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Danielle Pletka is a distinguished senior fellow in foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where she focuses on US foreign policy generally and the Middle East specifically. Until January 2020, Ms. Pletka was the senior vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at AEI. Concurrently, she also teaches US Middle East policy at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. On a visit to Sydney, sponsored by the Australia Israel & Jewish Affairs Council, Danielle Pletka gave an update on relations between the US and Israel during the Israel-Gaza conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past 15 years, there have been increasing calls for the United States to reduce its overseas force structure and to bring troops home. Such discussion accelerated during the Trump administration, and perceptions of American retrenchment were heightened by President Joe Biden's decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. This article asks the key question: Is Washington really engaging in a systematic pullout from the Middle East? Based on publicly available evidence, I argue that, contrary to common perceptions, the American military is actually increasing its forward presence in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf region. In addition, I contend that the two other states that have the potential to replace the United States in the Middle East, Russia and China, are for multiple reasons incapable of doing so. In addition to puncturing the myths, the article contributes to the ongoing policy debates and theoretical literatures regarding Middle East security and great‐power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The paper analyses offices of individual Venetian rectors in the eastern Adriatic cities of the 13th century, in the period after the IV Crusade, when Venice intensified its expansion toward the Levant. In this process, a very important role was played by representatives of the authorities (counts, podestàs, rectors) who supervised the areas entrusted to them and applied in them Venetian laws, as well as introducing the necessary institutions and urban models created in Venice. During the dogeships of Giacomo Tiepolo and later his son Lorenzo, the installation of patricians of certain families close to the new policy, but also of some other families from this area, is analysed. Some rectors were sent to the cities because of the doge’s policy or for military, economic reasons, or with the purpose of planning of the city. In any case, their circulation in the governmental positions of the eastern Adriatic and beyond had a great impact on the exchange of experiences and knowledge, but also on Venice’s relations with the local communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ankara Review of European Studies (ARES) / Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi (AAÇD) is the property of Ankara University European Union Research Centre and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What is the purpose of the modern nation-state and what drives its main functions? This analysis attempts to provide an answer by examining the correlates of state spending on military and public health in the Middle East and North Africa. I draw on theories of states and power, identifying the dual nature of modern nation-states, and argue that spending on military and social policy is shaped largely by domestic institutional arrangements. Theories from comparative politics, sociology, and political economy are operationalized. I consider hypotheses derived from each using pooled cross-sectional time series analysis with macroeconomic data and sociopolitical indicators. Analysis shows that democratic institutions generate spending in both areas, while governing capacity is associated with decreases in military and increases in public health spending. The regression also suggests the unrest of 2011 generated increases in military spending. Overall, these findings provide support for the notion that institutional arrangements largely determine state spending priorities and provide other insights relevant to the theories being tested. This paper extends our understanding of state behaviors vis-à-vis state spending in the context of social unrest. In light of these findings, I theorize that state behavior is molded by the triangular relationship between state, economy, and civil society, and I discuss the need to consider military expenditures in institutional analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The winding down of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has prompted a scholarly debate around America’s evolving strategic role and posture in the broader Middle East. Allegedly, its isolated geographical position and “seapower” condition would allow the US to behave as an “offshore balancer”, by pulling back militarily, retreating from alliances and formal security commitments and relying on the different regional powers to balance each other. However, it remains unclear to what extent a seapower like the US would be able to effectively manipulate the balance of power in the Middle East from offshore. An examination of US strategy in the Middle East from 2009 to 2015 suggests that the main puzzle Washington confronts is not so much whether to retreat offshore or remain engaged onshore, but rather to work out the terms of onshore engagement. As this article shows, current US strategy in the Middle East revolves around the need to reconcile two seemingly contradictory sets of pressures. The first is that war fatigue, financial pressures and the ongoing reorientation of military-strategic resources towards the Asia-Pacific theatre do require that the US cuts back on its engagement elsewhere, including in the Middle East. The second relates to Washington’s deep-seated conviction that there is a direct correlation between US forward presence and the preservation of a favourable balance of power in the Middle East, which is itself critical to the security of other regions, including the Asia-Pacific. By discussing the relationship between seapower and forward presence, this article places US strategic retrenchment in the Middle East in perspective. In particular, the article transcends the rather vague notion of “balancing” and concentrates on US perceptions about which geographical areas in the Middle East need to be balanced, and how, i.e., through which alliances, instruments and policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various aspects of the military and national security policies of nations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and it mentions the threats that the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham terrorist group and a Syrian civil war pose to other countries. Instability and insecurity in Libya are mentioned, along with defence economics and estimated MENA defence expenditures in 2014. An Israeli-Palestine conflict and the United Arab Emirates' national security are examined.

