based screening program in the identification and treatment of the infections.

We report a case of ocular vaccinia infection in an unvaccinated laboratory worker. The patient was infected by a unique strain used in an experiment performed partly outside a biosafety cabinet. Vaccination should continue to be recommended, but laboratories with unvaccinated workers should also implement more stringent biosafety practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

OBJECTIVES: We examined overall and incremental effectiveness of 2-dose varicella vaccination in preventing community transmission of varicella among children aged 4 to 18 years in 2 active surveillance sites. One-dose varicella vaccine effectiveness (VE] was examined in those aged 1 to 18 years. METHODS: From May 2009 through June 2011, varicella cases identified during active surveillance in Antelope Valley, CA and Philadelphia, PA were enrolled into a matched case-control study. Matched controls within 2 years of the patient's age were selected from immunization registries. A standardized questionnaire was administered to participants' parents, and varicella vaccination history was obtained from health care provider, immunization registry, or parent records. We used conditional logistic regression to estimate varicella VE against clinically diagnosed and laboratory-confirmed varicella. RESULTS: A total of 125 clinically diagnosed varicella cases and 408 matched controls were enrolled. Twenty-nine cases were laboratory confirmed. One-dose VE (1-dose versus unvaccinated) was 75.6% (95% confidence interval [CI], 38.7%-90.3%) in preventing any clinically diagnosed varicella and 78.1% (95% CI, 12.7%-94.5%) against moderate or severe, clinically diagnosed disease (≥50 lesions]. Among subjects aged ≥4 years, 2-dose VE (2-dose versus unvaccinated) was 93.6% (95% CI, 75.6%-98.3%) against any varicella and 97.9% (95% CI, 83.0%-99.7%) against moderate or severe varicella. Incremental effectiveness (2-dose versus 1-dose) was 87.5% against clinically diagnosed varicella and 97.3% against laboratory-confirmed varicella. CONCLUSIONS: Two-dose varicella vaccination offered better protection against varicella from community transmission among school-aged children compared with 1-dose vaccination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In early April 2003, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was diagnosed in a Pennsylvania resident after his exposure to persons with SARS in Toronto, Canada. To identify contacts of the case-patient and evaluate the risk for SARS transmission, a detailed epidemiologic investigation was performed. On the basis of this investigation, 26 persons (17 healthcare workers, 4 household contacts, and 5 others) were identified as having had close contact with this case-patient before infection-control practices were implemented. Laboratory evaluation of clinical specimens showed no evidence of transmission of SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection to any close contact of this patient. This investigation documents that, under certain circumstances, SARS-CoV is not readily transmitted to close contacts, despite ample unprotected exposures. Improving the understanding of risk factors for transmission will help focus public health control measures.