Search

This article studies the violent politics of stigmatisation and erasure of nationalist urban infrastructure. In general, urban infrastructure is a mechanism of state power. But, through the case of the imposing presence of Turkish nationalist infrastructure in the Kurdish city Diyarbakir, it demonstrates that when tied to an antagonistic nationalist political project, this infrastructure is often purposefully built to violently cleanse urban spaces of the national "other". Be it a statue, a mural or a picture of a nationalist leader – this infrastructure is incapable of inflicting physical pain. Nonetheless, its violence is symbolic and meant to have a real effect on Diyarbakir's Kurds' ability and willingness to identify as Kurds. That said, violence does not entirely inform the spatial experience of those targeted by this nationalist infrastructure. The article demonstrates that Kurdish residents also found ways of remaining unaffected, even treating the infrastructure laden with Turkish nationalist iconography as a reminder of their own Kurdish identity. This article thus expands our understanding of what nationalist infrastructure does. It may be designed to be violent. However, it also reveals itself to be a site of contestation – equally inspiring the persistence of the counter-narrative of the national "other". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rather than addressing the Kurdish conflict in Turkey directly, this study focuses on how the rising nationalist populism bears on Kurdish voters supporting the pro‐Kurdish party HDP. There are very few studies on how Kurds are affected by the nationalist populism often expressed in Turkey by the governing People's Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı) with its slogan "domestic and national," even though the literature offers a broad variety of studies on the Kurdish conflict. To fill this gap, this study is supported by focus group discussions with the Kurds in Turkey who support the HDP, based on a sample of the Kurds living in Istanbul, which is sometimes referred to as the "largest Kurdish city." This study claims that the populist slogan of the "domestic and national" not only marginalises the Kurdish interviewees but also weakens their sense of belonging to Turkey, thus encouraging them to establish their own national identities. An important result of the focus group meetings is that AKP's polarising policy not only causes polarisation among Turks but also among the Kurds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cultural imperialism thesis that emerged in late 20th century focused on inequalities in the West driven global flow of culture and communication, and how that adversely affected the cultural conditions of nations in the so called Third World. However, the core–periphery dynamic at the root of cultural imperialism has not merely been confined to the transnational level, from the West to the Rest. It has existed at the national level as well. Conducting a historical examination of state policy vis-à-vis Kurdish culture in Turkey, and drawing on the theories of cultural imperialism, internal colonialism and nationalism, I develop the concept of internal cultural imperialism to capture the state of severe center peripheral cultural imbalance that has been a product of Turkish nationalist ideology and its policies of cultural homogenization. In hegemonic condition, the state's ultimate goal has been to subjugate and/or possibly eradicate the cultures of non-core groups within its territory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imagined contact has been argued to reduce prejudice. Although extant research supports this argument, replication attempts have been unsuccessful. To resolve conflicting evidence from previous studies, this study examined the effect of imagined contact on explicit and implicit prejudice against Kurds and Syrians in Turkey. Using data from 335 Turkish undergraduate students, the moderating role of ethnic and national identification in the imagined contact effect was tested. Results indicated that imagined contact did not reduce prejudice, and in-group identification did not have a moderating effect, even after controlling for actual contact. These findings call for a theoretical refinement to the imagined contact hypothesis and emphasize the need for further research to advance our understanding of when imagined contact works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, Iraqi Kurds have made unprecedented political gains due to their alliance with the United States and the key role they have played in the post-Saddam government in Baghdad. Although Iraqi Kurds yearn for independence, their leaders have refrained from following such a course in view of Turkish and Iranian anxieties that an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq would stimulate nationalism among their restive Kurdish populations. Turkey and Iran have warned Iraqi Kurdish leaders against pursuing independence, and the former has warned the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) against plans to incorporate oil-rich Kirkuk. Although both countries engage in mutually beneficial trade with the KRG, the Turkish and Iranian governments have quarrelled with the Kurdish leadership over the activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), which have used KRG territory to launch attacks against Turkey and Iran respectively. In view of the acute vulnerability of Iraqi Kurdistan, prudence requires that the Iraqi Kurdish leadership avoid any needless provocation of Turkey and Iran, and to refrain from any hasty move toward independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Kurdish politics in Turkey. The Kurdish political activism in Turkey started during the late 1950s and early 1960s that initiated the Kurdish nationalism against the Turkish state. Relative to this, the government of Turkey remedied the situation by means of oppression and assimilation while the Kurdish nationals and political organizations developed an oppositional discourse to counteract the plans of Turkey. The Kurds also started to appropriate a socialist discourse that stresses economic exploitation and national oppression of the Kurdish peasants.

Presents an analysis of the policies of Turkey toward the development of nationalism, capitalism and state formation in Kurdistan-Iraq and Iraq in 2005. Elections in the provinces of Iraq and for the Kurdish parliament; Reason of the U.S. to involve Turkey in the rebuilding and economic development of Iraq; Commitment of Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan to participate in the U.S. Wider Middle East Initiative.

The Partia Karkare Kurdistan, or the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK) campaign of violence has cost Turkey about 30,000 lives and billions of dollars. In 20 years the organization made great efforts to create a Kurdish nation and to establish a separate state. However the lack of popular support forced the PKK to shift its policies. In fact the PKK movement is no exception. All Kurdist movements in Turkey's history have failed. This article looks at the reasons of this failure. According to the authors the ethnic origin, history, and demography did not provide a suitable environment for Kurdish nationalism, particularly in the Anatolian territories. The study focuses on the ethnic origin of the Kurds, their current perceptions, sociological and cultural descriptions of the Kurds, demography and their impact on Kurdish uprisings and separatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]