The article discusses Iran's acquisition of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles that can be used in asymmetric warfare against economic infrastructure in the Middle East, particularly in Persian Gulf Arab states. Topics include the vulnerability of oil industry infrastructure in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, tensions related to Iran's nuclear weapons acquisition attempts, and a possible Iranian blockade of the Straits of Hormuz waterway. Also addressed are U.S. and other Western arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other GCC states; air defense systems in nations including Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar; and the acquisition of command and control systems by GCC countries.

The article discusses the significance of the East Mediterranean region for Israeli strategic aims. Topics include U.S. military cooperation with Turkey; relations between Egypt, Israel, and the U.S.; and U.S. Middle East policies in relation to the presence of U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea. Also addressed are Islamist threats to the security of Egypt, conflict over maritime natural gas resources in the Mediterranean Sea, and Russian military influence in the region through a naval task force. Turkey's military policies are noted. Military cooperation between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece is discussed.

Egypt plays a pivotal role in the security of the Middle East as the doorway to Europe and its military expenditure reflects its involvement in the machinations of such an unstable region, showing considerable variation over the last 40 years. These characteristics make it a particularly interesting case study of the determinants of military spending. This paper specifies and estimates an econometric model of the Egyptian demand for military spending, taking into account important strategic and political factors. Both economic and strategic factors are found to play a role in determining military burden/spending, with clear positive effects of lagged military burden, suggesting some sort of institutional inertia, plus negative output and net exports effects. The strategic effect as a result of the impact of Israel’s military burden is mostly positive and significant, though its impact is reduced when the impact of important strategic events are taken into account. The military spending of Egypt’s allies Jordan and Syria generally seems to have had no effect on Egypt’s spending. These results are consistent over a range of econometric techniques. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses militarization of the Middle East. The author focuses on military defense expenditures of each country, main arms importers, and imported weapons categories and their U.S. dollar value in the period 2005-2012. Categories include combat aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters, and armored vehicles. Also mentioned is a military arms trade forecast for the period 2013-2016.

The article discusses international relations and nuclear weaponry, with a focus on potential nuclear capabilities in the Middle East and the cultural and political features that could influence Middle Eastern nuclear strategies. Topics include command and control systems, Islamic views of nuclear weapons, and concern over civilian casualties following deployment in densely populated areas. Additional information is presented on Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons and C3 (command, control, and communications).

This article uses a sequential mixed method approach to examine the origins and persistence of paramilitaries and state-sponsored militias in the developing world. Combining comparative case studies of Southeast Asia and the Middle East with statistical analysis, it shows that revolutionary decolonization produces more decentralized and localized force structures, while direct inheritance of colonial armies leads to more conventional force structures. Subsequently, the level of competition within the regional system influences whether a state can persist in the use of paramilitaries or must transition to a more centralized, conventional force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of UNISCI Discussion Papers is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper (derived from the author's dissertation) is written from an Israeli perspective and examines the Israeli political leadership's Grand Strategy and Defence policy and approach to the use of force in the 2009 Gaza Campaign. It examines whether the Israeli Asymmetrical Deterrence approach, as implemented in the Gaza Campaign, will lead to a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East, or whether the region on its way to another period of increased bloodshed. Drawing upon the geopolitical struggle in the region as well as analysing the challenges of Grand Strategy, the Nature of War, Deterrence and the so called idea of 'Victory,' in the contemporary Middle East, this paper sets out to demonstrate how an historic and strategic opportunity to achieve a stable and secure solution between Israel and the Palestinians has emerged. The aim, therefore, is to examine the Israeli strategic perceptions and the author's interpretations of the course of events in Gaza 2009, and as such is written from an Israeli point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses regional security issues in the Middle East and North Africa, and surveys the military strategies and capabilities of several nations including Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. For each of these as well as for other countries in the region, discussion is augmented by charts and tabular data that provide the manpower, organization, and equipment for the army, navy, air force, marines, naval aviation, and paramilitary forces, where applicable. Existing deployments of forces are also noted.

