Search

The changing and intensifying landscape of global, national, and local disaster risks, driven by socio-political, environmental, and technological shifts, underscores the critical need for risk assessment by international agencies and governments. The Risk Matrix, introduced in 1995, has been widely used for risk assessment in different contexts, lauded for its simplicity and effectiveness. This model relies on the core risk components of consequence and likelihood, making it a favored tool for risk managers. To enhance the precision of risk assessment, various adaptations and extensions of the risk matrix have emerged; while some indirectly address resilience aspects, none explicitly integrate resilience into the matrix. This paper explores the risk matrix and its extensions, advocating for the inclusion of resilience in risk assessment. It introduces an empirical approach to quantify resilience, through a survey targeting small and medium-sized businesses in Southern Ontario, Canada. By developing two types of risk matrices--one with resilience considerations and one without--our work demonstrates how resilience alters risk prioritization, highlighting the importance of preparedness. This research underscores the pivotal role of resilience in risk assessment and urges its explicit integration into risk matrices to enhance accuracy and efficacy. Through practical examples and empirical data, the paper builds a compelling case for the central role of resilience in modern risk assessment practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We study emergency response network design for rail hazmat shipments. • A two-stage stochastic programming model is proposed. • Problem instances based on the infrastructure of a railroad operator is studied. • Design should incorporate information from historical and projected accident data. • Redistribution of assets and emphasizing disutility improves coverage. Railroad is one of the primary transportation modes for hazardous materials (hazmat) shipments in North America. Designing an emergency response network capable of providing commensurate response is one of the primary levers to contain (or mitigate) the adverse consequences from rail hazmat incidents. To this end, we propose a two-stage stochastic programming model to determine the location of response facilities and equipment packages to be stockpiled therein. Several publicly available reports were consulted to estimate the different model parameters, which in turn facilitated the analyses of the case study on a realistic railroad network in Ontario (Canada). Our study suggests that the strategic emergency response network design decision made only on the basis of empirical data would undermine the effectiveness of the resulting network. We also explore several underlying trade-offs in our model, evaluate the incremental benefit of establishing (and stockpiling) additional response facilities. Furthermore, our analyses highlight that the mean coverage can be improved by redistributing the equipment in the network, purchasing equipment with higher containment capacity, and making use of a disutility multiplier factor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]