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An important condition for optimal health insurance is that the level of health care coverage is inversely related to the elasticity of demand. We show that this condition is not satisfied for voluntary deductibles in the Netherlands, which are optional deductibles on top of the mandatory deductible introduced by the Dutch government. We find that low-risk types, that mainly choose voluntary deductibles, have a lower elasticity of demand than high-risk types. Moreover, we show that voluntary deductibles introduce equity problems as it results in non-trivial cross subsidies from high-risk to low-risk types. Capping the level of voluntary deductibles (imposing minimum generosity) is likely to be welfare enhancing in the Netherlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Demand-side cost-sharing reduces moral hazard in healthcare but increases exposure to out-of-pocket expenditure. We introduce a structural microsimulation model to evaluate both total and out-of-pocket expenditure for different cost-sharing schemes. We use a Bayesian mixture model to capture the healthcare expenditure distributions across different age-gender categories. We estimate the model using Dutch data and simulate outcomes for a number of policies. The model suggests that for a deductible of 300 euros shifting the starting point of the deductible away from zero to 400 euros leads to an average 4% reduction in healthcare expenditure and 47% lower out-of-pocket payments., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)