This study argues that, in parallel to the developments in the West over the last three decades, several nations and organizations on 'the other side of the hill' have also undertaken a significant development in their military thought. This conceptual development is referred to in the study as the 'Other RMA' ('O-RMA'). This study aims to identify and describe O-RMA, to analyze the learning process that led to it and to trace its intellectual origins. This 'way of war', whose roots lie in a series of dramatic and tumultuous events that took place in the Middle East between the years 1979 and 1982, is based on the following components: Improving absorption capability, in order to increase survivability and provide a breathing space for the 'weaker side', creating effective deterrence, in order to deter the 'stronger side' from attacking the 'weaker side' and shifting the war to more convenient areas in case this deterrent fails; and winning the war by not losing it, while creating an attrition effect. O-RMA is an exceptionally eclectic conception and its development was not intentional or systematic. This study claims that the main ideas that underlie this conceptual development evolved within the different elements, while maintaining a common image, concerning the military, technological, economic, social and political developments in the West during the 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the military posture of nations in the Middle East and North Africa. Topics include a survey of contemporary developments including the war in Iraq and tension between Iran and the West, as well as a survey of the military spending, readiness, and capabilities for nations in the region.

Although a great deal has been written about British policy in the Middle East in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the reorganization of the Southern flank of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe after the admission of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the assumption of NATO's naval Mediterranean Command by Britain has attracted little attention. This article analyses British aims and policy on the formation of the Mediterranean Command, the talks between London and Washington concerning the appointment of a Naval Commander-in-Chief, the attitudes of France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey towards British policy, and finally, the establishment of NATO's Mediterranean Command in conjunction with the reorganization of SHAPE's Southern flank. For strategic as well as prestige reasons, Britain tried to retain its traditional dominant eastern Mediterranean position by encouraging the establishment of an Allied naval Mediterranean Command under a British Commander-in-Chief. However, the decline of British military and naval power and political influence meant that Britain secured a compromise settlement which only partially satisfied its aspirations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offers opinions on U.S. military policy in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Iraq War. That war is said to show the limits of a large military presence for the U.S. in the region. Large numbers of U.S. forces are seen as actually counterproductive to U.S. interests. By radicalizing large numbers of Middle Eastern residents, the troops generate the terrorists they are supposed to be eliminating. Major U.S. policy goals in the Middle East are outlined, including the suppression of terrorism and political stability securing the region's petroleum reserves. Reducing the U.S. military presence there is said to be the surest means of reaching those goals.

The article discusses about another impending war in the Middle East following the assassination of the chief of military operations of Shoebill, Mad Magnify. According to the article, as early as February 5, 2008, the tensions in the Lebanese-Israeli border rised after Israeli Troops killed a Lebanese drug smuggler connected to Hezbollah and works by collecting intelligence within Israel for Hezbollah. It is believed that this event would make Hezbollah obliged to make a response. It is also reported that Syria is conducting military operations on the belief that Israel would attack.

US policy on peacekeeping in the Middle East is not unitary but derives from the intersection between US strategic policy in the Middle East and US attitudes to peacekeeping in general. During the cold war, the United States supported UN and multinational peacekeeping and observer missions as a means of stabilizing conflicts and avoiding superpower confrontation. In the period between the end of the cold war and 9/11, peacekeeping was minimally relevant in the region. Since 9/11, counter-terrorism concerns and broader efforts to stabilize the region have led the United States to support ambitious NATO, UN and European Union peace operations in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses developments related to the political problems and defense policies of countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Iran has shown signs of a region-wide campaign against the U.S. and its allies because of its continuing support for Shia militias and Hizbullah. The goal of national unity in Iraq has remained elusive as sectarian violence and insurgent attacks continue to increase. Egypt has signed an agreement with the U.S. for the acquisition of air-defense units.

The article presents a study on the allied strategic and military interest in the Middle East after the Second World War. The Middle East theater played a critical role in the contingency plans to deal with the event of the new conflict in the first decade after the Second World War. John Foster Dulles, the Republican Secretary of State, who took office under President Dwight Eisenhower transformed by allied strategy.

