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By December 2021, administration of the third dose of COVID-19 vaccinations coincided with the spread of the Omicron variant in Europe. Questions had been raised on protection against infection conferred by previous vaccination and/or infection. Our study population included 252,433 participants from the COVID-19 vaccination registry in Malta. Data were then matched with the national testing database. We collected vaccination status, vaccine brand, vaccination date, infection history, and age. Using logistic regression, we examined different combinations of vaccine dose, prior infection status and time, and the odds of infection during the period when the Omicron variant was the dominant variant in Malta. Participants infected with Sars-Cov-2 prior to the Omicron wave had a significantly lower odds of being infected with the Omicron variant. Additionally, the more recent the infection and the more recent the vaccination, the lower the odds of infection. Receiving a third dose within 20 weeks of the start of the Omicron wave in Malta offered similar odds of infection as receiving a second dose within the same period. Time since vaccination was a strong determinant against infection, as was previous infection status and the number of doses taken. This finding reinforces the importance of future booster dose provision especially to vulnerable populations.

Background: In late 2020, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and Epiconcept started implementing a surveillance system for severe acute respiratory infections (SARI) across Europe., Objective: We sought to describe the process of digitizing and upgrading SARI surveillance in Malta, an island country with a centralized health system, during the COVID-19 pandemic from February to November 2021. We described the characteristics of people included in the surveillance system and compared different SARI case definitions, including their advantages and disadvantages. This study also discusses the process, output, and future for SARI and other public health surveillance opportunities., Methods: Malta has one main public hospital where, on admission, patient data are entered into electronic records as free text. Symptoms and comorbidities are manually extracted from these records, whereas other data are collected from registers. Collected data are formatted to produce weekly and monthly reports to inform public health actions. From October 2020 to February 2021, we established an analogue incidence-based system for SARI surveillance. From February 2021 onward, we mapped key stakeholders and digitized most surveillance processes., Results: By November 30, 2021, 903 SARI cases were reported, with 380 (42.1%) positive for SARS-CoV-2. Of all SARI hospitalizations, 69 (7.6%) were admitted to the intensive care unit, 769 (85.2%) were discharged, 27 (3%) are still being treated, and 107 (11.8%) died. Among the 107 patients who died, 96 (89.7%) had more than one underlying condition, the most common of which were hypertension (n=57, 53.3%) and chronic heart disease (n=49, 45.8%)., Conclusions: The implementation of enhanced SARI surveillance in Malta was completed by the end of May 2021, allowing the monitoring of SARI incidence and patient characteristics. A future shift to register-based surveillance should improve SARI detection through automated processes., (©John Paul Cauchi, Maria-Louise Borg, Aušra Džiugytė, Jessica Attard, Tanya Melillo, Graziella Zahra, Christopher Barbara, Michael Spiteri, Allan Drago, Luke Zammit, Joseph Debono, Jorgen Souness, Steve Agius, Sharon Young, Alan Dimech, Ian Chetcuti, Mark Camenzuli, Ivan Borg, Neville Calleja, Lorraine Tabone, Charmaine Gauci, Pauline Vassallo, Joaquin Baruch. Originally published in JMIR Public Health and Surveillance (https://publichealth.jmir.org), 05.12.2022.)

The importation of novel tick species to Europe and the emergence of tick-borne diseases have been of rising concern over the last decades. In May 2019, a total of 349 asylum seekers arrived in Malta by boat. Public health syndromic surveillance was conducted on all migrant boat arrivals. The incidental finding of a tick with anomalous morphology in a newly arrived migrant in Malta prompted an epidemiological investigation. Morphological identification of the tick followed by species identification using keys specific to North Africa was conducted and molecular testing for Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV) was performed. Detailed interview and clinical examination of the case were conducted on arrival and follow-up interviews were undertaken 1- and 4-weeks post-arrival. A Hyalomma rufipes tick was identified on the chest of a 28-year-old male from Sudan. The patient reported malaise and headache on arrival. No further symptoms were reported during follow-up. There was no evidence of previous CCHFV infection or the presence of other ticks or pathogens on the patient. The investigation revealed that the H. rufipes tick had likely been acquired in Libya. This is the first report of the presence of a H. rufipes tick, the main vector for CCHFV, on a recently arrived migrant in Europe. This event highlights the importance of increasing awareness on the risk of tick-borne infections among recently arrived migrants in the Mediterranean countries and the need to consider tick screening as part of the health screening offered in the EU., (Copyright © 2020. Published by Elsevier GmbH.)

Salmonella Give is a rare serotype across Europe. In October 2016, a national outbreak of S. Give occurred in Malta. We describe the epidemiological, environmental, microbiological and veterinary investigations. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) was performed on human, food, environmental and veterinary isolates. Thirty-six human cases were reported between October and November 2016, 10 (28%) of whom required hospitalisation. Twenty-six (72%) cases were linked to four restaurants. S. Give was isolated from ready-to-eat antipasti served by three restaurants which were all supplied by the same local food manufacturer. Food-trace-back investigations identified S. Give in packaged bean dips, ham, pork and an asymptomatic food handler at the manufacturer; inspections found inadequate separation between raw and ready-to-eat food during processing. WGS indicated two genetically distinguishable strains of S. Give with two distinct clusters identified; one cluster linked to the local food manufacturer and a second linked to veterinary samples. Epidemiological, environmental and WGS evidence pointed towards cross-contamination of raw and ready-to-eat foods at the local manufacturer as the likely source of one cluster. Severity of illness indicates a high virulence of this specific serotype. To prevent future cases and outbreaks, adherence to food safety practices at manufacturing level need to be reinforced.