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To make public policy recommendations, the deductive method with a qualitative approach was used to identify the empirical correlations between trade, competition, and anti-corruption regulations between Mexico and the United States, within the framework of USMCA. In the light of the findings, it is recommended to limit to a minimum the exceptions available in trade agreements that aim to restrict the application of domestic laws on economic competition and anti- corruption, as well as to standardize the use of the "rule of reason" in competition between administrative and judicial authorities in both countries to harmonize and provide certainty to international transactions and binational production chains. The limitations of this research are those inherent to the subjectivity of the deductive method, but it provides unpublished results as a ground for further investigations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How and why do anti-corruption reforms happen in countries with systemic corruption? This work builds on thirty years of historical evidence from Mexico to develop a model of anti-corruption reform. The three reforms under study --1982, 1995, and 2000-- happened as episodic punctuations after long periods of stability in the anti-corruption sub-system. The reforms were a consequence of exogenous and endogenous shocks that induced the political elite to approve them. The work also stresses the importance that reforming anti-corruption institutions and policies in countries with systemic corruption might have, an understudied subject in the literature --due to the literature's "structural bent", that is, an excessive focus on the economic, political-economic, and democratic structures that contribute to the control of corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]