Students of Middle Eastern policy and policy-makers in Europe and the United States have traditionally addressed the two Middle East subsystems – the Persian Gulf and the Levant – separately. This assumption was challenged by the July War from 12 July to 14 August 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah, largely seen as a proxy contest between Israel and Iran. This article examines the historical relationship between Tel Aviv and Tehran and its deterioration into proxy war. Particular attention is given to the creation of Hezbollah in 1982. The article also identifies the major changes in the emerging security environment in the Middle East following the 2006 war. The experience of the war shows that military means no longer are sufficient to end Middle East conflict. Although the war occurred largely as part of a reaction against the Middle East peace process, the experience reaffirms the overwhelming importance of a long-term solution that establishes a genuine peace between Israel and its neighbours and creates rapprochement with Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Middle East diplomatic Quartet (composed of the United States, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the Office of the Secretary General of the United Nation) authored and put forward its Road Map to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on April 30, 2003. The Road Map outlined steps to be taken by the parties. It was an ambitious plan that dealt with internal Palestinian security, humanitarian assistance, democratic reform, freedom of movement for Palestinians, Israeli military redeployment, and settlement freeze’all culminating in a permanent status agreement by end of 2005. Needless to say, none of the parties lived up to their sides of the bargain, the Quartet authors included. Implementation was all but nonexistent and the timetable lapsed, but the Quartet has not given up completely and international declarations still pay homage to the Road Map. This memo should be used as a guide for the Quartet on lessons learned and (if willing) the needed steps to see through the objective set forth three years ago. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article describes the processes that have dissolved Israel's cohesive territorial, political and social structures, in the aftermath of both the 1967 (Six Day) and the 1973 (Yom Kippur) Wars. The article also presents the breaching of the Israeli fortification along the Suez Canal by the Egyptian military as breaking geographical preconceptions as well as political hegemonies in the Israeli political system and accelerating the processes of political and territorial dissolution.

If there is no single long-standing American grand strategy, one nonetheless sees through the course of US. history the tracks of a grand strategy. It started with the idea of a US. monopoly in the Western Hemisphere, along with balances of power in the chief theaters of the world; with belief in the primacy of sea and air power and the need for an economic system to support these; and the objective of transforming international politics. Since 9/11, even if the strategic hierarchy, intensity, and political basis have changed, the Bush administration has largely been continuing in this same project, with a sensible strategy but poorly considered tactics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ongoing terrorism and repression in the Middle East has led to enormous passion and divisiveness in the United States and elsewhere, where competing ideological and theological claims have made an objective understanding of the complex issues in these conflicts extremely difficult. International law, however, can rise above such ideologies and partisanship because-whatever its failings- it is based upon certain universal assumptions. International law can provide a single yardstick of behavior that does not assume that one side is "good" and the other side is "bad." While international law, like constitutional law, can be subjected to a variety of interpretations, it is based upon certain universal principles of behavior rather than on the ideology or foreign relations of a particular government of movement. Of the many aspects of international law that pertain to contemporary conflicts in the Middle East, I will focus primarily on those addressed in the United Nations Charter, particularly those related to the use of force, military conquest and occupation, and the role of the UN Security Council. I will focus on four contemporary cases: the United States and Iraq, Turkey and Cyprus, Morocco and Western Sahara, and Israel and Palestine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Argues that international terrorism is rooted on inadequate development, limited employment opportunities and lack of interaction with other cultures and potential trading partners. Reasons behind the origin of terrorist attacks against the West in the Middle East; Role of investment from foreign aid agencies, investment banks and corporations in the restoration of the Middle East as a center of growth and enlightenment; Role of the World Trade Organization; Shifting of the U.S. focus away from military power and toward investment and market development.

Discusses the efforts of the U.S. to project its military might to the region encompassing the Caucasus, Central Asia and Southwestern Asia. Implications for regional politics and U.S. relations with the major powers; Predictions of expansion of U.S. military presence in the region.

Comments on the effect of the terrorist assault which Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization inflicted in September 2001, on the relations of the U.S. with countries in the Middle East. Criticism on the possible consequences of national security policies; Demonstration of the U.S. doctrine of preemptive warfare during its March 2003 invasion of Iraq; Assertion of linkage between Iraq and global terrorism.

Argues that Israel should refocus its nuclear policy to explore ways to leverage its nuclear capability to bring about regional agreement on a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. Anti-democratic implications of the policy; Performance of Israeli nuclear deterrence; Effect of the nuclear policy on the scope of Arab attacks.