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This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player zero-sum game with two-sided incomplete information, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a generalization of the model in Aumann et al. (Repeated games with incomplete information. MIT Press, New York, 1995) of two-player zero-sum one-sided incomplete information games. Under a correlated prior, the informed player faces the problem of how to optimally disclose information among two uninformed players in order to maximize his long-term average payoffs (i.e., undiscounted payoffs). Our objective is to understand the adverse effects of "information spillover" from one game to the other in the equilibrium payoff set of the informed player. We provide conditions under which the informed player can fully overcome such adverse effects and characterize equilibrium payoffs. In a second result, we show how the effects of information spillover on the equilibrium payoff set of the informed player might be severe. Finally, we compare our findings on the equilibrium-payoff set of the informed player with those of Bayesian Persuasion models with multiple receivers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work proposes a method for the intelligent deployment of distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. In recent years, in the field of moving target defense (MTD) strategies to detect coordinated cyber–physical attacks (CCPAs), establishing how to deploy D-FACTS devices has become an important research point. Although some research results have been proposed, the obtained deployment solutions are unintelligent due to not carefully considering smart attackers' behaviors. A method for achieving the intelligent deployment of D-FACTS devices is proposed in this paper. First, the basic concept of corrupting CCPAs is summarized; second, based on considering practical constraints and the basic concept, a protected transmission line set is confirmed; and third, a zero-sum game model is formulated, and a robust Nash equilibrium solution is computed. Due to the game's characteristics, this solution reflects the smart attackers' sense of action. Relying on the solution, those lines that are most likely to be tripped form a new protected transmission line set. Finally, a comprehensive algorithm using a metric proposed in previous studies is proposed for finding an intelligent solution for the deployment of D-FACTS devices. We validated our results through extensive simulations using IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus, and 118-bus power systems provided by MATPOWER and the real-world load profiles from New York State. Our work, in tracking the targets that attackers are most likely to attack, opens up new ideas for the intelligent deployment of D-FACTS devices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]