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This study argues that, from the standpoint of social suffering, the perspective that sees refugees in terms of their "bare life" (Agamben) over-represents the legal-political system and treats them as apolitical subjects. This study posits that when seen not only in the legal-political but also in personal-relationalsocial dimensions, refugees can be understood as political subjects during their transnational journeys from North to South Korea. In-depth interviews with North Korean refugees who have settled in South Korea are used to support this point. Other Asian states approach North Korean refugee migrations according to their own particular social and political circumstances and the refugees describe their experiences of exploitation and social dislocation as "bearable pain" or "temporary pain" in light of the hoped-for survival and legal asylum. While helpful in adapting psychologically or emotionally to adverse circumstances, such perceptions support the continuation of inhumane relationships and unjust practices in the formal and informal socio-economic arena made up of North Korean refugees and the local subjects who interact with them. The lived experiences and storytelling of refugees, however, expose contradictions in the social structure and demonstrate they are political subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to investigate the shift in a policy frame related to recent economic and social changes in North Korea. Most of the reforms in the Kim Jong-il era, including the "July 1, 2002 Economic Management Improvement Measure (EMIM)", failed. In comparison, its policy reforms have been reinstituted since the "June 28 Measure of 2012" in the Kim Jong-un era, and the policy frame in North Korea has been changed with more focus on civilian economic growth. Drawing on the policy framing approach, this article explores policy changes in the Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un eras and analyzes the features of a policy frame in each era in three aspects: framing contention, processes, and tasks. The findings imply that a new policy frame, formed on the Kangsong Taeguk doctrine, has been applied to recent policy changes since 2012 in North Korea in order for reforms to be stably instituted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korean President Moon took a bold initiative to establish peace on the Korean peninsula while denuclearizing North Korea. Though negotiations with North Korea are on the move, controversy about how to deal with North Korea never ends. Optimists argue that Kim Jong Un has made up his mind to give up nuclear weapons and concentrate on economic development They argue that, though slow and conditionally, North Korea is reciprocating to the US and South Korean demands. Thus, optimists take a position of 'trust and engage.' On the other hand, skeptics argue that North Korean goals have never changed and that Kim Jong Un will never give up nuclear weapons. What they are trying to do is delay, deceive, and buy time for nuclear enforcement. Skeptics take a position of 'coerce and verify.' This paper takes a position that we had better test Kim seriously and push to the limit until his ultimate decision can be discerned. Engagement is a viable option than other alternatives like dovish engagement, strategic patience, coercive sanctions, or war. However, there is a proper way to engage North Korea, what the author calls 'conditional engagement.' 'Engage and verify' should be a principle of conditional engagement. Tough and strict conditionalities should be attached to engagement. If you follow this position, negotiating with North Korea should be tougher and more principled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]