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The problem of narcotics trafficking (and more recently, methamphetamine production and trafficking) in Myanmar has been a regional and international problem for decades. The issue must be approached as an economic and social problem rather than a political or military one. The approaches must be multinational and multi-discipline, taking into account the economic, commercial, political, and social issues that force the cultivation of the opium poppy and the production of illegal drugs in the Shan State. This multi-dimensional approach is preferable whether the present military government or a democratic alternative holds power in Yangon. The problems include the lack of viable alternative crops, nonexistent transportation, the problem of armed gangs (whether ethnic or economic in nature), the lack of government presence, and the historical inability of the Myanmar armed forces to control the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do regimes delegate authority over a territory to nonstate militias, in effect voluntarily sacrificing their monopoly over the use of violence? This article argues that two factors increase the probability of states delegating control to a proxy militia, namely, military purges and armed conflict. Military purges disrupt intelligence-gathering structures and the organizational capacity of the military. To counteract this disruption, military leaders subcontract the task of control and repression to allied militias that have the local intelligence skills necessary to manage the civilian population. This argument is conditioned by whether the state faces an armed insurgency in a given region since intelligence, control, and repression are needed most where the state is being challenged. This hypothesis is tested on unique data for all subnational regions within Myanmar during the period 1962 to 2010 and finds that proxy militias are more likely to be raised in conflict areas after military purges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]